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1.1 PALM OIL PRODUCTION AND SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATION 
The concept of sustainable development has been widely applied to a broad range of 
issues, including agriculture (Du Pisani 2006). Sustainable agriculture refers to environ-
mentally sound, productive, economically viable, and socially acceptable agricultural 
practices (Hall 1998, Schaller 1993, Senanayake 1991). However, debates on the mean-
ing of sustainable agriculture in a developing context have not been conclusively settled. 
Agricultural expansion has been blamed for causing various problems, including defor-
estation and destruction of wildlife habitat, environmental degradation (such as poor 
water and soil quality), and unhealthy and unsafe working conditions due to the exces-
sive use of chemicals (Schaller 1993). This dissertation focuses on an agricultural com-
modity that has been the target of a great deal of criticism in the field of sustainability: 
palm oil in Indonesia. 
The oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) is an ancient tropical plant originating in West Africa. 
The first oil palm seedlings were brought from Bourbon (Mauritius) to Indonesia by 
Dutch tobacco planters in 1848 and planted in the botanical garden of Bogor in Java as 
ornamental plants. The first commercial oil palm plantations were established in the East 
Coast of Sumatra (in Pulu Raja-Asahan and Sungai Liput-Aceh) in 1911 (Badrun 2010). 
However, due to an unstable political situation, structural development of oil palm plan-
tations did not get off the ground until the 1970s. The development and expansion of 
palm oil plantations increased significantly after plantation development became an 
important topic in governmental policies for agriculture. These policies mainly focused 
on the provision of credit for private plantation companies and the introduction of the 
Nucleus Estate Smallholders (NES) financing program (Budidarsono et al. 2013). 
The expansion of oil palm plantations was also triggered by increasing demands for 
palm oil in the global market and awareness that the production of palm oil may con-
tribute to economic development, as it creates job opportunities in rural areas and gen-
erates government revenues from exports (Rifin 2013, Rist et al. 2010). However, and 
more on the negative side, many studies show that the expansion of oil palm plantations 
generally takes place in tropical forest and peat land areas, resulting in the loss of wild-
life habitat (Obidzinski et al. 2012, Sheil et al. 2009); loss of biodiversity (Koh and Wilcove 
2008, Wilcove and Koh 2010, Fitzherbert et al. 2008); and greenhouse gas emissions 
(Sheil et al. 2009, Fargione et al. 2008). The expansion of oil palm plantations also often 
lies at the core of social conflicts between companies and local communities, or be-
tween local communities and migrants (Obidzinski et al. 2012, Marti 2008, Colchester 
and Jiwan 2006).  
Many initiatives, mainly initiated by Northern non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and businesses, aim to improve the sustainability of agricultural production in 
Southern Countries (Bitzer and Glasbergen 2015). These private initiatives comprise 
sustainability standards, i.e. documented agreements containing specific criteria to be 
used consistently as rules, guidelines or definitions, to ensure that products and pro-
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cesses fit sustainability purposes. They use certification, i.e. a procedure by which a third 
party gives written assurance that a product and process is in conformity with sustaina-
bility standards, as the main instrument to govern agricultural production (Dankers 
2003). Private sustainability initiatives can be considered value chain approaches, as 
Northern manufacturers and retailers in collaboration with NGOs define the sustainabil-
ity standards that are channeled down to producers in Southern countries as a prerequi-
site to enter (parts of) the international market. The most important initiative for the 
governance of palm oil production in Indonesia is the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm 
Oil (RSPO). Originally, this initiative was mainly directed at large estate companies, which 
have the means to comply with the sustainability standards that are part of the certifica-
tion (Lee et al. 2011). More recently, the RSPO established a Smallholder Task Force 
(STF) to decompose the standards in a set of Principles and Criteria (PnC) that are more 
relevant for, and applicable to, smallholders. The RSPO also launched a Smallholders’ 
Fund Initiative (SFI) to financially support smallholders in the certification process 
(Pesqueira and Glasbergen 2013). In 2009, the Indonesian government also took up the 
idea to improve the sustainability of palm oil production, and initiated its own sustaina-
bility standard: Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO). ISPO is a public sustainability 
standard system that is mandatory and intends to certify all palm oil companies, includ-
ing smallholders, in the near future.  
Smallholders are a relevant group of producers as they own 41% of the Indonesian 
oil palm plantations (in terms of land area) and are large in number: more than two 
million farmers in 2016. As smallholder inclusiveness and participation are necessary to 
realize sustainability changes at a production level, smallholders can be considered gate-
keepers of sustainability in palm oil production. Smallholders, however, are vulnerable 
(Mol 2007). First, because they experience uncertainties in access to the market and are 
often confronted with price fluctuations (Vermeulen and Goad 2006). Second, palm oil 
smallholders are dependent on companies or middlemen to sell their products 
(Papenfus 2000), which implies a low bargaining power compared to other actors in the 
value chain. Moreover, palm oil smallholders lack capital and up-to-date agronomic 
knowledge, and consequently their productivity is far below its potential (Brandi et al. 
2013, Marti 2008, Papenfus 2000). Participation of smallholders in sustainability stand-
ard systems and certification is generally expected to accelerate a transformation to-
wards more sustainable palm oil production and simultaneously improve smallholders’ 
livelihoods.  
The impact of sustainability certification on smallholders’ livelihoods is still debated 
(Bitzer et al. 2012, Auld 2010, Méndez et al. 2010, Blackman and Rivera 2010) and re-
mains inconclusive (Beuchelt and Zeller 2012). Many impact studies on certification have 
studied coffee smallholders (see Ayuya et al. 2015, Jena et al. 2012, Ruben and Fort 
2012, Barham and Weber 2012, Méndez et al. 2010, Arnould et al. 2009, Bacon et al. 
2008, Bacon 2005). Impact studies with a focus on palm oil certification are still rare. 
This dissertation aims to contribute to our knowledge about the impacts of sustainability 
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certification on the livelihoods of palm oil smallholders in Indonesia from a smallholders’ 
perspective, while differentiating between different types of smallholders based on 
differences in their social context of production. 
This introductory chapter will first specify the concept of smallholder and sketch a 
profile of a smallholder as the focal point of this dissertation (section 1.2 and section 
1.3). Next, we will elaborate on the context in which Indonesian palm oil smallholders 
operate (section 1.4), before we review research on sustainability certification (section 
1.5). Based on the literature review, the objectives and research questions of this study 
will be presented (section 1.6). Next, the key concepts (section 1.7), research methodol-
ogy (section 1.8) and relevance of this study (section 1.9) will be explicated.  
1.2 PROFILE OF THE INDONESIAN PALM OIL SMALLHOLDER 
A blueprint of what being a smallholder entails cannot be given, as several combinations 
of criteria and indicators have been used to define smallholders. Examples include orien-
tation (i.e. subsistence in addition to the market), relatively small landholding sizes, labor 
input (i.e. a high ratio between family labor and hired labor), having the main responsi-
bility for a farm’s management, and limited income (Calcaterra 2013). Among those 
criteria, limited landholding sizes represents the most frequently used variable to define 
smallholders (Calcaterra 2013). The RSPO defines palm oil smallholders as “farmers 
growing palms sometimes along with subsistence production of other crops, where the 
family provides the majority of labor and the farm provides the principal source of in-
come and where the planted area of oil palm is usually below 50 hectares in size.” The 
Ministry of Agriculture in Indonesia defines smallholders as “farmers owning plantations 
smaller than 25 ha” (Regulation No. 33/Permentan/OT.140 /7/2006). However, in prac-
tice, most Indonesian palm oil smallholders own plantations that are, in terms of size, far 
below the baselines mentioned in these definitions. On average, oil palm plantations 
owned by Indonesian smallholders are 3.6 ha in size and 18 years old. The majority of 
smallholders plant oil palms in non-peat land areas, which used to consist of secondary 
forest (re-grown forest after timber harvest) or primary forest (primeval, previously 
untouched forest). The average productivity equals 19 ton/ha/year. The average age of 
smallholders is 44, and the majority of smallholders only went to elementary school. 
More than 90% of the smallholders in our study depend on palm oil as their main source 
of income and more than 80% uses family labor to manage their plantation. Moreover, 
the majority of these smallholders have an additional income, either from cultivating 
other crops such as rubber or paddy, or from working as agricultural contractor or trad-
er.   
Based on this profile and in this study, we define smallholders as farmers owning a 
plantation of no more than 4 ha (2 kapling), depending almost completely on oil palm as 
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their main source of income, and using primarily family labor to manage (parts of) their 
plantations.  
1.3 DIFFERENT TYPES OF SMALLHOLDERS 
Based on our definition we can distinguish different types of Indonesian palm oil small-
holders. A distinction that is often made in the literature (see for example Brandi et al. 
2015, Lee et al. 2014, Feintrenie et al. 2010) divides smallholders into scheme small-
holders and independent smallholders. Scheme smallholders are farmers whose oil palm 
plantations were established by private and/or public companies and who used external 
financial sources for the establishment of their plantations. Independent smallholders 
established their oil palm plantations autonomously and with their own resources.  
Scheme smallholders 
Scheme smallholders can be further differentiated based on the financial program and 
management system they are part of. The first sub-category contains smallholders who 
initially joined the Nucleus Estate Smallholders (NES) financing program from the late 
1970s till the 1990s. The NES program was initiated by the Indonesian government in 
response to advice from the World Bank to provide credits to farmers for establishing oil 
palm plantations. These credits had to be repaid by the farmers. NES scheme smallhold-
ers further cultivate their oil palm plantations with ongoing monetary and/or non-
monetary support from either the government or private companies (mostly mills), in-
cluding technical assistance, input provisions, and guaranteed purchase of the oil palm’s 
fruits, called Fresh Fruit Bunch or FFB. They manage their plantation independently (i.e. 
self-management). In 1992 the NES program was replaced by a similar, but new program 
called KKPA (Koperasi Kredit Primer untuk Anggota, or in English: Primary Cooperative 
Credit for Members) which ran till 2006 (Pramudya et al. 2017). The KKPA program – the 
members of which represent the second sub-category of scheme smallholders – is simi-
lar to the NES program in the sense that it provides credit for the establishment of plan-
tations and ongoing support to the smallholders. It differs with respect to giving more 
responsibility to cooperatives and companies and taking away management responsibili-
ties from the smallholders. The underlying reason was that this shift in responsibilities 
may contribute to improving the productivity of oil palms. Because of this we see a new 
group of smallholders emerging: scheme smallholders under manajemen satu atap (one-
roof management) which implies that cooperatives assigned by the companies manage 
the plantation administratively. The cooperatives then pay the smallholders for their 
palm oil harvest and/or their work on the plantation on a monthly basis (Gillespie 2012). 
This also implies that smallholders do not necessarily work on the plot of land they own; 
they may be asked to work on any plot belonging to the KKPA. Not all farmers under the 
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KKPA program are part of this one-roof management system. Some are still self-
managed, and therefore very similar to the NES smallholders described earlier. Since 
2006, there are no structural, long-term support systems from the Indonesian govern-
ment anymore. Structural funding has been replaced by smaller funding initiatives, for 
example for replanting and for a reduction of credit interest. Companies wishing to es-
tablish a palm oil plantation can still use a scheme-smallholder construction, but we 
have hardly observed such initiatives in the field anymore after 2006. 
Independent smallholders 
Although independent smallholders establish and manage their plantations ‘fully inde-
pendently’, they collaborate with other actors (i.e. middlemen, NGOs or companies) to 
access credit, receive training or sell their FFB. Independent smallholders collaborating 
with middlemen cultivate their oil palms with their own resources. The number of inde-
pendent smallholders in Riau, one of the most important palm oil-producing regions in 
Indonesia, has increased as from 1995 when government regulations allowed investors 
to establish oil palm mills without owning an oil palm plantation (Budidarsono et al. 
2013), which led to a sharp increase in the demand for FFB from independent small-
holders. Independent smallholders often collaborate with middlemen because these can 
provide credit at the moment the smallholders need it (for example when they need to 
buy fertilizer). As a reciprocity, the smallholder agrees to, at a later moment, sell a spe-
cific amount of their FFB to the same middlemen (Susanti and Burgers 2011), often at a 
preset price. The next sub-category encompasses independent smallholders collaborat-
ing with companies. These smallholders differ from the previous ones as they are tied to 
a specific mill through a formal contract. The contract states that the smallholder should 
sell all FFB to the mill under contract. To guarantee the receipt of good quality FFB, the 
mill usually arranges support (i.e. training or road maintenance) for the farmers via the 
farmer groups. Another sub-category comprises independent smallholders collaborating 
with NGOs. This type of smallholder emerged relatively recently in a response to private 
certification, as RSPO recommends a formal relation between farmers and an NGO or 
company (previous category) in order to become certified. NGOs strengthen the way in 
which these smallholders are organized and provide training on Good Agricultural Prac-
tices (GAP) and certification. These smallholders are not tied to specific mills, but sell 
their FFB to cooperatives that subsequently choose the mill to whom they want to sell 
their FFB.  
Certified smallholders 
As from the 1990s, palm oil smallholders are increasingly confronted with sustainability 
standards and certification. The first initiative was the RSPO, initiated in 2004 by Unilever 
in collaboration with the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), which aims to set standards to 
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improve the environmental conditions of palm oil production while simultaneously serv-
ing the social and economic interests of the producers. It does so through setting stand-
ards and verifying compliance. The RSPO works via NGOs or companies who organize 
training for the farmers to comply with the criteria. Producers who meet the standards 
may become certified. The miller companies (farmer organizations in the case of inde-
pendent smallholders) hold the certificates and also pay for the costs of certification. 
The farmers benefit in the form of premium prices (additional price resulting from the 
higher quality of their FFB) and premium fees (resulting from the approved certified 
CPO/FFB). Given the RSPO’s way of working, and the recommendation that farmers 
should collaborate with NGOs or companies, RSPO certification is not accessible to all 
farmers. Independent smallholders collaborating with middlemen, and scheme small-
holders under the KKPA one-roof management system are currently excluded from RSPO 
certification. More recently, a public certification scheme called ISPO was initiated by the 
Indonesian national government. ISPO is inspired by the RSPO to a great extent, but 
differs a bit in its standards and, unlike the RSPO which has a voluntary character, the 
intention is to make the scheme compulsory for companies first and later also for small-
holders. 
Table 1. Summary of different types of palm oil smallholders in Indonesia 
 Connection Management system Actor of collaboration RSPO certified versus 
uncertified 
1 Independent Self-management Miller company Certified 
2 Independent Self-management NGO Certified 
3 Independent Self-management Middlemen Uncertified  
4 Scheme KKPA One-roof management Miller company Uncertified 
5 Scheme NES or KKPA Self-management  Miller company Certified and uncerti-
fied  
 
The exact numbers of smallholders in each category are not documented, and are 
therefore largely unknown. During our research, however, we have seen that a small 
majority of Indonesian palm oil smallholders (i.e. around 60%) can be considered inde-
pendent. From the independent smallholders, most smallholders collaborate with mid-
dlemen. In the category of scheme smallholders, we see that most are Nucleus Estate 
Smallholders (NES)/KKPA smallholders under self-management, followed by KKPA small-
holders under one-roof management. Relatively few smallholders are independently 
collaborating with companies and/or NGOs. In this dissertation we use these categories 
(see Table 1) to analyze different ways in which the different smallholders relate to, and 
potentially benefit from, certification. 
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1.4 THE ACTOR-NETWORK CONTEXT OF SMALLHOLDERS 
We already touched upon some actors Indonesian smallholders directly or indirectly 
collaborate with. This section further elaborates on the institutional context in which the 
palm oil smallholders’ livelihoods are embedded (see Figure 1). Smallholders are at the 
bottom of the value chain and are generally regarded as the most powerless actors in 
the value chain (McCarthy et al. 2012). They operate in the same value chain as estate 
companies and are confronted with international and national initiatives that intend to 
change their production practices toward more sustainable production. Whether small-
holders will succeed in meeting sustainability standards and benefit from participation in 
certification depends also on actions undertaken by other actors in the value chain (e.g. 
verification of compliance, demand for sustainable palm oil, the materialization of ISPO, 
and support for farmers). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  
Five types of smallholders:  
ID-COM = (Semi) Independent smallholders collaborating with company 
ID-NGO = (Semi) Independent smallholders collaborating with NGOs 
ID-MID = (Fully) Independent smallholders collaborating (informally) with middlemen 
KKPA = Koperasi Kredit Primer untuk Anggota, scheme smallholders (partly one-roof management) 
NES  = Nucleus Estate Smallholders, scheme smallholders (self-management)  
Figure 1. Overview of actors in the palm oil value chain and their relationships with (different types of) small-
holders  
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Miller companies  
Indonesian smallholders own around 4.8 million hectares of oil palm plantations (equally 
41%); another 6.9 million hectares of oil palm plantations (equally 59%) belong to (public 
and private) companies (known as estate plantations) (Directorate General of Estate 
Crops 2016). Approximately 1,500 companies are currently active in palm oil production 
in Indonesia. These companies are diverse in terms of concession sizes. According to the 
Directorate General of Estate Crops (2016), approximately 3% of the oil palm estate 
plantation area is managed by foreign private companies, 11% belongs to public compa-
nies and 86% is managed by private national investment companies. Most companies 
have their own mill and are therefore able to directly process their Fresh Fruit Bunch 
(FFB) into Crude Palm Oil (CPO) and Palm Kernel Oil (PKO). Both CPO and PKO belong to 
the edible plant oils, although PKO is more saturated. Oil palm fruits contain more CPO 
than PKO, as the latter is only derived from the relatively small kernel of the fruits. CPO is 
the most widely consumed vegetable oil worldwide (see Figure 2). About half of the 
packed products in supermarkets, including food and cosmetics, contain palm oil. Com-
panies and smallholders together produce around 31.5 million ton of Indonesian Crude 
Palm Oil (CPO) per year.  Roughly 80% of this production is exported and 20% is used in 
the domestic market.  
 
Source: Food Agricultural Services (2016) 
Figure 2. Global consumption of vegetable oils in 2016  
All types of palm oil smallholders depend on miller companies to sell their Fresh Fruit 
Bunch (FFB), although fully independent smallholders do not have direct relationships 
with companies, because they sell FFB through middlemen and traders (see Figure 1, ID-
MID). Large traders are tied to miller companies through a formal contract. This contract 
specifies the quantity of palm oil that the large trader should deliver to the miller every 
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year. If large traders do not succeed in meeting the specified quota, their selling quota 
(and with it, their income) will be reduced in the following year. To meet selling quotas, 
large traders build informal relationships with middlemen and (more rarely) with small-
holders. Through these relationships, large traders provide support to middlemen in the 
form of financial credit or the provision of transportation (e.g. trucks). Middlemen may 
subsequently use this financial support to provide financial credit, fertilizers, pesticides, 
and means of transportation to smallholders. As an act of reciprocity for the provided 
credit or inputs, traders (and middlemen) expect the middlemen (and smallholders) to 
deliver specific amounts of FFB at predetermined prices.  
Independent smallholders collaborating with companies and NGOs are organized in a 
farmer association or Gabungan Kelompok Tani or farmer group (GAPOKTAN), and 
through the farmer organizations they can sell their FFB directly to (their affiliated) miller 
company (see Figure 1, ID-COM and ID-NGO). Although these smallholders have to ar-
range the transport of their FFB to companies on their own, they can bypass middlemen 
and receive relatively higher farm-gate prices compared to the fully independent small-
holders. These two types of smallholders are formally independent from miller compa-
nies, as they can deliver their FFB to any company offering a good price. However, to be 
assured of market access during the palm oil peak season, many smallholders prefer to 
establish a formal selling contract with specific companies. 
KKPA and NES smallholders can be considered to have a relatively good position in 
the market as they are closely connected to a company (see Figure 1, KKPA and NES). 
This connection does not only relate to a guaranteed supply and purchase of FFB, but 
also to the mill’s supply of training to the smallholders and monitoring to ensure a good 
quality of palm oil production. Companies even fully manage and control oil palm planta-
tions of KKPA smallholders under a one-roof management system. To reward smallhold-
ers for the good quality of their production, FFB produced by KKPA and NES plantations 
are prioritized by companies and receive higher prices than FFB from independent 
smallholders. All KKPA and NES smallholders are organized in a cooperative where all 
support, including the provision of fertilizers and training, and FFB transactions (FFB 
selling and its payment) are managed collectively.  
Producer organizations 
In Indonesia, we can distinguish two producer organizations that are directly linked to oil 
palm producers: the Indonesian Palm Oil Enterprise Association (GAPKI or Gabungan 
Pengusaha Kelapa Sawit Indonesia) and the Indonesian Palm Oil Smallholders Associa-
tion (APKASINDO or Asosiasi Petani Kelapa Sawit Indonesia). Both are part of an umbrel-
la organization called Indonesian Palm Oil Board (DMSI or Dewan Minyak Sawit Indone-
sia) that aims to improve cooperation and coordination among palm oil business actors 
(including smallholders) and to facilitate national palm oil policies and regulations to 
improve the competitiveness of Indonesian palm oil in the global market, as well as the 
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environmental conditions of palm oil production. GAPKI is an Indonesian business organ-
ization established in 1981 and consists of 644 palm oil estate companies (roughly 43% 
of all Indonesian palm oil estate companies). GAPKI communicates with and facilitates 
communication among palm oil companies through its platform and closely collaborates 
with the national government to provide suggestions for palm oil policies. GAPKI does 
not directly collaborate with smallholders, although its policies and actions may indirect-
ly affect smallholders. Different from GAPKI, which represents the interests of compa-
nies, APKASINDO serves the interests of Indonesian palm oil smallholders. This organiza-
tion was established in 2000 by Indonesian palm oil farmer representatives and is sup-
ported by the Ministry of Agriculture as a professional organization for palm oil small-
holders in Indonesia. APKASINDO tries to support palm oil smallholders to better com-
pete in the global market and to prevent policies that may negatively influence small-
holders’ livelihoods.  
Government 
The Indonesian government, on different levels, may enable or constrain the sustainabil-
ity of smallholders’ agricultural production. On the national level, the government pro-
vides the macro-legal framework within which smallholders have to operate (Gillespie 
2012). The Ministry of Agriculture provides the legal basis for palm oil plantations, 
whereas the Ministry of Agrarian and Spatial Planning and the Ministry of Environment 
and Forestry define the regulations about land use and the environment. Besides, the 
national government has programs specifically aimed at improving smallholders’ agricul-
tural productivity, such as training in Good Agricultural Practices (GAP), financially sup-
ported through a so-called CPO Fund, and the provision of subsidies and grants. These 
subsidies and grants are further managed by the provincial and district governments. 
Moreover, provincial and district governments have the authority to grant licenses for 
palm oil development and, through technical offices (e.g. the Agricultural Office, Forest 
Office, Agrarian and Spatial Planning Offices on the local level), enforce regulations from 
the different Ministries on the ground. The public initiative of ISPO is regulated by the 
Ministry of Agriculture on the national level and consists of regulations coming from 
different ministries.  
NGOs 
Many NGOs with various backgrounds and aims have become involved in the palm oil 
sector. Most of them are inspired by (increasing awareness of) the negative social and 
environmental effects of the expansion of oil palm plantations. NGOs provide trainings 
to palm oil smallholders to improve the sustainability of their production and some of 
them provide staff to help smallholders become certified. The World Wildlife Fund 
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(WWF), for example, provides training and support to smallholders in Riau to become 
RSPO certified. 
The government, seeing the success of NGO programs in bringing smallholders into 
certification, also took up the idea and developed a pilot project in Riau to support inde-
pendent smallholders to become ISPO certified. The government (i.e. the Ministry of 
Agriculture) in collaboration with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and 
a palm oil company took the initiative with support from an NGO (SNV Netherlands De-
velopment Organization) to facilitate training and technical support to independent 
smallholders to become the first farmers with ISPO certification in Indonesia. 
In this dissertation we use the actor-network context as background knowledge to 
understand the social context in which the smallholders operate and through which 
certification (potentially) affects their livelihoods. 
1.5. NORTHERN CERTIFICATION INITIATIVES DEBATED 
The attempt to overcome sustainability problems of agricultural production in Southern 
countries through partnerships between Northern businesses and international NGOs 
has been widely debated. Previous studies focus on two related concerns: the legitimacy 
and the effectiveness of voluntary standards to solve sustainability problems. Some 
studies on the RSPO revealed a legitimacy problem resulting from a lack of representa-
tion of stakeholders, and in particular smallholders, in the Roundtable (Marin-Burgos et 
al. 2015, von Geibler 2013, Schouten and Glasbergen 2011, Cheyns and Riisgaard 2014). 
The issue is that RSPO standards need to be translated into national (i.e. Indonesian) 
interpretations. This translation was initially formulated without the involvement of 
smallholders, which can be considered problematic as it reproduces and reinforces 
asymmetric power balances.  
Other literature questions the effectiveness of the voluntary standards and enforce-
ment principles to solve sustainability problems (Bitzer and Glasbergen 2015, 
Ruysschaert and Salles 2014). First, because of the dominance of Northern stakeholders 
in standard-setting processes (Fuchs et al. 2011, Bitzer et al. 2008), which implies the 
risk of mismatches between Northern knowledge, interests, and discourses on sustaina-
bility on the one hand and Southern knowledge, interests and discourses on sustainabil-
ity on the other hand. As a consequence, standards formulated by Northern actors may 
not fit and harmonize with realities of the Southern producers (Bitzer and Glasbergen 
2015, Busch 2014). Second, because private standards tend to focus on benefits for 
large-scale plantations, and by doing so, may marginalize smallholders (Bitzer 2012). This 
relates to the fact that private standards are often expensive and difficult to apply, par-
ticularly for smallholders (Perez-Aleman and Sandilands 2008). And third, because 
standards promise benefits (e.g. higher prices, premium fees or opening a niche market) 
that remain highly uncertain for smallholders (Bitzer and Glasbergen 2015). Moreover, 
Chapter 1 
 
14 
 
private standards do not seem to improve the vulnerable position of smallholders signif-
icantly (van Rijn, Burger, and den Belder 2012, Bacon 2005). 
Uncertainties about the effectiveness of private voluntary standards (Ruysschaert 
and Salles 2014, von Geibler 2013), inclusiveness of stakeholders’ interests (Bitzer and 
Glasbergen 2015, Cheyns and Riisgaard 2014, Silva-Castañeda 2012), and their ability to 
contribute to sustainability changes (Bitzer and Glasbergen 2015) have stimulated 
Southern governments to develop their own standards (Wijaya and Glasbergen 2016, 
Hospes 2014); for example, the standards of Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) and 
Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO). Public standards are largely based on laws and 
policies from state agencies that reclaim part of their national sovereignty to decide on 
acceptable effects of palm oil production, such as deforestation and the emission of 
greenhouse gases (Hospes 2014, 434). Public standards are designed to be less expen-
sive and stringent compared to the private standards in order to facilitate widespread 
adoption. By doing so, the government expects to strengthen the national agricultural 
sector by promoting a good image through sustainability certification (Schouten and 
Bitzer 2015). Public standards may better fit the national context, but other challenges 
may remain the same, such as the presence of variation in regional and local socio-
economic, political and environmental contexts and production systems (Schouten and 
Bitzer 2015, 182), which implies a challenging implementation process of the standards 
on the ground. Moreover, as these relatively new, public initiatives take place in rather 
weak administrative states, the capacity of the public standards to induce changes to-
ward a more sustainable agricultural production remains questionable.  
1.6. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This dissertation views sustainability standards and certification as an intervention logic 
that intends to improve the sustainability of agricultural production. We aim to investi-
gate how and to what extent this intervention affects smallholders in their social (i.e. 
economic, cultural and political) contexts, to explore the capacity of certification to bring 
about changes toward more sustainable palm oil production in Indonesia, and the capac-
ity of certification to contribute to improvements in Indonesian smallholders’ livelihoods. 
This objective has been specified in the following research question:  
In what way and to what extent does sustainability certification contribute to im-
provements in the livelihoods of palm oil smallholders in Indonesia? This question is 
specified in three sub-questions:  
 
1. How does private sustainability certification relate to smallholders’ livelihoods? 
2. To what extent can public sustainability certification become a viable alternative 
to private certification?  
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3. What might be a potential pathway towards a more sustainable livelihood for In-
donesian palm oil smallholders? 
1.7. LIVELIHOOD AS THE MAIN CONCEPT 
In our analysis, we explicitly question how and under which circumstances certification, 
as an intervention logic, may bring about sustainability changes in smallholders’ liveli-
hoods. The livelihood concept is not new and has been used as an important concept in 
development studies since the 1990s. Its development can be seen as a response to the 
realization that the concept of development was too narrowly focused around economic 
realities and opportunities of the poor, and hence did not sufficiently allow giving mean-
ing to the complexity of interacting aspects that influence the situation of the rural poor 
in making their living (Chambers and Conway 1992). The rise of the concept of livelihood 
widened the angle taken in development studies from a focus on production, employ-
ment and income to describe poverty levels towards a description of a diverse combina-
tion of activities adopted by the rural poor when trying to make their living (Scoones 
2009, 1998, De Haan 2012).  
The connection between the livelihood concept and sustainability was firstly made 
and introduced in the Brundtland Commission report in 1987 (Solesbury 2003, Scoones 
2009), and was further specified during the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) 
in 1992 and in the document resulting from this summit, Agenda 21. In Agenda 21, spe-
cific attention was paid to sustainable livelihoods (Chambers and Conway 1992) as the 
means of gaining a living, including livelihood capabilities, tangible and intangible assets, 
and activities that are required for a means of living. In 1998, Ellis (1998) added the 
component of availability to the definition of sustainable livelihoods and argued that 
activities and assets should also be available and accessible to and for individuals or 
households to gain a living. Later, Tang et al. (2013) further expanded the scope of the 
sustainable livelihood concept to also include the mediating role of institutions and so-
cial relations that may enable or constrain individuals and households from making their 
living. We define sustainable livelihoods as the availability of assets including access to 
these, that smallholders need to make their living. Livelihoods need institutions and 
social relations to be sustained and to further improve the availability of, and access to, 
assets in the future. 
The sustainable livelihood concept has been operationalized by different develop-
ment organizations (Carney et al. 1999, Krantz 2001), e.g. DFID, Oxfam, CARE and UNDP, 
and applied in their development programs. These organizations use a comparable 
framework, although they are slightly different in their emphasis dependent on their 
goal. Oxfam (in 1993), for example, operationalized the sustainable livelihood concept 
and loosely applied it across its organization to formulate strategic programs on alleviat-
ing poverty. In 1994, CARE operationalized the sustainable livelihood concept and ap-
Chapter 1 
 
16 
 
plied it to develop effective programs for the poor and vulnerable. In their operationali-
zation, CARE put less emphasis on institutional and organizational factors and stresses 
the fulfilment of basic needs as one crucial element of livelihood security (sustainability 
is not explicitly mentioned in their framework). In response, the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (UNDP) (in 1995) used the livelihood concept to think about ways to 
reduce poverty. In its framework, UNDP emphasized the importance of technology that 
could improve the use of livelihood assets and help people rise out of poverty. It also 
stressed adaptive and coping strategies which are crucial for sustainable livelihood. The 
scientific prominence of the sustainable livelihood concept increased after it was pro-
moted by the Department for International Development (DFID) in 1997 (De Haan 2012, 
Morse et al. 2009). The DFID operationalized the sustainable livelihood concept and 
applied it in their programs on poverty alleviation. In its operationalization, the DFID 
stressed the access to assets and structures (i.e. including government policies, institu-
tion), which may influence access to assets and livelihood strategies, as core elements of 
sustainable livelihood that are crucial for poverty alleviation. 
The sustainable livelihood concept (mostly using the DFID’s operationalization) has 
also been applied to a wide range of subjects, including rural development in agriculture 
(Tang et al. 2013, Bezemer and Lerman 2004), small-scale fishery (Allison and Ellis 2001), 
forest management (Das 2012, Nath and Inoue 2013), poverty alleviation (Adato and 
Meinzen-Dick 2002, Ansoms and McKay 2010, Bebbington 1999), environmental risk 
management (Anand and Forsyth 2007), and impact assessments of development pro-
jects (Ashley and Hussein 2000). The operationalization of sustainable livelihoods as 
developed by DFID has been given a central role in our study and consists of assets that 
are further operationalized in terms of human, social, financial, natural, and physical 
capital (Carney 2003). These assets provide people with the capacity to act and to sus-
tain and enhance their livelihood. They are influenced by what is known as the vulnera-
bility context (i.e. exposure to stresses and shocks) (DFID 1999, Morse et al. 2009), trans-
forming structures and processes (e.g. policies and regulations) (Carney 2003), and 
strategies of smallholders (i.e. activities and choices to improve livelihood outcomes) 
(Scoones 1998).  
However, the sustainable livelihood concept and the way in which it is operational-
ized has also been criticized: first, the framework is said to neglect economic and com-
mercial factors such as profitability (Utting 2009) and enabling and constraining market 
issues (Carney 2003). Second, the framework does not capture cultural issues, and ne-
glects the role of power relationships and politics (Adato and Meinzen-Dick 2002, Carney 
2003, De Haan 2012), for example in providing access to assets. Third, farmers’ priorities 
and preferences are commonly missing, although these are crucial to understand the 
livelihood strategies chosen and preferred by the farmers (Ashley and Hussein 2000). 
Fourth, inadequate representation of the relation between access to assets and a proper 
use of those assets was suggested (Bebbington 1999); having access to assets does not 
automatically imply a proper use of those assets. A fifth point of criticism relates to the 
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narrow scope of the livelihood approach, because it emphasizes vulnerability and strate-
gies to cope with potential stresses and shocks, while it neglects farmers’ ability to re-
cover from stresses and shocks (i.e. their resilience) (Marschke and Berkes 2006, 
Scoones 2009, Nyamwanza 2012, Speranza, Wiesmann, and Rist 2014).  
In response to these criticisms, this dissertation suggests an amended sustainable 
livelihood framework in Chapter 2, and a way to include resilience into the discussion on 
sustainable livelihoods in Chapter 4. In Chapter 2 we further connect the livelihood con-
cept to impact research and we use the sustainable livelihood concept as an approach to 
analyze relationships between sustainability certification and smallholders’ living condi-
tions. In Chapter 3 we zoom in on one of those relationships: the economic profitability 
of participation in sustainability certification of palm oil. Chapter 4 broadens the inter-
pretation of sustainable livelihoods to include the ability to recover from stresses and 
shocks and investigates how participation in sustainability certification correlates with 
livelihood resilience. Chapter 5 investigates the potential of ISPO certification in improv-
ing smallholders’ livelihoods.  
1.8. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
This dissertation takes a socioeconomic perspective. Socioeconomics is an interdiscipli-
nary study field that provides knowledge for policy making (Stern 1993) and recognizes 
that we cannot understand economic phenomena without considering the social context 
they belong to (Hellmich 2017, Zafirovski 2000). By adopting this approach, this disserta-
tion considers a more complete range of assumptions underlying human actions than 
orthodox neoclassical economic approaches that explain human decisions as rational 
(economic) choices, and therefore fail to account for the social nature of economic activ-
ities (Hellmich 2017). We see economic phenomena as part of a complex world in which 
spheres of social life, for instance culture and politics, relate to economic phenomena. 
Managing a palm oil plantation can therefore be seen as an economic activity, but the 
decisions made by smallholders cannot be explained through economic incentives and 
interests alone, as political, cultural and social aspects may play an important role as 
well. Smallholders provide meaning to certification, which does not happen in a vacuum, 
but in a dynamic sociopolitical environment that is subject to external changes, e.g. 
market changes, government interventions and climate change. 
Following the interdisciplinary nature of the socioeconomic approach, we integrated 
qualitative and quantitative analyses to address our sub-questions. The first sub-
question, on the relationship between private sustainability certification and smallhold-
ers’ livelihood, is answered in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. In Chapter 2 we per-
form a qualitative analysis, combining semi-structured in-depth interviews to investigate 
smallholders’ perspectives on sustainability certification with informal discussions, ob-
servations and literature studies. Interviews were transcribed and coded based on key 
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words. Codes and keywords resulted in a pattern that was further used as the main basis 
for deriving results and conclusions. A more quantitative approach was used in Chapter 
3 to assess the profitability of sustainability certification and in Chapter 4 to assess the 
livelihood resilience of different types of Indonesian palm oil smallholders. In both chap-
ters we used a survey and, in addition, interviews with key informants to get a better 
understanding of the data resulting from the survey. In Chapter 3 we calculated the Net 
Present Value (NPV) as an indicator of profitability and employed statistical regression 
analysis to analyze the factors that influence smallholders’ profit. Statistical analyses 
were also employed in Chapter 4, where we used the t-test and ANOVA test to quantify 
differences in livelihood resilience among different types of smallholders.  
The second sub-question, on public sustainability certification, is addressed in Chap-
ter 5. Similarly to Chapter 2, we employed semi-structured in-depth interviews to ana-
lyze the potential of ISPO for solving palm oil-related problems. These interviews were 
enriched by document analysis and participation in events. All interviews were tran-
scribed and analyzed with the help of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis 
(CAQDA). In most chapters, we adopt an ex-post analysis to investigate the impact of 
certification on livelihoods. In Chapter 5, however, and given the fact that ISPO has not 
been fully implemented yet, we applied an ex-ante evaluation to investigate what ISPO 
potentially implies for the livelihood of smallholders.  
The third sub-question, on what could be a potential pathway towards a more sus-
tainable livelihood for Indonesian oil palm smallholders, will be answered in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 also reflects on the findings from the four empirical chapters (2, 3, 4 and 5) of 
this dissertation. In this chapter, and based on the knowledge gained during this study, 
we define a potential sustainable future for Indonesian palm oil smallholders. Next, 
through a back-casting approach, we first identify crucial steps and prerequisites that 
need to be fulfilled to guarantee a sustainable future for smallholders. In the identifica-
tion of steps and prerequisites, we take as our premise that smallholders’ agency and 
empowerment are crucial for the improvement of their livelihoods. These steps and 
prerequisites subsequently form the basis of our reflections on a potential pathway.  
1.9. RELEVANCE OF THIS STUDY 
This dissertation is motivated by the observation that current research on palm oil certi-
fication pays limited attention to the impacts of sustainability certification from a small-
holders’ point of view, and to smallholders’ social contexts (i.e. their economic, cultural 
and political realities). We tried to cover this gap in knowledge by connecting the sus-
tainable livelihood concept to the literature on sustainability certification. Another con-
tribution to the current literature comprises the way in which we go beyond the com-
mon distinction between independent smallholders and scheme smallholders (see for 
example Brandi et al. 2015, Lee et al. 2014, Feintrenie et al. 2010). To better represent 
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the different institutional settings smallholders are part of, and therefore confronted 
with, we distinguish five different groups of palm oil smallholders in Indonesia, including 
two groups of scheme smallholders and three groups of independent smallholders.  
The need for a transformational path towards a more sustainable agriculture increas-
ingly demands the involvement of private and public actors. This dissertation has policy 
relevance in both domains. For the private sector, we provide insight on how and to 
what extent private initiatives may lead to sustainability changes for smallholders. We 
shed light on the challenges experienced by smallholders when being confronted with 
private sustainability certifications. For the public sector, this dissertation provides in-
sight into the relatively new trend in which Southern governments develop their own 
public standards, by focusing on one of those recently established standards: ISPO. More 
specifically, it analyses the feasibility and governance capacity of ISPO in bringing to-
gether actors for concerted action and solving palm oil-related sustainability problems.  
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POSITIONING CHAPTER 2 
Chapter 2 answers the following research questions: 
1. How can we conceptually understand the relationships between certification and 
the livelihood of smallholders? 
2. What does an application of this conceptual understanding learn us about factors 
that play a role in improving farmer’s livelihood through certification and what chal-
lenges can be identified? 
Given uncertainties around the implications of sustainability certification for smallhold-
ers’ livelihoods, this chapter explores the potential of sustainability certification to im-
prove the livelihood of smallholders. To achieve this objective we developed an amend-
ed sustainable livelihood framework that we used to analyze the livelihoods of Indone-
sian smallholders participating in the Roundtable of Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). We find 
that although access to markets and vulnerability are not improved through certification, 
indirect effects through organizational changes increase productivity. Certification 
schemes are also weakly institutionalized, and farmers will easily shift to a more profita-
ble way of production if they get the chance to do so.  
This chapter was written in collaboration with Pieter Glasbergen and Astrid Offermans, 
and has been published in the International Food and Agribusiness Management Review. 
The full reference is: 
Hidayat, N. K., P. Glasbergen, and A. Offermans. 2015. Sustainability certification and 
palm oil smallholders’ livelihood: A comparison between scheme smallholders and inde-
pendent smallholders in Indonesia. International Food and Agribusiness Management 
Review, 18(3), 25-48. 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the mid-1990s, voluntary sustainability standards and certifications have been 
introduced as a new governance model in global agrifood chains. Most of them aim to 
regulate the negative environmental and social effects of food production in Southern, 
often developing countries. However, their impacts on the livelihood of smallholder 
farmers at the production level are still widely debated (Auld 2010, Blackman and Rivera 
2010, Bitzer 2012, Glasbergen 2013, Méndez et al. 2010). 
Most of the studies analyze the impact on a combination of social, economic, and 
environmental indicators related to production processes of agricultural commodities. 
These studies show contradictory results and fluctuate between attributing positive 
economic effects (Becchetti and Costantino 2008, Brandi et al. 2013, Bacon 2005, 
Beuchelt and Zeller 2011), social effects (Elder et al. 2012, Giovannucci et al. 2008), and 
environmental effects (Melo and Wolf 2007, Blackman and Naranjo 2012), towards 
insignificant effects (Ruben and Fort 2012, Valkila 2009, Bacon et al. 2008), mixed results 
(Pirotte et al. 2006), and even negative consequences of certification (Beall 2012). 
We assume that these contradictions may be due to the different indicators that are 
used to measure impact, the different research methods, and, as we see as most im-
portant, the lack of a more generally accepted underlying theoretical consideration for 
the choice of variables.  
Based on this assumption, this paper aims to further explore the potential of certifi-
cations to improve the livelihood of smallholder farmers, asking the questions:  
1.  How can we conceptually understand the relationship between certification and the 
livelihood of smallholders? 
2.  What does an application of this conceptual understanding learn us about factors 
that play a role in improving farmer’s livelihood through certification and what chal-
lenges can be identified? 
We are particularly interested in smallholder farmers’ perspectives - what participation 
in the certification implies for them, what they value, what they regard as long term 
positive and negative effects. To that end we developed an amended livelihood frame-
work which comprehensively defines economic, social and environmental variables that 
may influence the relationship between certification and smallholder’s livelihoods.  
This analytical model is applied in an exploratory study of Indonesian smallholders 
who participate in the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). The RSPO, formally 
established in 2004, is a Northern-based international multi-stakeholder initiative in 
sustainable palm oil cultivation with members and participants from different back-
grounds and with different interests, including palm oil processors and traders, consum-
er goods manufacturers, retailers, banks/investors, representatives of oil palm produc-
ers, and social and environmental NGOs. The RSPO is generally regarded as a promising 
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certification scheme; it has a considerable impact on production processes and a market 
share of certified palm oil of about 15% (Schouten and Glasbergen 2012, Schouten et al. 
2012). 
Indonesia was chosen as our study field because this country is the largest producer 
and exporter of palm oil world-wide (WWF 2013). However, the inclusion of smallhold-
ers in palm oil certification has proven to be difficult (van Opijnen et al. 2013), despite 
efforts of the  RSPO  to accommodate smallholders in the RSPO system. The General 
Assembly established a Smallholder Task Force (STF) in 2005, focusing on the relevance 
and applicability of the RSPO principles and criteria for smallholders. In 2012, the RSPO’s 
Smallholders’ Fund Initiative (SFI) was launched to support the smallholders’ certification 
process and to increase smallholders’ awareness of the advantages of certification 
(Pesqueira and Glasbergen 2013). 
Smallholders are an important but economically vulnerable production group in palm 
oil. Their vulnerability is partly due to the characteristics of the commodity: Fresh Fruit 
Bunch (FFB) or palm oil fruit should be milled within 24 hours after harvest to maintain 
its quality. As palm oil smallholders often do not have the means to sell and transport 
their FFB quickly, the quality of their FFB is easily reduced (Colchester and Jiwan 2006, 
Hanu and Sadjli 2013). Other factors contributing to smallholders’  economic vulnerabil-
ity are uncertainty about market access, price fluctuations in the market, lack of 
knowledge about maintaining palm oil plantations which reduces their productivity, and 
their dependency on agents to sell their outputs to mills (Marti 2008, Papenfus 2000).  
In the coming years, the claim for a more sustainable production, including that of 
smallholders, will become even more important. Smallholder oil palm plantations in 
Indonesia increased from 3,125 ha in 1979 to 3,387,257 ha in 2010 and cover 40% of the 
total area of oil palm plantations. These areas are predicted to increase continually and 
reach 4,166,778 ha by the end of 2014 (Directorate General of Estate 2011). Moreover, 
the Indonesian government is in the process of developing its own sustainability stand-
ards and certification scheme called Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO), which will 
be mandatory, and aims to include the smallholder farmers (Hospes 2014). 
Presently, only 3.8% of the 4,415,800 hectare of smallholders’ oil palm plantations 
has been certified (estimated value
1
). We can expect that experiences of the first certi-
fied smallholders (either positive or negative), on which our study focuses, may have an 
influence on the willingness of the target group of uncertified farmers to participate in a 
certification scheme. 
This article is structured as follows. In the first section we develop the analytical 
framework that conceptualizes the relationship between certification and livelihood 
outcomes. Thereafter we introduce the research field and our research methods. Our 
                                                                 
1
The percentage of certified plantation is calculated by comparing total certified (independent and scheme) 
smallholders’ land area with total area of smallholders’ oil palm plantation in Indonesia. Certified Independent 
smallholders in Indonesia: 1,199 ha; certified scheme smallholders in Indonesia: 165,181 ha (Primary data).  
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research findings are presented in the next five sections. The last section reveals the 
pattern of relationships that has become visible and reflects on our research findings. 
2.2. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
Following van Rijn et al. (2012), who connected the livelihood concept to impact re-
search, we take the livelihood concept as a starting point to analyze the relationships 
between certification and smallholders’ living conditions. We consider the livelihood 
concept a powerful notion to select and arrange variables and to create order in the 
conceptual complexity underlying the relation between certification and impact.  
The livelihood concept is rooted in development thinking that traditionally focused 
on production, employment and income to describe poverty levels. This approach was 
considered too narrow and could not explain the complexity of interacting aspects that 
influence the situation of the rural poor. The livelihood notion therefore introduced a 
more comprehensive approach to poverty alleviation (Chambers and Conway 1992, 
Scoones 1998, Carney 1998, DFID 1999, Ellis 2000) that goes beyond analyzing the eco-
nomic realities and opportunities of the poor.  
Based on the definition of the Department for International Development (DFID), the 
concept of livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for sus-
taining or improving a means of living (DFID 1999). At the core of the livelihood concept 
lie the assets (resources) that can be utilized to undertake production, engage in mar-
kets, and improve ways of living (Scoones 1998, Utting 2009). Assets are conceptualized 
as different forms of capital: human, social, financial, natural, and physical capital 
(Scoones 1998, DFID 1999). Human capital refers to skills, knowledge, and health need-
ed to enable people to pursue different livelihood strategies and achieve their livelihood 
goals (DFID 1999). Scoones (1998) explains that social capital refers to empowerment, 
the opportunity to form networks, membership of groups, and relationships. Financial 
capital comprises all stocks and flows in income, credit, and savings (Scoones 1998, DfID 
1999). Natural capital encompasses natural resources including biodiversity, land, and 
forests. Issues of transport, shelter, water, energy, and communication belong to the 
category of physical capital (DFID 1999, Scoones 1998, Utting 2009).  
These forms of capital provide smallholders the capacity to act and sustain or im-
prove their livelihood. However, all these forms of capital are assumed to be influenced 
by (a) external factors, referred to as the vulnerability context, which encompasses criti-
cal economic trends, shocks and seasonality; (b) transforming structures and processes, 
such as policies and legislation; and (c) strategies of rural entities, which refers to activi-
ties and choices that smallholders make with the intention to improve their livelihood. A 
livelihood is considered sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and 
shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natu-
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ral resource base (Scoones 1998, Carney et al. 1999). In the sustainable livelihood ap-
proach this is indicated with the variable of outcomes, which results from livelihood 
strategies, and covers the conservation and enhancement of social, environmental and 
economic aspects. 
Although it provides an underpinned interpretation of the potential relationships be-
tween certification and impact on living conditions, the sustainable livelihood concept 
has also been criticized. First, the concept is said to give scant attention to commercial 
factors such as  profitability (Utting 2009) and lacks understanding of economic and 
market issues (Carney 2003). Second, it does not capture cultural issues, and lacks atten-
tion to power relationships, politics (Adato and Meinzen-Dick 2002, Carney 2003, De 
Haan 2012), and the role of history and historical experiences (Adato and Meinzen-Dick 
2002, Carney 2003). In addition, people’s priorities and preferences are commonly miss-
ing from the framework while they are believed to play a fundamental role in determin-
ing livelihood strategies (Ashley and Hussein 2000). Another criticism relates to the inad-
equate representation of the relation between access to assets and a proper use of 
assets. Bebbington (1999) emphasized that social capital (indirectly) affects livelihoods 
because it provides access to resources. However, access to assets is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition to guarantee sustainable livelihoods, if the productive capacities of 
farmers are not linked to access to markets (Bitzer et al. 2013).  
Taking these criticisms into account, we developed an amended livelihood frame-
work (see Figure 3) that connects certification to livelihood outcomes and addresses the 
criticisms by including additional variables. In this framework certification intervention is 
the independent variable and the livelihood outcome is the dependent variable. The 
framework consists of the following components: (1) the certification intervention; (2) 
livelihood components which consist of assets, livelihood strategies (activities), and live-
lihood outcomes; (3) smallholders’ priorities and preferences; and (4) external factors.  
Based on this conceptual model (Figure 3) we hypothesize that sustainability certifi-
cation can potentially support smallholders to improve their livelihood. This hypothesis 
has been further explicated in four assumptions. 
-  First, and most general, we assume that certification affects assets, which will then be 
used to perform activities that are expected to create better livelihood outcomes. We 
operationalized outcomes as increased and stable income, increased market access, 
conserved and enhanced environmental quality, better health and education, and organ-
izational strengthening. 
-  Second, we assume that certification may improve livelihoods in three ways: (1) 
through directly changing the assets of smallholders, such as skills and management 
practices; (2) through increasing smallholders’ access to the global market; 3) through 
reducing the economic vulnerability of smallholders, understood as the extent to which 
smallholders are influenced by uncontrolled or limitedly controlled factors such as price 
volatility. 
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-  Third, we assume that the preferences of smallholders play a role in the intervention 
process, as they influence choices to decide on what assets to invest, what activities to 
pursue, and what outcomes to be achieved. 
-  Fourth, we assume that changes in livelihood should also be understood in the context 
of external socio-economic factors. Besides the context of the global market and exter-
nal vulnerabilities, these are the cultural contexts (beliefs, history and traditions), poli-
tics, and other regulations.   
 
 
 
Figure 3. Conceptual framework amended from DFID (1999)  
2.3. RESEARCH FIELD AND METHODS  
We took the conceptual model of Figure 3 as starting point and comparatively analyzed 
the role of certification in sustaining and enhancing the livelihoods of two groups of 
smallholders: scheme smallholders and independent smallholders.  
Respondents in the certified scheme smallholders group live in the province of South 
Sumatera, which is the third most important province in Indonesia in terms of small-
holder land-area and an important site of scheme smallholder production of palm oil. 
Scheme smallholders are structurally bound by a contract or credit agreement to a par-
ticular mill or estate. Scheme smallholders are often not free to choose what crop they 
develop, are supervised in their planting and crop management techniques, and are 
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often organized, supervised or directly managed by the managers of the mill, estate or 
scheme to which they are structurally linked (RSPO 2009). Scheme smallholders in our 
research represent the PT Hindoli/ Cargill Group, which was the first RSPO certified 
scheme-smallholder group in the world.  
The scheme smallholders group consists of 8,797 members and covers 17,594 ha oil 
palm plantations. Ross (2010) explained that the scheme smallholders in PT Hindoli orig-
inate from a government transmigration project (PIR-Trans scheme), which was estab-
lished in the early 1980s for growing soybean. The soybean project, however, failed and 
in 1991 PT Hindoli received government approval for the development of oil palm plan-
tations including a plasma (smallholders) plantation establishment. The scheme is fi-
nanced by PIR-Trans scheme and KKPA (Koperasi Kredit Primer Anggota or Cooperative 
Credit Scheme). PT Hindoli hired “Farmer Development Assistants” who are located in 
the village in order to train the smallholders. PT Hindoli was taken-over by Cargill in 
1995. The smallholder oil palm plantations were planted in the early 1990s and the 
palms are now mature and in the first cycle. 
The respondents from the independent smallholders group are from the province of 
Riau, which has the highest share of smallholder land-area and smallholder production 
of palm oil in Indonesia. Independent smallholders are characterized by freedom to 
choose how to use their lands, what crops to plant and how to manage them. They are 
self-organized, self-managed, self-financed, and not contractually bound to any particu-
lar mill or association (RSPO 2010). We studied the Asosiasi Swadaya Amanah group. 
This is the second largest independent smallholder group in the world and the first RSPO 
certified in Indonesia (Savi 2013). 
There are 349 independent smallholders in Asosiasi Swadaya Amanah who have in-
dividual agreements with the association to comply with the RSPO certification require-
ment. Asosiasi Swadaya Amanah comprises 10 sub-groups of farmers and covers 763 ha 
of land. All the palms are in the first planting cycle and matured. Gustomo (2013) ex-
plains that the land of Asosiasi Swadaya Amanah members was originally obtained via 
government lease and the land status is officially issued by The National Land Agency in 
the form of Sertifikat Hak Milik or Land Ownership Certificate. This certificate indicates 
that the land of the association is neither illegal nor under conservation areas. The inde-
pendent smallholders in Asosiasi Swadaya Amanah sell FFB to a partnering mill, specifi-
cally Ukui Palm Oil Mill that belongs to PT Inti Indosawit Subur (IIS). 
The data collection methods covered semi-structured in-depth interviews, informal 
discussions, and participant observation and literature studies. The interviews consisted 
of questions regarding smallholders’ motivation to join the RSPO, the institutional 
changes the membership induces, and perceived effects of certification on livelihood 
outcomes. Semi-structured interviews were held with 66 certified smallholders (34 
scheme smallholders and 32 independent smallholders). Farmers were selected with the 
help of representatives of farmers group. To guarantee that the results would not be 
colored by the influence of (changes in) property rights and livelihood strategies im-
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posed by actors outside the certification schemes, we only selected farmers who own 
and manage their land themselves. Farmers had to be literate and able to communicate 
in the Indonesian language (Bahasa).  
During the time at the villages the first author participated in meetings and also had 
many informal discussions with farmers about the topic of the research, for example 
with those farmers that were hesitant to participate in the formal interviews. Additional 
Interviews were conducted with other stakeholders, such as companies, government 
actors, farmer organizations, an NGO and experts (see Table 2). These interviews were 
partly used to verify the results of the interviews with the smallholder farmers. 
As the farmer groups are very homogeneous in aspects such as ethnic background, 
level of education, land area, and start of the plantations, this sample is regarded to 
represent a normal distribution of the population in the villages; results will not be influ-
enced by significant differences in demographic background. A tabulated pivot table was 
used to note down whether respondents experienced any relationship between the 
components of Figure 3, and the type of relationship they experienced. This table was 
subsequently used as the main basis for deriving our results and conclusions. 
Table 2. Interview subjects by affiliation 
No Respondent Number of formal interviews 
Smallholder groups 
1 Independent smallholders from Asosiasi Swadaya Amanah, 
Riau 
32 
2 Scheme smallholders from PT Hindoli, Cargill Group, South 
Sumatera 
34 
Key informants 
1 Farmer organizations (cooperative, association) 5 
2 Government (district, regional and national such as Direc-
torate General of Estate) 
6 
3 NGO (WWF) 1 
4 Expert (Green Palm Company, RSPO Secretariat and re-
searcher) 
3 
5 Palm oil company (PT Hindoli) 3 
 Total 84 
2.4. MOTIVATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CERTIFICATION SCHEME 
The two groups of smallholders in our study came to participate in the RSPO with a simi-
lar understanding of the potential of certification. For both groups, certification was 
something new; a program that came from abroad and that was introduced to them by 
an external actor. In fact, the smallholders were unaware of the philosophy behind sus-
tainability certification and the concept of the RSPO. For them, certification was (and still 
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is) a set of technicalities that need to be fulfilled to improve their production and get a 
better price for their FFB. One farmer said: 
 “RSPO is English, I am Indonesian and I did not go to school. I do not know what 
the RSPO is. But I do know and do apply the technical things. RSPO obliges farmers 
to have a land certificate; we are banned to do total spraying…. Obviously, I want 
to join the RSPO because the RSPO guarantees selling of the certified product …” 
(Independent farmer). 
Another farmer said:  
 “…. I do not know where the RSPO stands for; after joining the RSPO our oil palm 
plantation became environmentally friendly because we reduced the use of chem-
icals …. For farmers the first and the most important thing is a higher price of the 
product” (Scheme farmer).    
Their motivation to join the certification is related to this unawareness about what the 
RSPO stands for. Our data show that all smallholders mention financial considerations as 
their main motive for joining RSPO. Motives related to social and environmental im-
provements did not play a significant role in their decisions. The smallholders see certifi-
cation as a marketing tool and not as a tool to create a more sustainable production. In 
our cases, participation in the RSPO certification scheme was even more attractive as the 
certification-related costs were covered by external actors; the nucleus company for 
scheme smallholders and an NGO for the independent smallholders. These motivations 
give a first indication on how farmers may value the effects of the RSPO on their liveli-
hood, namely, in economic terms. 
2.5. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE 
CERTIFICATION  
As smallholders cannot directly access certification individually (Bitzer et al. 2013, Brandi 
et al. 2013), and need support from external actors to comply with the standards 
(Lemeilleur 2013), participation has implications for the organizational structures within 
which they work. Regarding the RSPO, the organizational changes also result from the 
obligation that the smallholders should join a group certification and establish a group 
manager who is responsible for an internal control system (ICS) to monitor smallholders’ 
performance (RSPO 2013b).  
These organizational requirements have different consequences for the groups of 
smallholders. Scheme smallholders can only enter the market of certified palm oil when 
the nucleus they are connected to is certified. Their organizational embeddedness does 
not change that much. For scheme smallholders, certification is led by a group manager 
coming from the nucleus company. This nucleus company is responsible for the estab-
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lishment of internal control mechanisms including the standard operational procedures 
(SOP) and a ‘farmer development’ team in order to conduct an internal audit. Figure 4 
shows three important actors supporting scheme smallholders to become certified, 
namely a group manager, the Cooperative/Village Unit Cooperative/Koperasi Unit Desa 
(KUD), and farmer groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Key actors supporting scheme smallholders to participate in sustainability certification. 
Although participation in the certification does not change the scheme smallholders’ 
organizational embeddedness, the roles of the cooperative and farmer groups become 
more pivotal. After joining the certification, all plantation activities ranging from input 
supply and credit support to FFB selling, are centralized in a KUD. The KUD also provides 
a forum for sharing and communicating problems as well as the possible solutions relat-
ed to palm oil plantation. The KUD, however, cannot manage all individual smallholders 
directly; farmer groups are important to link the KUD with individual scheme smallhold-
ers. The farmer groups are a forum for sharing knowledge and information on a smaller 
scale. They also supervise all oil palm plantation activities, including fertilizer application, 
harvesting, sorting, loading and transporting the FFB, and distributing income from FFB 
selling to farmer members. A post harvesting monitor needs to guarantee traceability of 
the RSPO FFB from certified smallholders to mills. 
The independent smallholders entered the RSPO scheme after being made aware of 
the certified market by an NGO: WWF Indonesia. The NGO purposefully selected these 
independent smallholders because -as Java Trans migrants- they already had a long 
experience with farmer groups and a legal status of their land. The same ethnical back-
ground translates into comparable interests and easiness to communicate with each 
other. The smallholders were also selected because they are located near a conservation 
area. This is related to the objective of the NGO: conserving biodiversity through the 
certification of sustainable palm oil plantation management. 
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Participation in the RSPO certification changes the independent smallholders’ organi-
zational structure more fundamentally than for scheme smallholders. Joining certifica-
tion implies that the smallholders need to select a group manager from the farmers; one 
who is experienced in managing cooperatives or farmer groups. They also have to organ-
ize themselves to establish a quality control mechanism. They need to construct an in-
ternal control system (ICS) team for the internal audit and arrange the standard opera-
tional procedures (SOP). In the audit process they have to convince the third party audi-
tor about the reliability of the SOP and the capability of managers and the ICS team. 
Figure 5 illustrates actors that support independent smallholders to participate in the 
sustainable certification.  
 
Figure 5. Key actors supporting independent smallholders to participate in sustainable certification 
The independent smallholders’ cooperative or association has more responsibilities 
than the scheme smallholders’ cooperative. The association is not only responsible for 
the internal control mechanisms, which is also part of the nucleus company’s responsi-
bility for scheme smallholders, but also for selling the FFB, buying production input, and 
providing credit. In the same way, independent smallholders’ farmer groups have more 
responsibilities than scheme smallholders’ farmer groups. The functions of the inde-
pendent farmer group are not only limited to supervision and knowledge sharing, but 
also include activities such as coordinating plantation activities to gain benefits from 
economics of scale.  
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2.6. EMBEDDEDNESS OF THE SMALLHOLDERS IN NEW DEPENDENCIES 
In both cases, participation in the certification put the smallholders in a system of new 
dependency relationships, which determined their action space. The smallholders are 
dependent on the other stakeholders to get the RSPO certification and to gain benefit 
from participation in the certification. In the scheme smallholder case, the dependency 
on the nucleus company is stronger than before participating in the certification due to 
the rules of the RSPO. These rules require that certified palm oil growers with a Nucleus 
Estate Smallholder (NES) scheme are obliged to certify their smallholders within three 
years after the certification of the nucleus. The nucleus company is directly involved in 
the certification process; it pays for the RSPO membership and the costs of audits and 
takes responsibility for capacity building of the connected smallholders (e.g. training and 
strengthening farmer organizations). The company is also contractually bound to buy 
certified FFB from scheme smallholders and responsible for the distribution of a premi-
um for Crude Sustainable Palm Oil (CSPO) sales (if buyers can be found who are willing to 
pay a premium). The new dependency of the scheme smallholders on the company 
obviously relates to the fact that the company is the one who holds the RSPO certificate.  
Different from scheme smallholders, independent smallholders hold their own sus-
tainability certificate. However, although independent smallholders are characterized as 
independent and not bound by a contract to a nucleus, participation in the certification 
makes them reliant on external actors. This dependency is triggered by smallholders’ 
demand for, but incapacity to gain, credit, risk management, information, technology, 
and market access. The independent smallholders in our research became particularly 
dependent on an NGO: WWF Indonesia. The independent smallholders entered the 
RSPO scheme after they were made aware of the certified market by the NGO. Further-
more, the NGO socialized the required standards, conducted training, and helped to 
prepare for the RSPO certification audit. In turn, WWF was funded by the philanthropic 
Carrefour Foundation, which is concerned about the negative impacts of uncontrolled 
production of palm oil, to organize trainings.  
WWF also facilitated the smallholders to join a company to receive technological 
help and they have sold their RSPO certificate via the Green Palm trading system, which 
is the channel to the market of sustainable palm oil, and the way to get a premium fee. 
The certified independent smallholders can sell their products in two ways. The tradi-
tional way is selling the FFB (physical) to a nucleus company/mill. If the FFB has a higher 
quality than uncertified FFB, the smallholders can get a higher price. However, in this 
case smallholders are fully dependent on the company. The second way is new and 
opened by the RSPO certification scheme. RSPO certified palm oil producers can register 
a quantity of their output with the Green Palm program. It is only through this trading 
program that the smallholders can sell their certified products to buyers (e.g. consumer 
goods manufacturers). They are awarded one Green Palm certificate for each ton of 
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palm oil, which has been sustainably produced. They can then put those certificates up 
for sale on the Green Palm web based trading platform to get a premium fee (see also 
http://greenpalm.org/). 
2.7. BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATION IN THE CERTIFICATION 
Although the dependency relations of scheme and independent smallholders change in 
a different way through certification, the influence on their assets is more or less the 
same. Direct effects are observable in the assets of social and human capital, as well as 
some provisions that are related to physical capital. These direct effects are closely re-
lated to the new organizational structure, which provides the farmers with the necessary 
training to become certified. Therefore, these direct effects have already been visible or 
materialized from the first year of certification and can be identified as short term bene-
fits.    
Farmers’ organizations are trained by the certification facilitators (companies or 
NGOs) to better manage their business (including filing data), to better communicate 
with members, and to build business relationships with the company and input supplier. 
This contributes positively to farmer’s social capital (e.g. increase opportunities for net-
works and relationships) and human capital (skills and knowledge). The majority of 
smallholders hold the view that the farmer organization’s staff is better trained and their 
services improved. They also feel that they have more opportunities to participate in the 
organizations.  
Social and human capital is further strengthened through training of farmers in Good 
Agricultural Practices (GAP), focusing on integrated pest management, limited use of 
pesticide and spraying, proper fertilizer application, and best harvesting techniques. 
Furthermore, human capital is improved via trainings on High Conservation Values (HCV) 
and trainings on the concept of protected animals and Environmental Impact Assess-
ment. At this training, farmers receive ample information on the safe use of chemical 
pesticides and safe ways to deal with chemical waste. In addition, they are also intro-
duced to healthy and safe working conditions, first aid, and ways to deal with fire (see  
Ekayani et al. 2015), that, in turn, contribute to better health conditions. Next to that, 
smallholders get access to elements of physical capital such as safety tools (masks, 
boots, helmets, gloves and affronts), chemical storage systems, sanitary rooms, waste 
ponds, and owl nests. 
Other assets (natural and financial) are not directly improved through participation in 
the certification scheme, but indirectly through the process of capacity building. Moreo-
ver, these improvements are seen as long term effects that are not visible yet. Although 
smallholders cannot specify the value, they believe that sustainability certification may 
preserve natural capital. Our interviews indicate that scheme and independent small-
holders, after becoming a member in the RSPO, have undertaken several conservation 
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activities, which result in positive livelihood outcomes in the area of conserving and 
enhancing environmental quality, such as planting bamboo or trees to prevent erosion 
and floods. They also conserve soil and water quality, for example through arranging 
palm oil midribs in a ‘U’ shape to reduce erosion, maintain soil fertility, and keep the 
irrigation channels clear from any obstructions to prevent flooding. Due to better under-
standing of the harmfulness of pesticides and herbicides to health and biodiversity, the 
farmers apply a waste management system. They never wash chemical containers in the 
river, but collect used chemical containers and send them to the cooperative and com-
pany to be destroyed safely. Furthermore, farmers use natural predators for eradicating 
pest by building owl nests and plant Turnera ulmifolia and do not hunt protected animals 
- such as cobra snakes, owls, and Varanus salvator (water monitor lizard)- to safeguard 
biodiversity. The following comment of an independent smallholder is an illustration:  
 “… Maybe the effects [of certification] on environmental quality cannot be seen 
yet, because we are recently certified. But at least to reduce land and water deg-
radation we have already applied many activities. We do not apply fertilizer in the 
dry season and do not wash fertilizer containers in the river to protect animate 
creatures in the river. In essence, RSPO teaches us to protect our nature….” (Inde-
pendent smallholder).  
A scheme smallholder opinioned:  
 “…. Effects on the environmental quality can be seen if we look at our planta-
tion, which is greener now because we keep weed in our plantation to cover soil 
and reduce erosion due to surface runoff (rainfall), although it looks messy. Before 
joining RSPO, we believed that a good plantation is the one that is free from weed, 
so we applied total spraying with excessive herbicides” (Scheme smallholder). 
Certification is also considered to potentially contribute to an increase of smallhold-
ers’ financial capital and hence to contribute positively to the livelihood outcomes (more 
income). Within this context, certification is particularly valued by the smallholders be-
cause participation increases the volume and quality of their production, which opens 
opportunities for a higher income. Furthermore, understanding of Good Agricultural 
Practices encourages them to apply the right fertilizers at the right time and with the 
right dosage, which also increases the productivity of the plantation. Next, increasing 
knowledge on harmful chemicals leads the smallholders to reduce pesticide and herbi-
cide use, which reduces the cost of spraying from approximately IDR 900,000 – 1000,000 
/ha/year to IDR 400,000 /ha/year (interview with head of independent smallholder asso-
ciation). Also, compared to uncertified smallholders, most certified scheme and inde-
pendent smallholders believe that they get a higher price for their FFB. This higher price 
does not so much result from the fact that the FFB is certified, but from the fact that the 
quality of certified FFB is generally higher than uncertified FFB. In addition, centralization 
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of plantation activities (including fertilizer application, spraying and selling FFB) increases 
smallholders’ economies of scale that allows to share costs of production, management 
and transport. Table 3 shows the perception of farmers concerning the effects of certifi-
cation on price, production volume, costs and income. Based on Table 3, the majority of 
smallholders perceived participation in the RSPO to positively contribute to price, pro-
duction of FFB, and income, while decreasing cost of production. 
Table 3. Smallholders’ perception regarding certification effect on price, production, costs and income. 
 
Price (%) Production (%) Costs (%) Income (%) 
Higher 86 80 11 74 
The same 14 17 12 11 
Lower  0 2 77 2 
Do not know 0 2 0 14 
Table 4 summarizes the analysis of our data related to the different types of capital and 
several dimensions. The first dimension (direct versus indirect) refers to the presence of 
intervening variables that specify how a given effect occurs between an independent 
variable and a dependent variable, such as capacity building. The second dimension 
(short term versus long term) refers to the expected time lag between participation in 
the certification and effects. The third dimension (visible versus expected) takes the 
actual presence of results into account.  
Table 4. Benefits of certification on smallholders’ livelihoods 
Assets 1st Dimension 2st Dimension 3rd Dimension 
 Direct Indirect 
Short 
term 
Long 
term 
Visible (materi-
alized) Expected 
Social capital 
Strengthening organization √ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 Increasing smallholders’ trust in organiza-
tion 
 
√  √  √ 
Increasing participation in organizations 
 
√  √  √ 
Increasing connections and networking 
 
√  √  √ 
Human capital 
Increasing opportunity for training (improv-
ing knowledge and skill) √ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 Better health 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
Physical capital    
Providing safety equipment and building 
chemical storage system, sanitary room, 
waste pond, owl nests and planting Turnera √  √  √  
Natural capital 
Conserving soil and water quality  √  √  √ 
Protecting biodiversity  √  √  √ 
Financial capital 
Increasing income  √ √  √  
Increasing credit access  √  √  √ 
Premium fee 
 
√ √  √  
38 
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2.8. UNCERTAINTIES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE CERTIFICATION 
Participation in the certification scheme does not only create benefits, but also new 
uncertainties that may hamper or counteract the earlier described positive effects of 
certification on livelihood outcomes. These uncertainties regard the premium fee, price 
volatility, market access and access to credit.  
Premium fee  
Certified palm oil smallholders receive an annual premium fee, which is different from 
premium prices for certified FFB at the farm gate
2
. Smallholders consider the premium 
fee as a bonus from a company or the Green Palm certificate sales. The amount of pre-
mium fee gathered by smallholders dependents on their production capacity and (for 
scheme smallholders) on the affiliated company. Therefore, the policy and ability of the 
company to access international buyers who are willing to pay a premium fee plays an 
important role in the amount of premium fee. For independent smallholders, although 
they are facilitated by an NGO, their capability to negotiate with buyers of GreenPalm 
certificates determines the amount of premium fee they are able to receive.     
The low uptake and slow growth of the Crude Sustainable Palm Oil (CSPO) uptake al-
so influence the extent to which premium fees will be paid to the smallholders. In 2012, 
the actual volume of the CSPO produced was 6,724,236 tons, while the CSPO sales were 
3,479,415 tons, which is only 51.7% of CSPO produced (RSPO 2013a). In 2013, the CSPO 
uptake did not significantly increase as the market absorbed only 52% of the global CSPO 
production  in that year (WWF 2014). Furthermore, the global market share of CSPO  is 
approximately 6% of the 58 million tons of global palm oil production (RSPO 2013a). 
WWF (2013) reported that in 2012 CSPO usage by the most important European mar-
kets equals 2,534,767 tons, which is approximately 43% of the 6,384,000 tons palm oil 
usage (Gerasimchuk and Koh 2013). These data show the lack of commitment of interna-
tional buyers to support the sustainable certification and little possibilities to shift part of 
the certification costs to the buyer (World Growth 2013). It needs to be seen each year 
again if buyers are willing to pay a premium fee. This uncertainty becomes higher if more 
certified palm oil enters the market, while the demand for CSPO is not significantly 
changing.  
                                                                 
2
For Independent smallholders, average premium price is approximately $50/ton FFB, and premium fee is 
around $1.82/ton FFB; For scheme smallholders the premium price is managed by the  farmer organization, 
there is no premium fee and premium price directly received by scheme smallholders as additional income 
(Primary data).
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The premium fee is managed by the cooperative (scheme smallholders) or associa-
tion (independent smallholders) and is used to fund surveillance preparation such as 
training, safety tools, and ICS wages (for independent smallholders). It can also be used 
to fund social activities such as building a mosque. Premium fees are thus no direct 
source of income. The relationship between certification and livelihood outcomes in the 
financial domain should not be seen merely in terms of the availability of premium fees. 
Increased productivity and improved product quality more importantly contribute to the 
higher income of certified smallholders.  
Price volatility 
Our interviews indicate that price volatility can be considered the most important factor 
to explain in come insecurity. As an illustration, at the end of 2007, smallholders experi-
enced a sharp decrease of FFB price from IDR 2100/kg to IDR 760/kg (for scheme small-
holders) or IDR 250/kg (for independent smallholders). This situation significantly de-
creased the smallholder’s income. Smallholders try to cope with this permanent instabil-
ity in different ways. The majority of the independent smallholders (56%) depends on a 
cooperative or association and uses savings and loans from the cooperative to contem-
porarily set-off a decrease in income. Around 16% of the smallholders employ non-
agricultural activities and 13% has livestock as alternative source of income. The remain-
ing 15% has even more than one income alternative. Different from the independent 
smallholders, the majority of scheme smallholders uses crop diversification as an income 
alternative (50%), although many of them still depend on the cooperative (26%) for a 
loan to fulfill their daily needs when their income decreases. Furthermore, approximate-
ly 9% of scheme-smallholders work in non-agricultural activities, 3% has livestock as 
alternative income, and 12% even has more than one income alternative.  
Certification does not change the price volatility the smallholders need to cope with. 
Because of this we can say that certification –although generally leading to a higher 
income- does not result in a more stable income. After becoming certified, smallholders 
stay (scheme) or become (independent) dependent on the company. Whether the com-
pany is willing to pay a higher price for certified palm oil depends on its policy, which 
may be different for each company. Although the FFB price is, formally and by regula-
tion, the same for scheme smallholders within a region, the incentive for certification is 
not regulated, which gives more freedom to companies to differ in their prices and limit 
surplus prices for certified palm oil. Scheme smallholders can, however, not go to anoth-
er company (that may pay higher prices) because they are bounded to a company by 
contract. Independent smallholders have more leeway. They are free to decide to whom 
their FFB will be sold. Their choice is mainly determined by prices (which depends on the 
number of certified companies), and the distance to mills. However, the characteristic of 
FFB as a perishable commodity and the limited number of certified mills mostly con-
strain their choice. Also, independent smallholders tend to avoid risk and prefer to stay 
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with one mill/company by arranging contracts and building commitment with this com-
pany. Here we see that maintaining commitment and social relations (social capital) are 
sometimes equally decisive for smallholders to engage in a buyer-seller relationship as 
the chance of gaining higher prices.  
Market access 
Smallholders do not have much insight into the market and global value chains. They 
consider the market as a place where they can sell their FFB directly, such as to middle-
men (for independent smallholders), or to mill companies (for scheme smallholders). 
The smallholders perceive palm oil companies as the most important market for them as 
they pay higher prices than middlemen. Nevertheless, the number of certified mills is 
still limited; 107 mills (out of 324) are under 34 RSPO certified companies in Indonesia 
(RSPO 2014). In Pelalawan, Riau where independent smallholders reside, there are only 
three certified mills and in Musi Banyu Asin, South Sumatera there are only two. Certifi-
cation limits smallholders’ opportunities to access market due to the limited availability 
of mills.  
Scheme smallholders do not consider market access as a benefit of certification. 
They have a market; the FFB of scheme smallholders must be bought by the corporation. 
In contrast to the scheme smallholders, independent smallholders perceive an im-
provement of their market access through increased opportunities for collaboration with 
companies. The FFB of certified independent smallholders is prioritized over uncertified 
FFB. Although in a peak season the certified smallholders are still able to sell their FFB 
easily. Therefore, independent certified smallholders do not need to spend extra 
transport costs and time to find alternative buyers. Furthermore, they can avoid deterio-
ration of FFB quality and depreciation costs due to the time lag between harvesting and 
milling.  
Access to credit 
Regarding access to credit, our research shows different results for scheme and inde-
pendent smallholders. Our interviews indicate that the majority of independent small-
holders (66%) do not observe an improvement in access to credit after joining RSPO. 
However, most of the scheme smallholders (59%) do experience better access to credit. 
Independent smallholders believe that access to credit is not influenced by participation 
in the certification, but by membership of a farmer organization; 56% of the independ-
ent smallholders rely on farmer groups, cooperatives or associations for their credits 
compared to 26% of the scheme smallholders. In contrast to independent smallholders, 
scheme smallholders believe that access to credit is affected by participation in the certi-
fication scheme because it increases income and therewith their ability to repay loans. 
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Moreover, better record-keeping and management of cooperative and farmer groups 
indicate the improvement of organizations’ transparency. As a consequence, banks or 
other financial institutions have more trust in them and are more willing to provide 
loans.  
2.9. ON THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS 
Our data show that external factors, such as the difficult access to the global market and 
vulnerability in terms of price fluctuations, do not change significantly with certification. 
Our research findings also indicate that government programs that are intended to im-
prove smallholders’ livelihood (for example through increasing oil palm productivity by 
providing palm oil seeds and subsidized fertilizers) do not succeed in doing so either. 
This can be explained by limited information and/or access of the smallholders to these 
programs and the fact that some of these programs are not even known by the small-
holders. Training arranged by the government is only available to farmers who have just 
established new plantations or those who request training, which hampers the continu-
ous development of human capital. Furthermore, and in line with Gauthier (2000) our 
study indicates that in the view of the smallholders, the policies often do not reach the 
poorest farmers due to limited budget allocation and bureaucracy. Improvements in 
infrastructure for example, are limited to village roads (jalan desa), while agricultural 
roads (jalan usahatani) that are crucial to transport FFB) have to be established by the 
smallholders themselves. The smallholders in our research view the role of the govern-
ment as non-responsive and even an obstacle to participate in the certification scheme. 
Because of complicated checks and approvals all smallholders face a lot of difficulties to 
receive the Cultivation Registration Certificate (which is one of the RSPO requirements) 
showing that they comply with the national and local regulations. The following com-
ment by the association management illustrates this:  
 “Cultivation Registration Certificate (Surat Tanda Daftar Budidaya/ STD-B) is 
very important after the Land Ownership Certificate (Surat Hak Milik/ SHM). The 
process is difficult because we need verification from the District Plantation Office 
and it should be signed by Head of the District Government… There has not been 
any support yet from the government… I think they only see oil palms as a matter 
of business… 
2.10. CONCLUSIONS 
To better understand the potential of sustainability certifications for improving the live-
lihood of Indonesian smallholder farmers we developed an amended sustainable liveli-
hood framework as a conceptual model for our empirical study. 
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In accordance with the study of van Rijn et al. (2012), who studied the impacts of cof-
fee certification from a livelihood perspective, our research reveals that capacity building 
plays a vital role. Certification encourages the transformation of an unorganized, frag-
mented and uncontrolled plantation production into an organized one. First, certifica-
tion requires organizational changes that are a condition to participate in the certifica-
tion. Second, through the organizational structures the smallholders get access to train-
ing, valuable relationships, and technology, which secures their ability to comply with 
the prerequisites, but also to improve their production methods.  
Organizational and technological changes induce a higher production quality that 
may benefit smallholders indirectly and financially. We found that certification, as a tool 
to create a more sustainable agriculture is not fully understood by the smallholders. 
Rather, certification is seen as an economic tool in the pursuit of a better livelihood. 
Smallholders participate because they have to (scheme smallholders) or because certifi-
cation is introduced by trustful people who open opportunities for higher incomes (in-
dependent smallholders). Non-economic benefits of certification such as social and envi-
ronmental improvements are less valued by the smallholders unless they lead to eco-
nomic benefits.   
Consistent with the findings of van Rijn et al. (2012), our study reveals that participa-
tion in the certification does not change the farmers’ dependency relations, nor their 
economic vulnerability and access to the market (scheme smallholders). Smallholders do 
not have much insight into the price setting of their products and they are still subject to 
unpredictable price fluctuations. There is also uncertainty about the uptake of certified 
palm oil in the market as well as the premium fees. Furthermore, the governmental 
programs designed to improve smallholder livelihood rarely reach them. Neither have 
the difficulties that result from smallholder alignments with certification programs be-
come visible enough to influence the governmental programs designed to improve 
them.  
Different from earlier research has focused on the impacts of certifications on the 
environmental, social, and economical effects of sustainability certification (see for an 
overview Blackman and Rivera 2011, Von Hagen 2011), our research provides some first 
insights into the relationships between these impacts. These findings have led us to 
hypothesize that the ethical aspects of sustainability must be better aligned with the 
economic interests of the (Southern) farmers or the certifications will likely lead to a 
weakly institutionalized practices.  
This need to better accommodate the economic interests of the farmers will proba-
bly increase with more smallholders are certified whereas the demand for certified palm 
oil is not growing. Currently the overproduction of certified palm oil of about 50%; and 
many markets are not interested in buying certified palm oil if the price is higher than 
conventional palm oil a similar trend is seen among other agricultural commodities certi-
fication (KPMG Sustainability 2013).  
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This study examined two smallholder groups that are culturally homogeneously. Nat-
urally, certification more difficult if the farmers do not share similar backgrounds as 
group belongingness and organizational identity are essential components to cohesive-
ness and willingness to work together in a group towards a shared goal. Cultural diversity 
and its impact on certification schemes in an underexplored topic in the current re-
search. Such knowledge might further improve our understanding and potential for 
schemes to induce more sustainable livelihoods.   
Also, the scope of this research did not examine the outcome and relationships of 
uncertified smallholder groups, the difficulties in compelling them to participate in a 
certification scheme; and analyzing strategies to incorporate them while improving the 
livelihood effects of participation in sustainability certification.  
Last, our research was focused on actors at the bottom of the value chain. However, 
these value chains are not power-neutral. As Bitzer and Glasbergen (2015) observed, 
with certification smallholder farmers need to change their production processes in a 
context of existing resource and power asymmetries. Their relative vulnerable position 
may influence the farmers’ ability to cope with uncertainty inherent to participation in a 
certification scheme. Therefore, we suggest exploring the connection between the ‘hori-
zontal’ livelihood framework and the logics of a ‘vertically’ organized agricultural value 
chain (see also Vellema and van Wijk 2014).   
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POSITIONING CHAPTER 3 
Chapter 3 answers the following research questions:  
1. To what extent and in what way is sustainability certification profitable for Indone-
sian palm oil smallholders?  
2. Following from the fact that certification costs are currently paid by the affiliated 
miller companies or donors we question: Is certification still profitable for Indonesian 
palm oil smallholders if they had to pay all certification costs themselves? If not, how 
much premium fee would then be necessary to make certification profitable for the 
smallholders? 
Economic profitability is at the core of chapter 3 in which we analyze the profitability of 
private palm oil certification through the use of Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) and the as-
sessment of Net Present Values (NPV). Understanding the investment value of certifica-
tion adoption can be used by policy makers or certification providers to bring in more 
smallholders and to make certification more beneficial for the generally vulnerable 
smallholders. The results indicate that certification is currently profitable for different 
types of Indonesian palm oil smallholders. The extent to which certification can be con-
sidered profitable depends on the smallholders’ pre-conditions. If smallholders had to 
pay the certification costs on their own, certification is not profitable for scheme small-
holders and only remains profitable for independent smallholders when they continue to 
receive premium prices. If premium prices are however removed, the independent 
smallholders may need unrealistically high premium fees for certification to remain prof-
itable in this scenario. Next to certification, we found that the organization of farmers 
around miller companies contributes positively to their profit, even before certification 
takes place. Therefore, investing in farmer organizations and linking organized farmers 
to companies may be an effective form of government involvement. 
This chapter was written in collaboration with Astrid Offermans and Pieter Glasbergen, 
and has been published in the Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development. The 
full reference is: 
Hidayat, N. K., A. Offermans, P. Glasbergen. 2016. On the profitability of sustainability 
certification: An analysis among Indonesian palm oil smallholders. Journal of economics 
and sustainable development, 7(18), 45-62. 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
If we consider monetary returns in relation to investments, oil palm is one of the most 
attractive commodities for smallholders, also compared to crops like cassava, rice, and 
rubber (Subervie and Vagneron 2013, Brandi et al. 2015). Although the expansion rate of 
oil palm plantations in Indonesia is slowly decreasing from 11% in 2009 to 7% in 2013 
(Statistik Indonesia 2014), the total land area of oil palm plantations owned by small-
holders in Indonesia still increases every year. Oil palm plantations contribute positively 
to the economic situation of smallholders by reducing unemployment and poverty, par-
ticularly in rural areas (WWF 2013, World Growth 2011, Blackman and Guerrero 2012, 
McCarthy, Gillespie, and Zen 2012). Notwithstanding these positive effects, the expan-
sion of palm oil plantations is not undebated as many studies also discovered negative 
effects of oil palm plantations on the environment and social position of smallholders 
(McCarthy et al. 2012). More specifically, palm oil expansion is said to contribute to 
deforestation, greenhouse gas emissions, and land conflicts (Fitzherbert et al. 2008, 
Obidzinski et al. 2012). 
Increasing awareness of international buyers about sustainability problems related to 
the production of agricultural commodities has led to the emergence of private sustain-
ability certification standards (Jena et al. 2012, Basu et al. 2004), such as the Roundtable 
on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). These standards can be seen as new governance models 
(Glasbergen 2013) and alternative steering instruments for governmental regulation to 
overcome the downside effects of agricultural production (Oosterveer et al. 2014).   
The RSPO, as one of the most important organizations for sustainability certification 
(Offermans and Glasbergen 2015), was established in 2004 (Preusser 2015) and initially 
targeted large-scale producers (Schouten and Glasbergen 2011, Silva-Castañeda 2012). 
However, 42% of the Indonesian palm oil producers are smallholders who together own 
4.42 million ha of oil palm plantations (Statistik Indonesia 2014). Although palm oil certi-
fication has a potentially positive effect on smallholder’s livelihoods, certification does 
not improve smallholders’ vulnerable position or market access (Hidayat et al. 2015). 
There are two types of oil palm smallholders in Indonesia (Brandi et al. 2013): the 
scheme smallholders, who are tied to a palm oil company through formal partnerships 
that also provide the farmers with technical assistance, and the independent smallhold-
ers, who operate independently and without assistance from palm oil companies. Alt-
hough both groups are differently institutionalized, they face comparable challenges to 
enroll in certification (Brandi et al. 2013), which puts them in a marginalized position 
from the sustainable palm oil market (Pichler 2013, Asfaw et al. 2010). These challenges 
include the lack of capacity and knowledge regarding compliance to the standards, the 
lack of organization and incentives to become involved, and high certification cost 
(Brandi et al. 2015). Therefore, even though the establishment of the RSPO took place 
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more than a decade ago already, only 3.8% of the total Indonesian smallholders are 
certified (Hidayat et al. 2015).  
Acknowledging the importance of smallholders in the oil palm production, the RSPO 
developed many sub-programs intended to bring in more smallholders in the certifica-
tion. Examples are the Smallholder Task Force (STF) and the RSPO Smallholders Support 
Fund (RSSF) (Pesqueira and Glasbergen 2013). Furthermore, the Indonesian Sustainable 
Palm Oil (ISPO) sustainability standard that was developed by the Indonesian Govern-
ment, is now mandatory for large-scale companies,  and  will become mandatory for 
smallholders in 2022 (for more information see Hospes 2014, Schouten and Bitzer 2015, 
Hospes and Kentin 2012). 
Earlier research shows that financial benefits are the main motivation of smallholders 
to participate in sustainability certification (Hidayat et al. 2015). So far, it however re-
mains unclear whether the new practices that go together with palm oil certification, 
present better profit. We argue that, for smallholders, certification adoption may be 
seen as an investment project that should offer tangible financial benefits in order to 
consider participation in it. Next, it is not only the present profitability of palm oil certifi-
cation that remains unclear, but also the potential future profitability. The latter is par-
ticularly uncertain because certified smallholders are currently dependent on companies 
or NGOs to pay the certification costs (Hidayat et al. 2015, Bitzer et al. 2013), and to 
provide the farmers with a premium fee. Both forms of support can however not be 
guaranteed into the future, and changes may result in consequences for smallholder’s 
profit, making certification adoption less attractive. 
To this end, this study analyses whether or not certification is profitable for Indone-
sian palm oil smallholders. We defined two research questions: (1) to what extent and in 
what way is sustainability certification profitable for Indonesian palm oil smallholders? 
(2) Following from the fact that certification costs are currently paid by the affiliated 
miller companies or donors we question: Is certification still profitable for Indonesian 
palm oil smallholders if they had to pay all certification costs themselves? If not, how 
much premium fee would then be necessary to make certification profitable for the 
smallholders?  
A way to analyze the profitability of palm oil certification is to use cost-benefit analy-
sis. This analysis assesses the profitability of an investment project or program (Campbell 
and Brown 2003) as an aid for decision making (Zerbe and Dively 1994). It provides in-
formation on whether or not a particular project is worthwhile (Campbell and Brown 
2003, Prest and Turvey 1965) given present resources and expected future outputs and 
by comparing costs and benefits in the case of project adoption and in the case wherein 
the project will not be adopted, or will be adopted in a different way. This approach 
helps to better understand the investment value of certification adoption. This infor-
mation, on its turn, can be used by policy makers or certification providers to bring in 
more smallholders and to make certification more beneficial for the generally vulnerable 
smallholders.          
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First we present information from previous studies on profitability of certification 
adoption (section 3.2), that results in our conceptual framework to assess profitability of 
the sustainability certification, which is presented in section 3.3. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 
introduce the research methods, study sites and characteristics of the smallholder re-
spondents. Our findings are presented in section 3.6 to 3.8, before turning to the con-
clusion in section 3.9. 
3. 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are several studies on the economic effects of certification. Most of them howev-
er focus on the effects of certification on gross income. For example, Méndez et al. 
(2010) who indicate positive effects of certification on gross income, or Ruben and 
Zuniga (2011) and Ruben and Fort (2012) who use a so-called Propensity Matching Score 
to compare differences in gross income between certified and uncertified farmers. Oth-
er impact studies compare differences between certified and uncertified farmers by 
looking at the revenues (e.g. incomes) minus the costs of production. Some authors 
refer to this as profit (Valkila 2009, Blackmore et al. 2012), others as net income (Bacon 
et al. 2008, Jena et al. 2012), or gross margin (Beuchelt and Zeller 2011, Bachmann 
2012). Although these studies use the same concept, they show conflicting results. 
Bachmann (2012), Bacon (2010), Blackman and Rivera (2011), and Blackmore et al. 
(2012) for example, conclude that certification contributes to higher profits for farmers. 
Bacon et al. (2008), Beuchelt and Zeller (2011), Valkila (2009), however, argued that the 
economic effect of certification is not clear and dependent on the type of certification, 
the price of uncertified commodities and the existence and size of a price premium. Jena 
et al. (2012) in their study about the profitability of coffee certification even reveal a 
negative contribution of certification to net income. The above presented studies share 
one important limitation as they only focus on production costs and therewith neglect 
the costs of certification in their calculations. Therefore, these studies can be expected 
to present an incomplete understanding of the effects of certification on profitability.  
Studying the profitability of sustainability certification while including the costs of 
certification is not entirely new, but results from existing studies often conflict. Some 
studies pointed out that certification adoption is profitable for farmers (Nuva et al. 2013, 
WWF 2012), while other studies revealed that certification adoption is not profitable 
(Simula et al. 2004, Wangrakdiskul and Yodpijit 2013, Beall 2012) or only reaches a 
break-even position (Victor et al. 2010). To calculate the size of benefits and costs, some 
studies (Nuva et al. 2013, Wangrakdiskul and Yodpijit 2013, Simula et al. 2004) use Net 
Present Values (NPV), which refer to the discounted value of the returns minus the dis-
counted value of the costs of investment projects (Campbell and Brown 2003). Others 
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(Beall 2012, WWF 2012), use numbers for input, yield and price to calculate benefits, 
and some (Victor et al. 2010, Beall 2012) conduct scenario studies.  
Nuva et al. (2013) conducted a cost-benefit analysis to assess the profitability of Eco-
labelling for Indonesian coffee smallholders, concluding that certified plantations gener-
ated a higher NPV than non-certified plantations. Victor et al. (2010) explored the future 
profitability of Rainforest Alliance certified Cocoa in Ghana. They developed several 
scenarios for the use of inputs, farm gate prices and yields, and different parameters for 
technology advancements and the use of shade trees. Their results show that Rainforest 
Alliance certification may only reach a break-even point. Simula et al. (2004) also investi-
gated the profitability of forest certification for Brazilian, Indonesian and Malaysian 
companies, showing different profitability results depending on the location and the 
initial performance of the adopters. The implementation of forest certification is profita-
ble for companies in Malaysia and Indonesia, while it is not financially feasible in Brazil 
due to the high investment costs.  
Regarding profitability of palm oil certification, WWF (2012) investigated the financial 
costs and benefits of RSPO compliance in Indonesia and Malaysia. They studied ranges 
for costs and benefits and did not use an aggregate measurement (such as NPV, IRR and 
ROI) and solely looked at certification costs and benefits without comparing these with 
costs and benefits of non-certified farmers. They conclude that the annual certification 
costs range from $1.19 to $34.66 per smallholder per hectare and that the annual bene-
fit equals 9.4 to 26.9 MT yield improvement (WWF 2012). They indicate that certification 
adoption is profitable as the benefits generally outweigh the costs of implementation. 
Beall (2012) also used the concept of profitability to measure monetary effects of 
palm oil certification on smallholders in Thailand. Beall (2012) simply subtracted the 
average costs of certification from the average income (per hectare/year) in one specific 
year. However, she neglected investment costs and possible long-term benefits, such as 
the effects of yield improvement. She did however consider different scenarios for pre-
mium fee, yields and fertilizer costs in her analysis. The study points out that certification 
is only financially viable if smallholders receive a premium fee higher than US$ 13.34/ton 
crude palm oil (CPO), if certification increase yields, and if fertilizer costs decrease.  
Where Beall (2012) analyzed the profitability of certification in one random year, 
Wangrakdiskul and Yodpijit (2013) performed a cost-benefit analysis of RSPO certifica-
tion for Thai smallholders based on 5 years. Wangrakdiskul and Yodpijit (2013) conclude 
that the prevailing premium fee of $15/ ton CPO is not enough to make RSPO certifica-
tion a profitable project for farmers. The standard may however become profitable if 
training costs and certification costs decrease by 30% and if the premium price increases 
by 20%.    
These limited numbers of studies about the profitability of oil palm certification have 
some limitations. First, none of these studies assess the profitability of non-certified 
palm oil smallholders. This is however crucially important as smallholders will only con-
sider certification adoption if it results in higher net profits compared to their profit as 
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non-certified smallholder. Second, only parts of the certification costs are included in 
their analyses. Previous studies, for example, do not include investment costs, such as 
the cost for capacity development, membership fees, the establishment of waste man-
agement systems, and safety tools into their calculations. Therefore, it is not unlikely 
that the results of these studies give a too positive impression of the profitability of 
certification. Third, previous studies only assess the profitability of palm oil certification 
for one year net return (Beall 2012),  or for one certification project life cycle (5 years, 
see Wangrakdiskul and Yodpijit 2013). Average oil palm plantations however, have a 
long lifespan of about 25 years (Pahan 2008). Zooming in on a specific period of the 
plantation neglects variations in productivity resulting from the age of the oil palms. This 
may lead to misleading conclusions, e.g. too low if the plantation under analysis is very 
young or too high if the plantation is in its most productive stage. Considering these 
limitations, we identify the need for a cost-benefit analysis to assess the profitability of 
palm oil certification for smallholders’ by comparing certified and non-certified farmers, 
considering the investment costs and the entire oil palm plantation lifecycle. 
3.3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Profitability is commonly defined as the ability of an investment project to earn a return 
from its use (Howard and Upton 1953) and generally implies that benefits are, or income 
is, higher than the costs. Following earlier research revealing financial benefits as the 
most important motivation for smallholders to participate in certification (Ibnu et al. 
2015, Hidayat et al. 2015, Ibnu et al. 2016), we have an additional requirement to speak 
of profitability as certified smallholders need to earn more profit than non-certified 
smallholders. To decompose all costs and benefits of palm oil certification we developed 
a conceptual framework (see Figure 6), which adopts four starting points: 
First, the profitability of certified and non-certified oil palm plantations depends on: 
(1) investment costs, such as the cost of establishing the plantation and purchasing agri-
cultural equipment, (2) operating costs, like the costs for fertilizer and labor, and (3) 
benefits resulting from the revenues of selling Fresh Fruit Bunch (FFB). Certified farmers 
have additional costs related to certification, but also additional benefits in the form of a 
premium fee (resulting from the certificate) and, for the certified independent small-
holders, a premium price (resulting from higher quality FFB).  
Second,  we assume that profitability  may  be influenced by governmental policies or 
programs such as fertilizer subsidies, and relationships between farmers and market 
chains, for example in the form of contract farming (Simmons et al. 2005) or, specifically 
for Indonesia, Nucleus Estate Smallholder schemes (NES). 
Third, we also assume that social economic characteristics, such as relatively high 
education, long experience, good access to agricultural extension programs, tenancy, 
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and the presence of non-farm income may contribute to smallholder’s profit (Rahman 
2003).    
 
Figure 6. Conceptual framework to assess profitability of certification adoption 
 
Fourth, following Simula et al. (2004), we distinguish between direct costs and bene-
fits and indirect costs and benefits of certification (see Figure 7). The direct costs refer to 
all costs associated with the certification process, such as the auditing costs and costs to 
prepare for the certification process. Indirect costs result from activities that are re-
quired as part of the certification, such as document recording, and the costs for soil and 
water conservation.  
Direct benefits are monetary benefits directly resulting from certification (premium 
fee and premium price). The indirect benefits consist of monetary benefits (e.g. cost 
reductions resulting from economies of scale, higher revenues following better FFB qual-
ity, and reductions in FFB depreciation resulting from better harvesting practices and 
post harvesting treatments) and non-monetary benefits. The latter relate to human 
capital (for example, better knowledge), social capital (e.g. participation in farmer organ-
izations) and natural capital (e.g. better environmental quality) (see Hidayat et al. 2015 
for more information).    
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Source: adopted from Simula et al. (2004)  
Figure 7. Monetary costs and benefits of the certification adoption 
3.4. RESEARCH METHODS 
In order to assess the profitability of certification adoption, we interviewed five groups 
of smallholders: (1) certified scheme smallholders, (2) non-certified scheme smallhold-
ers, (3) certified independent smallholders, (4) non-certified independent smallholders 
and (5) prospective independent smallholders. Prospective smallholders are non-
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certified independent smallholders who are in the preparation phase to become certi-
fied. Although they do not comply to all standards yet, they can be considered to be 
organized around a miller company already, and therefore generally receive higher pric-
es for their products compared to non-certified independent smallholders. The surveyed 
smallholder groups were selected using cluster sampling techniques. We interviewed 
214 smallholders, 50 being drawn from each of the certified and noncertified groups 
(both scheme and independent) and 14 from the prospective smallholders. To guarantee 
data reliability we conducted interviews aimed at verification of the data with 7 inform-
ants: the head of a farmer association (N=1) and cooperative (N=1), plantation workers 
(N=2), experienced smallholders (N=2), and a Nucleus Company representative (N=1).  
To analyze whether certified smallholders gain more profit than non-certified small-
holders, we calculated and compared the Net Present Value (NPV) of all smallholder 
groups
3
 through a two-step approach. In the first step we calculated the present nomi-
nal values of costs and benefits based on interviews with farmers. In these interviews we 
asked the farmers about the quantity of their FFB production/ kapling = 2ha/ year, the 
latest price received for their FFB, and the latest input costs. 
To estimate past and future costs and benefits, we asked the farmers to specify 
quantities of products used and sold in the past
4
 and we approached quantities of prod-
ucts in the future by interviewing farmers and agronomist palm oil experts. These quan-
tities are multiplied with current prices to specify past and future costs and benefits in 
cash flow.    
Directly summing up these values to calculate the overall NPV of a plantation for its 
entire lifetime would neglect the influence of time preference. Therefore, in the second 
step we corrected all costs and benefits resulting from the first step- for time prefer-
ence. We multiplied the numbers for costs and benefits that resulted from the first step 
by the compounded interest factor for the years in the past till the present time. We 
multiplied values in the future by the discount factor for the years between the current 
plantation’s age and 25 years. The used formula of NPV equals: 
 = ∑ 

	
 − ∑ 

	
        (1) 
 = ∑ 

	
 + ∑ 

	  − ∑ 

	
 +∑ 

	   (2) 
 = ∑  − 

	
 + ∑  − 

	    (3)
                                                                 
3
 Alternative methods to measure the profitability of certification exist, for example, modelling the same 
smallholders with and without certification based on data about what changes as a result of certification. 
Although also offering relevant results, it may neglect profit-related factors that only apply to one specific 
group of smallholders (independent, scheme or prospective). Therefore we decided to follow the approach as 
suggested in this article. 
4
 Different from prices, farmers record quantities of products used and sold in a detailed way. 
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Where, 
 = Present value benefit year-t; where compounding
5
 is used if 0≤t≤z (for the 
past, and discounting
6
 is used if z≤t≤n (for the future) 
 = Present value cost year-t; where compounding
7
 is used if 0≤t≤z (for the past), 
and discounting
8
 is used if z≤t≤n (for the future) 
t   = year-t 
z   = age of the plantation (representing the present point of time) 
n   = project life time (25 years, based on the economic life-time of oil palm trees) 
r  = real discount rate (5.58 %)
9
 
Following our earlier mentioned interpretation of profitability we consider certifica-
tion profitable if the NPV of certified farmers is higher than the NPV of non-certified 
farmers (see Figure 8). However, to be sure that differences in NPV can be attributed to 
certification, we included three control variables that are largely believed to influence 
profit in our analysis: 
Socio-economic characteristics to control for the potential effects of education, ex-
perience and the receipt of governmental support on profits. These characteristics were 
included in a regression analysis
10
. We define the average of last year’s monthly profit 
(B-C) as dependent variable whereas the independent variable of certification refers to 
the level of compliance with the certification standard (1=non-compliance/ uncertified, 
2=in the process to certification, but not fully certified yet and 3=full compliance/ certi-
fied) (CERT). Subsequent independent variables include: government support 
(GOV_USED), education (EDU), experience (EXP), income from other activities than oil 
palm plantation (OTH_I), status of smallholders/scheme or independent smallholders 
(STATUS), ownership of other oil palm plantations (OTH_LAND), and productivity per 
kapling (PROD). The equation of the regression analysis equals:  
                                                                 
5
 =  ∗ 		 !;where 		 ! = 1 + # if z≤t≤n; 
FT = future value, PV=Present Value, t=year-t, z=age of plantation (in the year of observation), n=project life 
time of the plantation  
6
  = $ ∗ %!	 !; where %!	 ! = 1 1 + #⁄  if 0≤t≤z; PastV = Past value, 
PV=Present Value, t=year-t, z=age of plantation (in the year of observation) 
7 
See footnote 5  
8
 See footnote 6 
9
 We use real interest rates (real discount rate) because we also used constant or current prices to estimate 
past and future benefits and costs in step 1 (instead of nominal prices). The real interest rate is calculated by 
subtracting inflation rates from nominal interest rates: 12% (based on the average (nominal) commercial credit 
interest in Indonesia in 2014) - 6.42% (based on average of inflation rate in 2014) = 5.58%  
10 
Although we see that it may be reasonable to include the age of a plantation as independent variable,  it 
could not be done for this case, as we have already included the experience of farmers (in years) as an inde-
pendent variable. The majority of farmers are under their first plantation cycle. Therefore, the plantation’s age 
and the farmers’ experience are –in almost all cases- similar. Including both would result in severe multicollin-
earity problems. The selection of variables results from the literature overview provided in section on the 
conceptual framework and relies on Simmons, Winters, and Patrick (2005), Rahman (2003)  
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INCOM_MON = f (CERT, GOV_USED, EDU, EXP, OTH_I, STATUS, OTH_LAND, PROD)  
If the variable certification (CERT) significantly influences last year’s monthly profit 
(B-C), we can conclude that certification explains variation in profitability.  
Organization. To see whether differences in NPV mainly result from certification or 
from a better organizational structure in which the certified farmers are embedded, we 
included the NPV of prospective independent farmers (who are organized already, but 
not certified yet) in our analysis. We calculated the NPV values for this group and per-
formed an independent T-test to statistically compare the differences in profit between 
the different smallholder groups.      
Pre-condition before certification. Hidayat et al. (2015) observed that certified small-
holders may have been better off in terms of productivity before they became certified 
compared to non-certified farmers. In a first step, we therefore used the independent T-
test to compare the productivity of certified smallholders before and after certification 
adoption. If this test indeed reveals no significant differences between the productivity 
before and after certification adoption, we can conclude that the certified smallholders 
have been better off, and continue to control for the influence of productivity on profit-
ability by defining the NPV of a so-called preliminary group. This group comprises certi-
fied smallholders that are treated as non-certified by leaving out all costs and benefits 
directly related to certification. In Figure 8, the criteria for profitability that are adopted 
in this study are summarized. 
The second research question considers the profitability of certification in the case 
that smallholders have to pay the costs of certification themselves. Although external 
stakeholders, i.e. companies, NGOs, and other donors, currently pay certification costs 
for the farmers, the long-term continuation of this support is uncertain (Hidayat et al. 
2015).  This issue was addressed by complementing the NPV with a sensitivity analysis 
(Campbell and Brown 2003, 195) in which we included certification costs and premiums 
as critical variables. We performed the sensitivity analysis under a so-called self-funded 
scenario, which is the scenario wherein certified smallholders pay all certification costs 
themselves (while maintaining the premium prices and fee). For the certified scheme 
smallholders we consider it likely that they will receive the premium fee themselves in 
the self-funded scenario; i.e. if they have to pay the costs themselves, they will also 
receive the benefits themselves. Other institutional arrangements between smallholders 
and their nucleus company do not change in the self-funded scenario. This implies that 
the nucleus company remains responsible for providing agricultural assistance (training), 
monitoring and paying the RSPO membership fee (as in the RSPO, the out-grower small-
holders are part of the company and registered under the company’s name). Compared 
to the procedure followed to answer the first research question, we included the certifi-
cation costs in the calculation of the NPV for the certified farmers. Next, we also includ-
ed the benefits from receiving premium fees in the calculation of the NPV of certified 
scheme smallholders.  
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Figure 8. Criteria for profitability:  Certification is profitable if the certified NPVs are higher than the NPVs of 
the controlling groups (i.e. non-certified smallholders, prospective smallholders and preliminary smallholders 
(those who were better off already before joining certification)) 
If the results of the sensitivity analysis show that certification is not profitable under 
the self-funded condition, we employ a switching value analysis to determine the size of 
a minimum premium fee to make certification profitable. To also consider uncertainties 
regarding the provision of premium prices, that heavily depend on company policies, we 
calculate the size of the premium fee in two situations: (1) premium prices are available 
and (2) premium prices are not available. Premium prices are paid per ton CPO or Palm 
Kernel Oil (PKO). Based on interviews with employees from the nucleus companies and 
heads of independent smallholder associations we equal 1 ton of the scheme smallhold-
ers’ FFB to 21% CPO and 5% PKO, and 1 ton of the independent smallholders’ FFB to 
19.4% CPO and 2% PKO.  
3.5. STUDY SITES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SMALLHOLDER 
RESPONDENTS  
This study was conducted in two important oil palm producer regions in Indonesia, i.e. 
Riau and South Sumatra. These study sites were purposely selected as the first certified 
  
NPV non certified 
within the same 
category (a=scheme/ 
b=independent) 
NPV prospective 
independent c 
NPV without within the same 
category (d=scheme/ 
e=independent) 
NPV certified scheme  
(A) 
Profitability of certifi-
cation for scheme 
smallholders 
(O) = (A-a) 
NA Profitability of certification  for 
scheme smallholders corrected 
by all factors  that might influ-
ence yield and profit such as age 
of plantation, agricultural prac-
tices used; only consider direct 
costs and benefits of certification  
(R) = (A-d) 
NPV certified inde-
pendent 
(B) 
Profitability of certifi-
cation for independ-
ent smallholders  
(P) = (B-b) 
Profitability of certifi-
cation for independ-
ent smallholders 
corrected by influ-
ence of organization 
on profit  
(Q) = (B-c) 
Profitability of certification for 
independent smallholders cor-
rected by all factors that might 
influence yield and profit such as 
age of plantation, agricultural 
practices used; only consider 
direct costs and benefits of 
certification  
(S) = (B-e) 
The adoption of certification is profitable for the smallholders if O, P, Q, R and S are positive.      
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independent smallholders and the first certified scheme smallholders reside in Riau and 
South Sumatera respectively. The non-certified and certified smallholders were selected 
within the same district and therefore located in vicinity of each other. Almost all 
scheme smallholders and certified independent smallholders are Javanese ex-
transmigrants, while the non-certified independent smallholders consisted of Javanese 
migrants and locals (Melayunese and Bataknese).  
Most smallholders are between 41 and 60 years old and have more than 15 years’ 
experience in managing oil palm plantations; 89% of the respondents are men and most 
smallholders have had a low education. For 96% of the smallholders, palm oil encom-
passes their main source of income. The average land area owned by the certified 
scheme smallholders equals 3.90 hectare (ha) and does not differ substantially for the 
non-certified scheme, certified independent, and non-certified independent smallhold-
ers, as their land ownership covers 3.21 ha, 3.87 ha and 3.82 ha respectively. The pro-
spective smallholders own, however, relatively smaller plots: 2.21 ha on average. Ap-
proximately 33% of the smallholders own both independent plantations and scheme 
plantations, while 42% of the respondents solely own independent plantations and 25% 
only scheme plantations. The smallholders who own both types of plantation are treated 
either as independent or scheme smallholder, based on the status of their farmer organ-
ization.  
All plantations covered by this research are matured, although the average age of the 
plantations differs between the smallholder groups. The scheme smallholder’s planta-
tions are relatively old (22 years in the case of the certified scheme smallholders, and 25 
years for non-certified scheme smallholders), which implies that their productivity will 
steadily decrease. The plantations of the independent smallholders are younger: 15 
years on average in the case of the certified independent smallholders and 13 year for 
the non-certified smallholders. This means that these plantations are currently on, or 
just before, the top of their productivity. As we consider and calculate the profitability of 
the entire palm oil plantation life-span (t=25, see section 3.4 on research methods) these 
differences in the plantations’ age will be considered in our study and therefore not bias 
our results. 
3.6. PROFITABILITY OF PALM OIL CERTIFICATION UNDER ACTUAL 
CONDITIONS 
Our profitability analysis suggests that oil palm certification is currently profitable for 
scheme and independent smallholders. The NPV of certified scheme smallholders is 35% 
or $48,919.72 higher than the NPV of the non-certified scheme smallholders. For inde-
pendent smallholders, certification is even more profitable as the NPV of certified inde-
pendent smallholders is 89% or $39,279.38 higher than for the non-certified independ-
ent smallholders (Table 5). Although the certified scheme smallholders can be consid-
Livelihood resilience of Indonesian palm oil smallholders: An analysis among different 
types of smallholders with and without certification  
 
61 
 
ered the most profitable palm oil farmer group, the independent smallholders relatively 
gain most when they become certified (e.g. a 89% increase in profit).    
Table 5. Net Present Values of smallholders’ oil palm plantations 
No. Type of smallholder Certification NPV ($) 
1 Scheme Certified 187,854.23 
2 Scheme Non-certified 138,934.52 
3 Independent Certified 83,603.19 
4 Independent Non-certified 44,323.81 
5 Independent Prospective non-certified 62,368.45 
 The certified scheme smallholders have a higher NPV than the non-certified scheme 
smallholders because they have higher benefits (32%) and lower operating costs (9%) 
(See Table 6 and Table 7). The higher benefits result from higher productivity, and fol-
lowing from this, higher FFB sales. The productivity of the certified scheme smallholders 
reaches on average 25 ton/year/ha, whereas the non-certified scheme smallholders 
produce around 19 ton/year/ha. The certified scheme smallholder’s premium fee is 
received and managed by the farmer organizations that also pay the certification costs. 
In terms of operating and investment costs, the certified scheme smallholders pay rela-
tively lower costs than the non-certified scheme smallholders (see Table 7). This results 
from the lower costs for the plantation’s establishment and lower costs for spraying. The 
latter can be explained by referring to their centralized plantation management system 
that allows benefiting from purchasing large quantities for lower prices and changing 
agricultural practices that require less chemical usage.
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Table 6. Benefits of the oil palm smallholders, average value per year
11,12
 
Smallholder group 
FFB selling 
($/year/kapling) 
Premium price 
($/year) 
Premium fee 
($/year) 
Total benefit 
Certified scheme  6,492.39 - - 6,492.39 
Non-certified scheme  4,900.45 - - 4,900.45 
Certified independent 4,950.64 197.14*) 60.00*) 5,207.78 
Non-certified independent  3,037.33 - - 3,037.33 
Prospective independent  4,280.38 177.02*) - 4,457.40 
Note: *)
 
The
 
average is counted by considering the period in which the smallholders have adopted the certifica-
tion: for the scheme smallholders this equals 6 years and for the independent smallholders 13 years.  
 
The difference between the NPV of the certified and non-certified independent 
smallholders’ results from higher benefits, and not from lower costs as was the case for 
the scheme smallholders. A higher productivity, resulting from changing practices, again 
explains why certified independent smallholders have higher benefits than the non-
certified independent smallholders. (On average, the productivity of the non-certified 
smallholders equals 12 ton/year/ha, compared to 15 ton/year/ha for the prospective 
smallholders and 17 ton/year/ha for the certified independent smallholders). Moreover, 
a stronger organization opens opportunities for the certified independent smallholders 
to bypass middlemen through directly selling their FFB to a Miller Company. This results 
in higher selling prices that lie around $17 (per ton FFB) higher than the prices for FFB 
received by the non-certified smallholders. Additionally, the certified independent 
smallholders receive a premium price of about $5/ton FFB (average premium price of 
the last year) or $197.14/year/kapling from the Affiliated Miller Company. The sale of 
Green Palm certificates (i.e. premium fees) offers another $60.00/year/kapling to the 
certified independent smallholders. The prospective independent smallholders do not 
receive premium fees from the Green Palm certificate sales yet, but they do benefit 
from higher FFB prices as they are already affiliated to a miller company (see Table 6).   
                                                                 
11
 The average is counted by considering the period in which the smallholders have adopted the certification: 
for the scheme smallholders this equals 6 years and for the independent smallholders 13 years.   
12
 Standard deviation: overall=28%; certified scheme=14%; non-certified scheme=20%; certified independ-
ent=17%; prospective independent=29%; non-certified independent=34% 
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Table 7. Costs for Indonesian oil palm smallholders, average value per year
13
 
Costs structure 
Certified 
scheme 
Non-
certified 
scheme 
Certified 
independ-
ent 
Non-
certified 
independ-
ent 
Prospec-
tive 
independ-
ent 
Investment costs 351.27 389.37 388.85 293.26 271.47 
Land - - 226.04 197.10 164.03 
Agricultural Equipment 74.78 79.18 85.64 51.96 51.96 
Plantation establishment 276.49 290.53 47.37 32.88 39.10 
Land clearing - - 22.02 9.68 9.94 
Rehabilitation of Plantation - 7.93 - - - 
FFB collecting place - 11.73 7.78 1.63 6.44 
Contribution of farmers to associa-
tion /costs of certification 
- - 30.75 - 31.78 
Operating costs 1,390.34 1,529.85 1,439.04 1,020.78 1,341.39 
Plantation maintenance 
     
Spraying 76.12 176.51 102.45 138.46 158.54 
Irrigation and tapak kuda
14 
maintenance 
7.97 22.62 5.26 39.75 - 
Fertilizer application 442.14 469.04 744.05 629.38 665.94 
Pruning 88.66 103.01 73.24 70.14 36.42 
Management Fee 16.08 112.49 80.68 - 71.11 
Road maintenance 45.77 16.08 54.80 - 77.74 
Harvesting 385.85 358.59 192.59 143.05 125.93 
Weighing - 59.99 40.34 - 35.56 
Transportation costs 327.76 211.52 145.63 - 170.16 
The cost structure also differs between scheme and independent certified farmers 
(see Table 7). Whereas the certification costs of the scheme smallholders are paid by the 
affiliated Miller Companies, the certified independent smallholders pay the certification 
costs themselves. The results furthermore indicate that certified independent small-
holders have higher investment- and operating costs compared to their non-certified 
counterparts. This can be explained by the fact that non-certified independent small-
holders generally have a lack of capital (Molenaar et al. 2013), therefore, they often 
used low quality of seedlings, limited agricultural equipment e.g. manual weeding tools, 
                                                                 
13
 Coefficient of variation (CV): overall=28%; certified scheme=11%; non-certified scheme=22%; certified 
independent=15%; prospective independent=24%; non-certified independent=42%. The CV for non-certified 
independent is relatively high due to variation in input use, as a consequence of differences in capital owner-
ship. It further implies higher CV of profit gained by non-certified independent smallholders. 
14 
Tapak kuda (horseshoe) is a technique of soil and water conservation in oil palm plantation which located on 
sloped areas (3◦-28◦) 
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no adequate safety tools, and they apply land clearance with slash and burning, which is 
commonly done by family labor. Moreover, non-certified independent smallholders are 
not organized, and therefore do not have to pay management fees. Next, although by-
passing middlemen may result in higher FFB prices, it may also reduce income for the 
independent smallholders, as the middlemen pay for the post-harvesting expenses of 
non-certified independent smallholders (e.g. transportation costs). In addition, due to 
the lack of capital the non-certified independent (Molenaar et al. 2013), smallholders 
generally use lower amounts of fertilizers and commonly use family labor for pruning 
and harvesting, which further reduces their monetary costs. Only some operating costs 
(e.g. spraying and irrigation) are higher for the non-certified independent smallholders 
than for the certified independent smallholders as the former generally apply blanket 
spraying (or total spraying), which is banned by the RSPO, and involves higher costs. 
Irrigation costs only play a minor role in explaining differences in profit as it is only appli-
cable to young plantations; maintenance is however  applicable for the entire  plantation 
life time.         
3.7. CONTROLLING THE RELATION BETWEEN CERTIFICATION AND 
PROFITABILITY FOR ORGANIZATION, SOCIO DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHARACTERISTICS, GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT AND PRE-CONDITIONS  
Although the results in section 3.6 seem to indicate a positive relationship between 
certification and profit, we want to verify this relation through a regression analysis 
wherein we also include other variables (see the section 3.4, on research methods). 
First, the regression analysis (see Table 8) shows that certification significantly and posi-
tively contributes to smallholder’s profit (P=0.001). Second, the inclusion of an organiza-
tion variable in the profit analysis for the independent smallholders indicates that the 
organized (non-certified) independent smallholders obtain significantly more profit than 
the non-certified smallholders (P=0.011, see Table 5). The profit may further increase if 
the smallholders fully comply with the certification (P=0.013, see Table 9). Certification 
therefore seems to be an important vehicle to increase profit in the sense that it opens 
opportunities for better organization in relation to the Miller Companies, and for better 
access to training. Better organization ultimately leads to benefits in terms of higher FFB 
prices and improved productivity.  
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Table 8. The results of the regression analysis: we observe significant effects of certification, status and produc-
tivity on profit 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statis-
tics 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -
956.833 
174.651 
 
-5.479 0.000   
Certification
15
 113 190 33.034 0.080 3.426 0.001 0.624 1.603 
Other income -34.908 140.793 -0.005 -0.248 0.804 0.892 1.121 
Other land outside 
current land 
29.493 61.158 0.010 0.482 0.63 0.773 1.294 
Experience -6.773 3.93 -0.034 -1.724 0.086 0.845 1.184 
Education 7.079 8.951 0.015 0.791 0.43 0.977 1.024 
Productivity per kapling 126.738 3.326 0.899 38.107 0.000 0.607 1.647 
Dummy Government 
Support
16
 
33.682 63.884 0.012 0.527 0.599 0.628 1.592 
Status
17
 183.258 68.683 0.067 2.668 0.008 0.542 1.845 
F-test=344.377; R2=0.931; Prob-F=0.000 
Third, Table 8 shows that smallholders’ profit is not influenced by governmental sup-
port and socio-economic variables such as education, experience, ownership of other 
plantations, or having alternative sources of income. Certification, status and pre-
condition before certification productivity, however, significantly influence smallholder’s 
profit. The significant and positive relation between certification and profit validates our 
argumentation in section 3.6. The significant effect of status refers to the fact that 
scheme smallholders (both certified and non-certified) gain significantly more profit than 
the independent smallholders. This can be explained by referring to the scheme small-
holders’ higher productivity, the higher prices for their FFB, and the technological sup-
port they receive from their NES Company. Further, Table 8 shows that productivity is 
the most important variable explaining variation in the smallholders’ profit. The higher 
the productivity of the smallholders, the higher their profit.    
                                                                 
15
The scores  describe the level of  compliance with the certification standard (1=non-compliance/ uncertified, 
2=in the process to certification, but not fully certified yet and 3=full compliance/ certified)  
16
 Dummy government support: 1=receive government support; 0=do not receive government support 
17
 Status: 1=scheme smallholders; 0=independent smallholders 
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Table 9. The results of the T-test analysis for fertilizer expenses, productivity, price, and profit among small-
holder groups 
 certified vs. non-
certified 
Independent 
smallholders 
Prospective vs. 
certified 
independent 
smallholders 
prospective vs. non-
certified 
independent 
smallholders 
non-certified vs. 
certified scheme 
smallholders 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Fertilizers 
expenses ($) 
0.002 194.6123 0.383 -57.7739 0.06 136.8384 0.281 -55.5086 
Productivity 
(ton/kapling/year) 
0.000 13.0732 0.003 -7.3866 0.055 5.6866 0.000 -6.89 
Price ($/ton) 0.000 17.84 0.601 -0.14 0.000 17.7 0.866 0.167 
Profit 
($/kapling/year) 
0.000 1799.282 0.013 -882.924 0.011 916.3584 0.000 -1223.4 
Fourth, and following from the important role of productivity in explaining profit, we 
analyzed the potential influence of pre-condition before certification productivity on 
profit. Table 10 indicates a significant difference in productivity before and after inde-
pendent smallholders become certified. We can say that, for the independent small-
holders, their productivity and therefore also their profit goes up as a result of certifica-
tion. For the scheme smallholders, however, we could not identify significant differences 
in productivity before and after the adoption of certification. This result indicates that 
the certified scheme smallholders may have been better off already before they joined 
the certification.  
Table 10. The result of T-test analysis of the certified smallholders before and after the certification adoption 
 Scheme smallholders 
(before and after) 
Independent smallholders  
(before and after) 
t-test for Equality of Means t-test for Equality of Means 
t Sig. (2-tailed) t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Productivity 1.271 0.219 3.966 0.002 
FFB sale
*)
 (Revenues) 1.096 0.287 4.221 0.001 
Note: *) It is analyzed based on price in 2014 
Figure 9 (last column) subsequently shows the effects of certification on NPV cor-
rected for the fact that (scheme) smallholders were already better off in terms of 
productivity before they adopted certification (see previous paragraph). The results 
show that the certified scheme smallholders still increase their profit by adopting certifi-
cation, although the additional profit is relatively low (0.06%).  
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 NPV non certified within 
the same category 
(a=scheme/ 
b=independent) 
NPV prospective inde-
pendent c 
NPV without within the same 
category (d=scheme/ 
e=independent) 
 (a= $138,934.52)  (d= $187,742.55) 
NPV certified 
scheme 
(A= $187,854.23) 
Profitability of certifica-
tion for scheme small-
holders 
NA Profitability of certification  
for scheme smallholders 
corrected by all factors  that 
might influence yield and 
profit such as age of planta-
tion, agricultural practices 
used; only consider direct 
costs and benefits of certifi-
cation 
 (O)=(A-a)= $48,919.72  (R)=(A-d) = $111.68 
 (b=$44,323.81) (c= $62,368.45) (e= $81,320.65) 
NPV certified 
independent 
(B= $83,603.19) 
Profitability of certifica-
tion for independent 
smallholders 
Profitability of certifica-
tion for independent 
smallholders corrected 
by influence of organiza-
tion on profit 
Profitability of certification 
for independent smallhold-
ers corrected by all factors 
that might influence yield 
and profit such as age of 
plantation, agricultural 
practices used; only consider 
direct costs and benefits of 
certification 
 (P) = (B-b)= $39,279.38 (Q)=(B-c)= $21,234.73 (S)=(B-e)= $2,282.54 
The adoption of certification is profitable for the smallholders if O, P, Q, R and S are positive. 
Figure 9. Summary of profitability of the certification adoption under actual condition 
Figure 9 shows that under the actual condition, where smallholders do not (fully) pay 
the costs of certification, certification adoption is profitable for all types of smallholders. 
Certified actors have a higher NPV than the uncertified actors. Although productivity and 
organization play a role in explaining differences in profit as well, certification still con-
tributes positively to the smallholder’s profit, also for well-organized non-certified small-
holders with a relatively high productivity. To what extent the certification can be con-
sidered profitable depends on the initial performance of the smallholders as adopters 
e.g. productivity, and their status (scheme or independent).     
3.8. ON THE SELF-FUNDED CONDITION: PROFITABILITY OF THE 
CERTIFICATION ADOPTION 
Under the self-funded scenario, in which the smallholders pay all certification costs 
themselves, certification adoption will still be profitable for the independent smallhold-
Chapter 3 
68 
 
ers, but not for the scheme smallholders who were already better off at the moment 
they become involved in certification (see Figure 10). The NPV of certified independent 
smallholders in this scenario is still much higher (i.e. 84%) than for the non-certified 
independent smallholders. The well-organized independent smallholders also still re-
ceive 31% higher profits (about $19,308.82 in terms of NPV) if they fully adopt certifica-
tion. Scheme smallholders with a low initial productivity improve their profitability by 
35% in the self-funded scenario.  However, for the scheme smallholders who have been 
better off (i.e. who had a high initial productivity), certification will not be economically 
appealing if they have to pay all certification costs themselves. Even if they receive the 
present premium fees, certification adoption will not be profitable as the scheme small-
holders’ NPV decreases by 0.14% (equal to $259.65).  
 
  
 
  
 NPV non certified 
within the same catego-
ry (a=scheme/ 
b=independent)  
 NPV prospective inde-
pendent c  
 NPV without within the 
same category (d=scheme/ 
e=independent)  
  (a= $138,934.52)   (d= $187,742.55)                          
 NPV certified 
scheme   
(A= $ 187,482.91) 
 Profitability of certifica-
tion for scheme small-
holders  
 NA   Profitability of certification  
for scheme smallholders 
corrected by all factors  that 
might influence yield and 
profit such as age of planta-
tion, agricultural practices 
used; only consider direct 
costs and benefits of certifi-
cation   
 (O)=(A-a)=$ 48,584.39 (R)=(A-d) = $ (-259.65)                                                            
  (b=$44,323.81) (c= $62,368.45) (e= $81,320.65) 
 NPV certified 
independent 
(B= $ 81,677.28) 
 Profitability of certifica-
tion for independent 
smallholders   
 Profitability of certifica-
tion for independent 
smallholders corrected 
by influence of organiza-
tion on profit   
 Profitability of certification 
for independent smallhold-
ers corrected by all factors 
that might influence yield 
and profit such as age of 
plantation, agricultural 
practices used; only consider 
direct costs and benefits of 
certification   
                          (P) = (B-b) =$37,353.47  (Q) = (B-c) = $19,308.82  (S) = (B-e) = $356.63  
 The adoption of certification is profitable for the smallholders if O, P, Q, R and S are positive.       
Figure 10. Profitability of certification adoption in the self-funded scenario 
Table 11 further specifies the certification costs for scheme and independent small-
holders in the self-funded scenario. These costs are much lower for the scheme small-
holders (56%) than for the independent smallholders. This results from the fact that 
some costs are necessary to be paid by independent smallholders but not by the scheme 
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smallholders (for example data verification costs, certification group establishment (As-
sociation), RSPO membership costs, compliance to legal aspects (Cultivation Registration 
Certificate/Surat Tanda Daftar Budidaya/STDB) and the operating costs of farmer associ-
ations). Moreover, due to the connectedness of scheme smallholders with their Nucleus 
Company, some certification costs, like the costs of training and internal audits, can be 
saved as they are taken up by the Nucleus Company.  
Table 11. Annual costs of certification adoption in the self-funded scenario 
Costs of the certification component 
Certified scheme*) 
($/year) 
Certified inde-
pendent*) 
($/year) 
Direct costs 44.75  65.94  
Audit implementation 0.23 - 
Capacity building and training - 13.49 
Data verification - 0.22 
External audit 44.35 37.03 
Follow up audit 0.18 8.02 
Internal audit - 3.25 
organization establishment - 2.86 
RSPO membership - 1.07 
Indirect costs 56.07  164.82  
Document recording 36.00 5.89 
Environmental and biodiversity standard compliance 6.24 2.60 
Farmer organization meeting and for independent small-
holders also incentive for ICS  
8.10 130.92 
Legal aspect compliance (STDB/ Cultivation Registration Cer-
tificate) 
- 
7.76 
operational costs of organization - 5.82 
Social standard compliance 5.74 11.84 
Total Costs of the certification per year 100.83 230.76 
Note: *)
 
The
 
average is counted by considering the period in which the smallholders have adopted the certifi-
cation: for the scheme smallholders this equals 6 years and for the independent smallholders 13 years.   
In the scenario we assume that not the farmer groups, but the smallholders receive 
the premium fees and prices (see section 3.4). This implies that the certified scheme 
smallholders receive a premium fee in the worth of $37.35/ year, while the certified 
independent smallholders maintain their $197.14/year premium price and $60.00/year 
premium fee (Table 12). 
 
Table 12. Benefits of certification in the self-funded scenario 
Smallholder group Premium price ($/year) Premium fee ($/year) 
Certified scheme - 37.35*) 
Certified independent 197.14*) 60.00*) 
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Note: *) The average is counted by considering the period in which the smallholders have adopted the certifi-
cation: for the scheme smallholders this equals 6 years and for the independent smallholders 13 years.   
To transform certification into a profitable investment project for the scheme small-
holders in the self-funded scenario, a minimum premium fee of $8.6/ton CPO, which is 
roughly twice as much as the fee that is currently received by the scheme smallholders’ 
organization ($4/ton CPO), is necessary. The minimum premium fee decreases if the 
scheme smallholders adopt certification from the beginning of the plantation period, as 
this may allow costs to be distributed over a longer period. In the case of early adoption, 
a minimum premium fee of $8.5/ton CPO is necessary to maintain the same profitability 
compared to the pre-condition before certification (break-even point). As this is still a 
significantly higher amount compared to the current fees, it is questionable whether 
certification will be profitable for scheme smallholders in the self-funded scenario.   
In the long-term, the receipt of a premium price is uncertain as it relies on the poli-
cies of affiliated companies to provide an incentive for independent smallholders of 
being certified and applying the best management practices. If the independent small-
holders do not receive premium prices anymore, but nonetheless pay all certification 
costs themselves, certification adoption is no longer profitable for them: the NPV will go 
down by 5%. In this case, the independent smallholders need to receive a minimum of 
$29.7/ ton CPO to reach the break-even point. Considering the rate of the actual premi-
um fee for independent smallholders, which  reaches $15/ton (Wangrakdiskul and 
Yodpijit 2013), the sustainability certification may only be profitable for independent 
smallholders if they receive a  premium fee that is 93% higher than the actual premium 
fee. However, this seems to be an unrealistic situation, particularly as the supply of 
Crude Sustainable Palm Oil (CSPO) is already much higher than the demand, leading to 
an oversupply of 55%
18
. Given this oversupply, it is unlikely that premium fees will in-
crease dramatically. Therefore, certification will likely not be profitable for independent 
smallholders in the self-funded scenario wherein premium prices will be cut.  
3.9. BEYOND DIRECT MONETARY BENEFITS 
Next to monetary benefits, certification contributed positively to non-monetary aspects. 
These aspects include ease of selling FFB, participation in farmer organizations, access to 
knowledge and training, better safety and health, environmental conservation and bio-
diversity.  
After joining the RSPO, the independent smallholders perceive better access to a mil-
ler company, which made it easier to sell their FFB. However, for scheme smallholders, 
certification does not contribute to better market access, because they are already con-
                                                                 
18
 CSPO production in 2014= 11,909,121 tonnes; CSPO uptake in 2014= 5,349,666 tonnes 
(http://www.rspo.org/about/impacts) 
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tractually bound to a miller company from the moment they join the Nucleus Estate 
Smallholder (NES) scheme.  
Both independent smallholders and scheme smallholders argue that certification en-
hances the exchange of knowledge and participation of smallholders in farmer organiza-
tions. Farmer organization meetings are attended more frequently by certified scheme 
smallholders compared to non-certified scheme smallholders. Similarly, the participation 
of certified independent smallholders in farmer organizations increases after they be-
come certified. Through these regular meetings, members have the opportunity to be-
come informed about activities undertaken by the farmer organization, which contrib-
utes to transparency and accountability, and about recent developments in, or affecting, 
the palm oil sector.  
Further, certification is believed to improve the safety and health of farmers, both for 
the independent and scheme smallholders. The farmers are, for example, required to 
use safety tools and instructed on how to use safer equipment. The health condition of 
the farmers is checked regularly and health care expenses are covered by cooperatives 
or associations. The latter does not only lead to better health, but also to lower expenses 
(around $11.67 - $ 158.13 for medical expenses and $26 - $120 regarding the redundan-
cy of an income-free recovery period after accidents that may occur without certifica-
tion). 
Certification also creates awareness about the importance of environmental conser-
vation (Brandi et al. 2013). Certified farmers arrange the palm oil midrib in the planta-
tion in a specific way, planting Bamboo or other trees along the river and do not apply 
chemical substances along the river side to reduce erosion and pollution of waterways.  
Almost all certified scheme and independent smallholders apply soil and water conserva-
tion techniques, which they evaluate as a positive effect of certification.   
Protecting biodiversity is one important objective of the RSPO and was –among other 
causes- threatened by illegal hunting practices. However, we found that most smallhold-
ers, also those who are not certified (yet), do not hunt protected animals. The small-
holders prefer to use natural predators to get rid of unwanted species, but, in alignment  
with Brandi et al. (2013), we found that certification increases knowledge about inte-
grated pest management (IPM). Therefore, besides leaving useful animals, such as mice-
eating snakes, in their plantation, certified scheme- and independent smallholders tend 
to plant Turnera ulmifolia (yellow alder) as a habitat for natural predators consuming 
bagworms (moths damaging oil palm trees),  and build owl nests as a natural way to 
contribute to eradicating pests. The protection of biodiversity implies that the small-
holders use less chemicals in their plantation. It, therefore, contributes to a better health 
and prevents soil degradation ultimately contributing to sustained long-term income.  
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3.10. CONCLUSION 
This paper contributes to our understanding of the profitability of palm oil certification 
for Indonesian smallholders and to methodological and conceptual advancements in the 
academic field of sustainability certification. Our conceptualization of certification as a 
profitable investment project is rather novel as it not only considers the profit resulting 
from certification, but also compares this profit to the profit of non-certified actors. 
Smallholders will only consider certification adoption if they can increase their profit 
compared to their current, non-certified situation. Methodologically we presented a 
procedure to include a more realistic range of costs and benefits for both certified and 
non-certified farmers. By doing so we also considered direct and indirect costs and bene-
fits of certification, as well as the entire lifespan of a plantation. Neglecting the entire 
lifespan may lead to misleading conclusions as a plantation’s productivity, and therefore 
profit, strongly depends on its age. Next, some costs that mainly apply to young planta-
tions (e.g. irrigation), may be neglected if the analysis only considers matured planta-
tions. Given these novelties, this research can be considered to offer a clearer and more 
nuanced picture of the profitability of sustainability certification.  
Under the actual condition, in which the smallholders do not pay the certification 
costs, certification adoption is profitable for all different types of smallholders (scheme 
smallholders and independent smallholders). To what extent the adoption is profitable 
depends on the smallholder’s conditions before they adopt the certification. In the self-
funded scenario wherein smallholders pay all certification costs themselves, certification 
remains profitable for smallholders except for scheme smallholders who were already 
better off before certification. Certification might still be profitable for them if they 
would receive premium fee $8.6/ton CPO. However, as this amount is twice as much as 
what is currently received by their organization, we doubt whether certification will ever 
be profitable for these smallholders in the self-funded scenario. For independent small-
holders, premium prices turned out to be crucial to speak of certification as a profitable 
investment project in the self-funded scenario. A collapse of premium prices implies that 
the independent smallholders would need $29.7/ ton CPO premium fee to reach a 
breakeven position. This amount of fee is however twice as much as the current premi-
um fee. Considering the current oversupply of sustainable palm oil (SPO), it seems that 
an 100% increase in premium fee is not realistic. Therefore, it is very unlikely that certifi-
cation remains profitable for independent smallholders if they do not receive premium 
prices anymore in the self-funded scenario.  
The practical relevance of this study is two-fold. First, it may support the RSPO’s in-
tention to bring in more smallholders. The results indicate that in the present situation, 
certification is financially profitable for all types of smallholders. Given the fact that fi-
nancial considerations are among the most important drivers for smallholders to join 
certification, communication of the results may result in higher smallholder adoption 
rates and make smallholders decide to invest upfront costs with the prospect of higher 
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profits. Although investment costs for independent smallholders can be substantially 
limited by making use of hand-tools and family labor, the time needed to develop a well 
running plantation will be relatively high. It may be good to smoothen the access of 
independent smallholders to credit. We have also seen that certification adoption is not 
only profitable for farmers with young plantations, but also for farmers with old planta-
tions (20-25 years). This indicates that certification as an investment project already 
offers tangible benefits in the short term. What we have furthermore seen is that certifi-
cation (although still being profitable) does not significantly contribute to a better 
productivity for the scheme smallholders. The explanation is that these smallholders 
were already better off in terms of productivity before they became involved in the 
certification process. The question why the certification process with its trainings and 
focus on Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) does not succeed to increase the productivity 
of this group of smallholders needs further investigation. Possibly, the plantation’s age 
may play a role in this, or the level and intensity of trainings that are (sometimes) al-
ready provided to scheme smallholders by the affiliated companies. 
Second, it may contribute to better targeting certification programs (privately e.g. 
RSPO and publicly e.g. ISPO) for the benefit of the smallholders. We furthermore found 
that the organization of farmers around a miller company significantly contributes to 
higher profits. Such an organization assures higher FFB prices, lower costs, and better 
opportunities to structurally sell FFB. In the current structure, however, it is impossible 
for independent smallholders to become organized around a miller company without 
being in the process towards certification. Certification in this scenario will still be profit-
able, but also implies a rather long and sometimes difficult process to comply with all 
formal requirements. Organization on the other hand, would be a faster less complicat-
ed process if it is focused around an agreement between farmer groups and a miller 
company. Investing in organization may therefore be an effective form of government 
involvement, especially as our results indicate that governmental provision of seeds and 
fertilizer does not contribute to farmer’s profits. A further exploration of the ineffective-
ness of current governmental programs to increase profits, and the potential role of the 
government in organizing farmers around miller companies, would be an interesting 
topic for further research. Furthermore, if certification will turn out to be a self-funded 
project, it is absolutely crucial that premium prices will be maintained. Otherwise, certi-
fied farmers will need unrealistically high amounts of premium fee, which most likely 
implies that certification adoption will no longer be profitable.  
This study reveals the importance of relations between farmer organizations, certifi-
cation and the ability of farmers to improve their profit. However, the exact interrela-
tions between these components, as well as their effects (individually, but also holistical-
ly) on smallholder’s livelihoods remain unclear. Particularly the question whether 
strengthening the organization of farmers, without certification, would contribute signif-
icantly and positively to the smallholders’ livelihoods, and how and to what extent certi-
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fication could potentially play an additional role in this, deserves further investigation. 
An example of such a study applied to coffee certification can be found in Ibnu et al. 
(2016). 
In next research, it may also be interesting to investigate how profit would change if 
the institutional arrangements between certified scheme smallholders and their affiliat-
ed companies would change (and if smallholders would really pay all costs, including 
RSPO membership fees themselves). Methodologically, our approach could benefit from 
a more longitudinal approach in which we do not only calculate real quantities, but also 
real costs and benefits during the entire life time of a plantation. This approach would 
then also ask for   the inclusion of different scenarios for discount rates as these are  
inherently uncertain and depend on global and national developments in economy (for 
example inflation) and politics. Moreover, stricter selection on sampling bias may be 
applied for example by considering information and knowledge flows about certification, 
ownership of mixed plantations  (scheme and independent smallholders’ plantation) to 
gain better insight in spillover effects.  In addition, it might also be important to mone-
tize non-market costs such as opportunity costs of smallholders to actively involve in 
organization, and non-market benefits of certification such as environmental improve-
ments, and better health and to internalize them in the calculation of economic cost-
benefit analysis. By doing so, we approach the potential benefits of certification on a 
national/public scale instead of solely on an individual scale.   
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POSITIONING CHAPTER 4 
Chapter 4 answers the following research question:  
How and to what extent does participation in certification improve the livelihood resili-
ence of different types of palm oil smallholders? 
Chapter 4 further extends the sustainable livelihood framework to also include small-
holders’ resilience to stresses and shocks. This chapter analyses the livelihood resilience 
of five different types of palm oil smallholders in Indonesia and assesses the correlations 
between certification and livelihood resilience. This chapter intends to contribute to the 
development of livelihood resilience studies by empirically applying and verifying a liveli-
hood resilience assessment framework. Our results show that palm oil smallholders are 
relatively resilient to price declines, haze resulting from forest fires and climate related 
effects of El Nino. Differences in resilience resulting from different shocks and between 
the different groups of smallholders are relatively small. Certification and collaboration 
with companies are identified as favorable conditions for livelihood resilience. The ter-
minated NES system allowed smallholders to meet these favorable conditions. A few 
new initiatives, such as FAIR company-community partnerships and ISPO may provide 
similar opportunities for smallholders. 
This chapter was written in collaboration with Astrid Offermans and Pieter Glasbergen, 
and has been submitted to Regional Environmental Change.  
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Palm oil smallholders are a vulnerable category of actors in the palm oil value chain. 
First, because they have limited knowledge about the market they are part of and the 
price setting mechanisms of their product (Hidayat et al. 2015), resulting in selling at 
prices below market standards and hence a relatively low income. Second, because palm 
oil smallholders strongly depend on other actors, such as companies and middlemen, to 
access the market. This creates dependencies and difficulties in selling their products in 
good time. Third, because the smallholders have limited resources and access to credit, 
which hampers investments and improvements in their plantation (Molenaar et al. 
2013). Moreover, given unclear (customary) land rights, palm oil smallholders are con-
fronted with, and therefore involved, in land use conflicts (Sheil et al. 2009). Social con-
flicts between local communities and trans-migrants may also arise from the fact that 
companies prefer to hire trans-migrants rather than local community members to work 
on estate plantations (Casson 2000; Marti 2008; Sheil et al. 2009). Further, palm oil 
smallholders are exposed to external shocks, such as the effects of climate change and 
unpredictable price fluctuations in the global market (Hidayat et al. 2015; Vermeulen 
and Goad 2006).  
Participation in the certification scheme of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO), was introduced in the early 21st century with the aim of improving the environ-
mental sustainability of palm oil production, while considering and improving the social 
and economic realities of producers. Certification may – as a side effect – improve the 
vulnerable position of oil palm smallholders in several ways. Certification reduces small-
holder’s dependency on middlemen, and creates a better and more secure income 
through the provision of premium prices. The organization of farmers around miller 
companies, which can be seen as a side effect of certification, may also improve farmers’ 
market access, especially for independent smallholders. Further, training – provided 
along with the certification process – also potentially improves farmer’s knowledge 
about farming practices, which may contribute to enhancing the productivity and quality 
of their palm oil products. Certification may indeed positively contribute to smallholder’s 
livelihoods by decreasing the farmer’s vulnerability and strengthening their assets (Hi-
dayat et al. 2015). 
Livelihood resilience 
Smallholders’ livelihood generally refers to the capabilities, assets and activities required 
for sustaining or improving smallholders’ means of living (Hidayat et al. 2015; Scoones 
2009; Chambers and Conway 1992; Tang et al. 2013; Tao and Wall 2009). Following from 
this, livelihoods can be considered sustainable when the farmers can cope with or re-
cover from stresses and shocks. This implies that the farmers – even when confronted 
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with stresses and shocks – are able to maintain or enhance their capabilities and assets, 
without undermining their natural resource base. A limitation of current studies on the 
impact of stresses and shocks on the sustainability of livelihoods is that they only pay 
attention to the vulnerability context and the coping strategy of farmers (see Hidayat et 
al. 2015; van Rijn et al. 2012, Swift 2006, Schneider and Niederle 2010). Their recovering 
ability remains largely neglected although this is an equally important concept explaining 
the sustainability of farmers’ livelihoods (Scoones 2009; Speranza et al. 2014; Marschke 
and Berkes 2006; Nyamwanza 2012). Farmers who cannot directly cope with stresses 
and shocks, but who are able to recover from those stresses and shocks in due time, still 
succeed in maintaining their capabilities and assets. In such cases, the farmers can be 
considered vulnerable to the stresses and shocks, but also resilient (Cutter 2016; Contas 
et al. 2014), even though vulnerability and resilience (Cutter 2016) are often interpreted 
as opposites (for example in Adger 2000). Vulnerability addresses susceptibility to 
stresses and shocks (Cutter 2016), while resilience refers to the capacity to sustain 
stresses and shocks in such a way that they do not have long-lasting consequences on 
the farmers’ livelihoods (Contas et al. 2014; Harrison & Chiroro 2016). 
Although some studies showed that certification does not significantly improve the 
vulnerability of smallholders (see van Rijn et al. 2012; Bacon 2005; Hidayat et al. 2015), 
the effects of certification on livelihood resilience are still unknown. Following the defini-
tion of Walker et al. (2006), we refer to a livelihood as resilient if it allows farmers to 
recover from stresses and shocks, and therefore maintain the functions of having a sta-
ble income, fulfil daily needs, and have good environmental quality, health, education 
and security in the long term. 
Speranza et al. (2014) suggest that livelihood resilience is maintained when farmers 
have a buffer capacity that does not decline, if self-organization exists and is promoted, 
and if learning occurs. Although this theory offers building blocks to analyze and com-
pare the resilience of farmers’ livelihoods, it also has some limitations. First, because the 
relation they assume to exist between the dimensions of resilience (buffer capacity, self-
organization, and learning capacity) and livelihood resilience is purely based on a review 
of theories and literature and never tested systematically (Speranza et al. 2014). A high 
score on the dimensions therefore automatically implies a more resilient livelihood. 
Second, because it does not give any information regarding the relative importance of 
the dimensions; and third, because it does not inform about potential interrelations 
between the dimensions. This study aims to enrich knowledge on livelihood resilience by 
examining these aspects. We are particularly interested in the way in which certification 
may influence the livelihood resilience of different types of Indonesian palm oil small-
holders.  
We identify five different groups of smallholders in the Indonesian palm oil sector: 
1. Scheme smallholders collaborating with a company under Nucleus Estate Smallhold-
ers (NES) and the Koperasi Kredit Primer Anggota / Members’ Primary Credit Coop-
erative (KKPA) system under self-management (centralized contract-farming system) 
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2. Scheme smallholders collaborating with a company under the KKPA system under 
one- roof management 
3. Independent smallholders collaborating with a company 
4. Independent smallholders collaborating with an NGO 
5. Independent smallholders collaborating with a middleman (informal contract). 
Our main question is: How and to what extent does participation in certification improve 
the livelihood resilience of different types of palm oil smallholders?  
The main question will be addressed by answering the following sub-questions:  
1. What is the relative importance of buffer capacity, self-organization and learning 
capacity in contributing to livelihood resilience? 
2. How and to what extent do certified and uncertified smallholders differ in their liveli-
hood resilience? 
3. If they differ, how, to what extent, and why, can the differences be explained 
through differences in buffer capacity, self-organization and learning capacity?  
This study is expected to provide insights for different actors (e.g. governmental ac-
tors, certification schemes, NGOs) to improve smallholders’ livelihood resilience. More 
specifically, it will explain why certain groups of smallholders may be more resilient than 
others.  
In the next section, we introduce an analytical framework to analyze smallholders’ 
livelihood resilience, followed by a description of the study area, methods, smallholders’ 
characteristics, stresses and shocks, and results, and end with a conclusion. 
4.2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Speranza et al. (2014) developed an indicator framework for assessing farmers’ liveli-
hood resilience. They indicate that livelihood resilience is correlated with three dimen-
sions of farmer resilience: 
1. The buffer capacity is made up of the possession of, and access to, assets (Speranza 
2013, 523). Assets generally comprise of human capital, natural capital, financial cap-
ital, social capital and physical capital (Carney et al. 1999; Tao and Wall 2009). 
2. Self-organization indicates a level of autonomy, freedom to act, independence, and 
having power and control over your own actions (Speranza et al. 2014, 113). Attrib-
utes of self-organization include membership of institutions, cooperation and exist-
ing network structures. 
3. Learning capacity refers to the ability to incorporate previous experiences into cur-
rent actions (Speranza et al. 2014). Indicators include knowledge of threats and po-
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tential opportunities, commitment to learning, capability to identify, share and trans-
fer knowledge, and the existence of a well-functioning feedback mechanism between 
various actors, such as between smallholders, companies’ staff and extension offic-
ers. 
These three dimensions are supposed to create diversity in livelihood strategies and 
therefore diversity in the ability to recover from stresses and shocks (Speranza et al. 
2014).  
 To address our research questions, we adapted the framework of Speranza et al. 
(2014) and empirically verified the correlations between the dimensions of resilience 
and livelihood resilience (number 1 and number 2 in Figure 1). We adapted the frame-
work in two ways: first, by adding potential correlations between the dimensions (num-
ber 3 in Figure 1); and second, by adding certification, collaboration and the type of 
management to the framework (number 4 in Figure 11). These three variables explain 
the differences between the different types of palm oil smallholders existing in Indonesia 
(see methods section and Figure 11).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Speranza et al. (2014). 
Figure 11. Framework to assess livelihood resilience 
Regarding the role of certification, some literature presents a positive link between 
certification and smallholder’s buffer capacity through enlargement of their capital, and 
improvement of access to assets (Ruben and Fort 2012; Donovan and Poole 2014; Ayuya 
et al. 2015). Smallholders who are not self-managed, but part of a centralized contract-
farming system (such as KKPA), may lack autonomy to freely choose how to manage 
their plantation, especially if this deviates from the practices required by the system they 
are part of. This potentially results in a lower score for self-organization (see for example 
Kirsten and Sartorius 2002; Rehber 1998). Moreover, collaborating with companies may 
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enlarge smallholders’ capacity to learn and may give opportunities for smallholders to 
gain better access to information, technology, technical skills, access to seedlings, ferti-
lizers, and equipment (Vellema 2000; Kirsten and Sartorius 2002; Vermeulen and Goad 
2006), and to financial capital (Hudson 2000). In the next sections we will analyze 
whether these first indications from the literature can be explained by and verified 
through the framework in Figure 11. 
4.3. METHODS 
Crucial in selecting our study area was the coverage of different types of oil palm small-
holders. In Indonesia, we distinguish five types of smallholders based on 1) whether they 
work independently or are connected to a scheme system, 2) the actor they collaborate 
with, and 3) whether they manage their plantation under a one-roof management sys-
tem or not. Smallholders are made aware of certification by companies and/or NGOs 
(Hidayat et al. 2015). 
Table 13. Respondent selection criteria 
No. Dependency 
relation 
Actor of collabora-
tion 
Type of manage-
ment 
Certification 
status  
N 
1 Scheme 
smallholders 
a company under 
Nucleus Estate 
Smallholders (NES) 
and KKPA following 
NES structure 
Self-management Certified and 
uncertified 
45 (NES certified) 
45 (NES uncertified) 
15 (KKPA certified) 
2 Scheme 
smallholders 
a company under 
KKPA system 
one- roof man-
agement 
Uncertified 36 
3 Independent 
smallholders 
Company Self-management Certified 45 
4 Independent 
smallholders 
NGO Self-management Certified 45 
5 Independent 
smallholders 
Middlemen (informal 
contract) 
Self-management Uncertified 44 
The fieldwork was conducted in the Province of Riau. Riau is not only the largest 
palm oil producing region in Indonesia, covering 24% of the total Indonesian palm oil 
production in 2015 (Directorate General of Estate Crop 2015), but it is also home to 
more than a quarter of the palm oil smallholders in Indonesia and accommodates all 
smallholders types distinguished in Table 13. Further, the majority of the oil palm planta-
tions (in terms of area) belongs to smallholders, and much of the oil palm production in 
this region thus results from them. This amounts to approximately 61 percent of the 2.4 
million ha of oil palm plantation areas in Riau and 56 percent of the total production of 
CPO (4.2 million ton) (Statistics of Riau Province 2016). 
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We selected our respondents in September and October 2016 via stratified sampling, 
based on the five categories of smallholders and participation in certification. The survey 
consisted of two parts: the first on livelihood resilience, questioning the ability of small-
holders to recover from stresses and shocks (see Table 14); the second on the three 
dimensions of resilience, that is, buffer capacity, ability to learn and self-organization 
(see Appendix 1). As the respondents filled out the questionnaire in the presence of the 
researcher, the respondents usually gave an explanation on why they chose a particular 
answer. Although this information was not recorded and transcribed in a structured way, 
it allowed us to gain greater insight into the correlation patterns resulting from the ques-
tionnaires. Before conducting the survey, we selected stresses and shocks based on 
discussions with three farmer experts from different districts. The discussions focused 
on the identification and understanding of stresses and shocks that have been experi-
enced by farmers in the last 10 years, and that are likely to occur again in the future. This 
information was also used to provide an illustration to the farmers during the survey. 
These illustrations turned out to be helpful in challenging the farmers to think about, 
and to relive, past situations in which stresses and shocks occurred, and the way in 
which they responded to, and recovered from these stresses and shocks.  
 
4.3.1. Assessment of livelihood resilience  
Livelihood resilience is measured on a five-point Likert scale (see Table 14) representing 
the extent to which smallholders are able to recover from the identified stresses and 
shocks. Following our framework, it only makes sense to investigate resilience (ability to 
recover) when farmers are actually impacted by a stress or shock; if they do not feel any 
impact, there is also no need to recover. Therefore, we first asked questions on the 
extent to which farmers would be impacted by the stresses and shocks should they be 
confronted with them again in the future (column 2, Table 14). If they expect to be im-
pacted, we continued asking questions on the ability to recover (column 3, Table 14). 
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Table 14. Operationalization of resilient livelihood. We first asked whether farmers would be impacted by a 
specific stress or shock, and only if they are (namely if they provide a score of 1-4) we asked them to also fill 
out column three.   
Livelihood outcomes Coping ability/ vulnerability Recovering ability/ livelihood resilience  
Household Income 1=Extremely impacted; 2=Highly 
impacted; 3=Moderately impacted; 
4=Slightly impacted; 5=not impacted 
1=could not recover; 2=slightly recov-
er; 3=moderately recover; 4=highly 
recover; 5=fully recover 
Daily needs 1=Extremely impacted; 2=Highly 
impacted; 3=Moderately impacted; 
4=Slightly impacted; 5=not impacted 
1=could not recover; 2=slightly recov-
er; 3=moderately recover; 4=highly 
recover; 5=fully recover 
Environmental quality in 
general (soil fertility, 
water supply, pest 
outbreak) 
1=Extremely impacted; 2=Highly 
impacted; 3=Moderately impacted; 
4=Slightly impacted; 5=not impacted 
1=could not recover; 2=slightly recov-
er; 3=moderately recover; 4=highly 
recover; 5=fully recover 
Health and education 1=Extremely impacted; 2=Highly 
impacted; 3=Moderately impacted; 
4=Slightly impacted; 5=not impacted 
1=could not recover; 2=slightly recov-
er; 3=moderately recover; 4=highly 
recover; 5=fully recover 
Security  1=Extremely impacted; 2=Highly 
impacted; 3=Moderately impacted; 
4=Slightly impacted; 5=not impacted 
1=could not recover; 2=slightly recov-
er; 3=moderately recover; 4=highly 
recover; 5=fully recover 
4.3.2. Assessment of dimensions of resilience 
The three dimensions of resilience (buffer capacity, self-organization, and capacity for 
learning) are operationalized based on indicators that were developed, but not further 
applied to practice, by Speranza et al. (2014) (see Appendix 1). All answers are phrased 
according to a five-point Likert scale, where a score of one implies low resilience, and a 
score of five high resilience. We finally sum up the scores of all indicators belonging to 
one dimension to determine the smallholders’ buffer capacity, self-organization ability 
and learning capacity. We first asked whether farmers would be impacted by a specific 
stress or shock, and only if they would be (namely if they provided a score of 1–4), did 
we ask them to also fill out column three. The higher the total scores, the greater the 
buffer capacity, self-organization ability and learning capacity.  
The Cronbach’s Alpha reliability test indicates a strong degree of internal consistency 
(see Tavakol and Dennick 2011) for the questions on livelihood resilience (0.88) and for 
the dimensions of resilience (0.73). 
4.3.3. Differences among smallholders and correlation 
Next, we used Pearson Correlation to analyze the existence of potential relations: 
1. Between and among the three dimensions of resilience. 
2. Between the separate dimensions and livelihood resilience. 
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3. Between certification (certification vs. uncertified), on the one hand, and livelihood 
resilience and the three dimensions on the other hand.  
4. Between the actor of collaboration (middlemen vs. companies vs. NGOs), on the one 
hand, and livelihood resilience and the three dimensions on the other hand. 
5. Between the type of management (self-management vs. one-roof management), on 
the one hand, and livelihood resilience and the three dimensions on the other hand. 
To analyze the relative importance of the different dimensions of resilience in ex-
plaining differences in livelihood resilience, we also used Pearson correlation. In cases 
where we found a significant effect, we used either an ANOVA or a T-test to gain more 
insight into the way in which the different smallholder groups differ. We adopted a sig-
nificance level of 5 percent (P≤0.05).  
4.4. STRESSES AND SHOCKS 
The interviews with the three farmer experts revealed three stresses that all farmers had 
been confronted with in the past and which are likely to occur again in the future: a 
sudden and sharp decline in palm oil prices, El Niño, and haze problems resulting from 
forest fires. The first one, price decline, exists because the Indonesian palm oil industry is 
strongly influenced by fluctuations in the global economy. At the end of 2008, Indone-
sian palm oil smallholders experienced a sharp decline in Fresh Fruit Bunch (FFB) prices 
due to the global financial crisis
19
.  Reductions in price led to a lower income and a de-
crease in palm oil productivity as smallholders faced difficulties in affording fertilizers.  
Oil palms are also sensitive to climate and need an adequate water supply to provide 
an optimal yield. The water supply may be threatened in the case of El Niño weather 
patterns. For Indonesia, El Niño implies a reduction in rainfall, leading to lower produc-
tivity in terms of palm oil yield (Harun et al. 2010). El Niño occurs every two to seven 
years and differs in intensity, depending on the exact increase in ocean surface tempera-
tures. In the last decade, Indonesian palm oil smallholders were confronted with an El 
Niño three times, ranging from a rather weak El Niño (2006–07), to a moderate occur-
rence (2009–10) and a very strong one (2015–16) (GGWeather 2016). The last occur-
rence in 2016, affected approximately 30 to 40 percent of the total area of oil palm 
plantations in Indonesia, including Riau, and reduced the national CPO production by 15 
to 20 percent (Bantolo 2015). Our respondents further reported that El Niño may even 
reduce FFB production by 30 to 50 percent if farmers do not fertilize their plantation 
properly (low quantity or incorrect timing).   
The third stress, haze resulting from forest fires, has become a seasonal phenome-
non in Indonesia. The main reason lies in the practice of forest clearance, or ‘slash and 
burn’, which is the cheapest way to clear forest for establishing new plantations (Balch 
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2015). Planting new oil palms in peat land areas is another trigger for forest fires, as 
canalization of peat land dehydrates the land and makes it more susceptible to fire, 
particularly in the dry season (Asurambo et al. 2014). In late October 2015, there were 
more than 115,000 such fires in Indonesia, with these concentrated in Riau, Jambi and 
Borneo (CIFOR 2015). The fires caused health and transportation problems, and reduced 
the UV-radiation intensity by 60 percent. Such a reduction in UV-radiation intensity has a 
negative effect on agriculture as it leads to problems regarding photosynthesis, thereby 
disturbing the fruit maturing process, and reducing the palm oil productivity by 5.3 per-
cent. 
4.5. RESULTS 
4.5.1. Vulnerability and Livelihood resilience 
Our results show that the majority (78.1%) of palm oil smallholders are indeed vulnera-
ble to price shocks, haze from forest fires and El Niño, with an average score of 2.64 
(between highly and moderately impacted). However, they also indicate they are rather 
resilient, and score, on average, a 4.25 on their livelihood resilience (see Figures 12 and 
13). This means that palm oil smallholders are exposed to, and adversely impacted by, 
these stresses and shocks, but that they also have a high ability to recover. This pattern 
holds for all three shocks (see Figure 13) and although the average vulnerability to the 
three shocks does not differ greatly (2.52 for price shocks, 2.54 for haze from forest fire 
and 2.96 for El Niño), we could identify that farmers are significantly less vulnerable to 
the effects of El Niño than to those of haze from forest fires and the effects of price 
shocks (P=0.00). Although the recovering ability (resilience) is relatively high for all 
shocks, we see that farmers have significantly more difficulties in recovering from price 
shocks compared to haze from forest fires (P=0.022). The strong recovering ability can 
be explained by the farmers’ ability to find a job and an income outside their oil palm 
plantation relatively easily, if there is a crisis.  
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Figure 12. Distribution of palm oil smallholders’ vulnerability and livelihood resilience to stresses and shocks   
(averages for price declines, haze from forest fires and El Nino together) 
 
(a)   (b)                                                            
 
(c) 
Figure 13. Distribution of palm oil smallholders’ vulnerability and livelihood resilience to price shock (a), forest 
fire (b), and El Nino (c)    
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4.5.2. Dimensions of resilience 
4.5.2.1. Buffer capacity 
In line with the framework of Speranza et al. (2014), we find a positive correlation be-
tween the dimension of buffer capacity and livelihood resilience (r=0.138). The greater 
the assets (or access to assets), the higher the capacity of smallholders to cushion 
stresses and shocks, and to use emerging opportunities to achieve better livelihood 
outcomes. Our observations in the field show that smallholders with a higher income 
commonly reinvest this money, for example in buying livestock. Cattle and other animals 
can be sold again as a strategy to maintain livelihoods in the event of a crisis. Moreover, 
smallholders who participate in a cooperative tend to have higher scores on social capi-
tal and tend to be more resilient. This has several reasons, but in general, organized 
farmers have a more stable income and easier access to credit compared to unorganized 
farmers. The stability of income partly results from road maintenance activities per-
formed by the cooperatives, which allows structural, predictable, and rather fast trans-
portation of FFB to the mills. This leads to the creation of a buffer that the farmers may 
use in the event of a crisis. Further, the relatively easy provision of credits by coopera-
tives (e.g. to buy fertilizers) also helps farmers in a reactive way after a shock has taken 
place. This prevents further impacts on livelihood resilience and shortens the recovery 
period. 
4.5.2.2. Learning capacity 
Learning capacity correlates with livelihood resilience in line with the theory of Speranza 
et al. (2014); we found a rather weak, but positive correlation (r=0.166). Smallholders 
who have up-to-date information and knowledge regarding palm oil, and who have op-
portunities to discuss problems and possible solutions, turn out to be more resilient than 
the more isolated smallholders. We found that informally exchanging knowledge (e.g. in 
small shops, plantations or the mosque) helped the farmers to more effectively translate 
information and knowledge into concrete actions. Further, we found that the interaction 
between learning capacity and buffer capacity also correlates with livelihood resilience 
(r=0.173, see Figure 14). 
4.5.2.3. Self-organization 
Contrary to the framework of Speranza et al. (2014), we could not identify a direct 
correlation between the dimension of self-organization and livelihood resilience. How-
ever, this does not imply that the dimension becomes redundant in the suggested 
framework. We did indeed find that a high score on self-organization combined with a 
high score on capacity for learning, correlate with livelihood resilience (r=0.128). This 
correlation is even stronger if smallholders subsequently also score well on buffer capac-
ity (r=0.129, see Figure 14). Being self-organized is therefore not enough to explain live-
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lihood resilience, but is an important factor strengthening the effect of learning capacity 
and buffer capacity. 
We conclude that buffer capacity, and capacity for learning positively correlate with 
livelihood resilience, and that self-organization has a positive intermediating effect on 
livelihood resilience in interaction with learning capacity and buffer capacity. Figure 14 
reveals that all correlations between the three dimensions and livelihood resilience are 
rather weak. If we look at the dimensions separately, we find that learning capacity is 
the relatively most important dimension for livelihood resilience, while self-organization 
is the least important. However, if we look at interaction effects between and among the 
dimensions, and the extent to which these correlate to livelihood resilience, we can 
conclude that the interaction between buffer capacity and learning capacity have the 
strongest (and therefore most important) correlation with livelihood resilience. 
Table 15 shows that the dimensions of resilience cannot be considered stand-alone 
domains since they correlate with each other: buffer capacity does not only directly 
correlate to resilience, but also to learning capacity and self-organization. This implies 
that strengthening buffer capacity is not only beneficial for improving the smallholders’ 
ability to recover from shocks, but also to improve their learning capacity and self-
organization.    
Table 15. Correlations between the dimensions of resilience 
Person correlation Buffer capacity Self-organization Learning capacity 
Buffer capacity 1 .404** (.000) .470** (.000) 
Self-organization   .339** (.000) 
Learning capacity   1 
P-value is in the bracket ** Significant level =.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Correlation between dimensions of resilience and livelihood resilience 
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4.5.3. Effects of certification, management and collaboration on livelihood 
resilience 
4.5.3.1. Certification 
We found that certified farmers are significantly more resilient than uncertified farmers 
(P=0.00, see Table 16), and score higher on buffer capacity (P=0.00) and learning capaci-
ty (P=0.00). There is a correlation between certification and livelihood resilience, but it is 
rather weak (0.231, see Figure 14 and Appendix 2). Although relatively weak, this corre-
lation is stronger than the correlations between the dimensions of resilience and liveli-
hood resilience. 
Table 16. T-test: mean difference of livelihood resilience based on participation on certification 
 Certification N Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
Score of livelihood resilience 
uncertified 170 .000 -.28913 
certified 105   
In addition to a direct correlation between certification and livelihood resilience, we 
also identified an indirect correlation through the dimensions of resilience (buffer capac-
ity 0.251, self-organization 0.233, and learning capacity 0.240) (see Figure 14 and Ap-
pendix 2). It should, of course, be noted that correlations do not provide information 
about (the direction of) causal relationships. Further research would therefore be re-
quired to investigate whether certification causes higher scores on the dimensions of 
resilience and livelihood resilience, or whether farmers who tend to score well in terms 
of resilience are more eager to become certified. The information provided by the re-
spondents while filling out the questionnaire, seems to suggest that certification leads to 
improvements in financial capital and social capital.  
Certified smallholders commonly have more financial capital because their productiv-
ity and FFB selling prices are generally higher compared to uncertified smallholders (see 
also Hidayat et al., 2016). Certification standards further require farmer organizations to 
be more transparent and accountable, which creates and maintains trust among mem-
bers. This trust is said to smoothen the provision of credits and encourage labor sharing 
in the event of a crisis. Trainings sessions and periodic meetings that go along with certi-
fication may provide farmers with information, thus allowing them to better prepare for 
stresses and shocks and to diversify their recovering strategies.   
4.5.3.2. Management 
The type of management a farmer falls under (self-management, one-roof management, 
or independent) does not correlate with livelihood resilience (see appendices 2 and 4). 
This may not be fully in line with the framework of Speranza et al. (2014), who suggest 
that self-organization positively contributes to resilience, but can be explained by the 
fact that smallholders under one-roof management do not work on their plantation for 
Chapter 4 
92 
 
most of their time. This implies that they have plenty of time to work outside the palm 
oil sector, which also allows them to find alternative sources of income when they are 
confronted with stresses and shocks impacting the oil palm plantation.  
4.5.3.3. Collaboration  
Our results indicate that collaboration correlates with livelihood resilience (r=−0.232) 
(see Figure 14 and Appendix 2). More specifically, we found a significant difference be-
tween the livelihood resilience of smallholders collaborating with middlemen, and those 
collaborating with companies (P=0.008) or NGOs (P=0.005, see Appendix 5). The former 
are significantly less resilient. Further, smallholders collaborating with middlemen also 
tend to have a lower buffer capacity (see Appendix 6a).  
 The reason is that smallholders collaborating with middlemen are fully independent 
and cannot participate in farmer organizations. As they are unorganized, they cannot 
benefit for being organized in terms of costs sharing, road maintenance or labor shar-
ing
20
.  Smallholders collaborating with middlemen also tend to have lower scores on 
learning capacity than smallholders collaborating with NGOs (P=0.001) and companies 
(P=0.000, see Appendix 6c). Smallholders collaborating with middlemen do not have a 
learning platform and do not have very many opportunities for sharing information and 
knowledge. We found that middlemen, as external sources of information, are not 
transparent towards the smallholders, as they only deliver information when it benefits 
them. Farmers argued, for example, that information about FFB price decreases spreads 
more quickly than information about price increases. Public extension officers may play 
a role here, but currently focus on, and prioritize, non-estate crops, such as rice. Besides, 
they are often not available in palm oil regions due to the extensive working area and 
the limited amount of staff. 
4.5.4. Implication to different types of smallholders 
Table 17 shows a ranking of the different types of smallholders concerning their liveli-
hood resilience. Certified, independent smallholders collaborating with companies turn 
out to be the most resilient type of smallholders. NES and KKPA scheme smallholders 
under self-management may not differ in terms of livelihood resilience from independ-
ent or semi-independent smallholders if they are certified, but the decision of scheme 
smallholders to participate in certification is dependent on their affiliated companies.  
Independent smallholders collaborating with NGOs also have a relatively high score 
in terms of livelihood resilience, although their score on buffer capacity is below aver-
age. This can be explained by their plantations being located in a flood-prone area. Capi-
tal savings are therefore relatively often needed to cope with the impacts of a flood. 
Reduced time between different shocks also reduces time to rebuild buffers against a 
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next shock. Independent smallholders collaborating with middlemen are the weakest in 
terms of livelihood resilience. Their scores on the dimensions of resilience are below 
average. They do not have access to certification and, other than KKPA under one-roof 
management, independent smallholders collaborating with middlemen lack external 
supports.      
Table 17. Smallholders rank based on resilience  
Types of 
smallholders 
Buffer 
capacity 
(max. 
score = 
75) 
Self-
organization 
(max. 
score=30) 
Learning 
capacity 
(max. 
score = 
30) 
Certifica-
tion 
Management 
of plantation 
Collaboration Ra
nk 
NES/KKPA self-
management 
39.69 18.34 15.52 Yes/No Self-
management 
Companies 2 
KKPA one-roof 29.58 9.86 10.75 No One roof Companies 4 
Independent 
smallholders 
with compa-
nies 
42.29 18.16 17.22 Yes Self-
management 
Companies 1 
Independent 
smallholders 
with NGOs 
34.51 20.09 14.33 Yes  Self-
management 
NGO 3 
Independent 
smallholders 
with middle-
men 
35.32 18.91 11.57 No Self-
management 
Middlemen 5 
Average 36.28 17.02 13.90     
Note: 
Red cell: score below average or positively correlates with resilience 
Purple cell: score above average or negatively correlates with resilience 
Blue cell: not significantly correlates with livelihood resilience 
4.6. CONCLUSION 
Most studies about the effects of certification on smallholders’ livelihood emphasize the 
vulnerability component (coping ability), while neglecting the livelihood resilience (re-
covering ability). This paper contributes to knowledge development in this area by em-
pirically applying and verifying an assessment framework developed by Speranza et al. 
(2014), and through assessing livelihood resilience for five different palm oil smallholder 
groups in Indonesia.  
Our results show that palm oil smallholders are relatively resilient to price declines, 
haze resulting from forest fires and El Niño. Differences in resilience resulting from the 
different shocks and between the different groups of smallholders are small. Regarding 
the assessment framework, we found that correlations between the dimensions of resil-
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ience and resilient livelihood are either rather weak for buffer capacity and learning 
capacity, or even absent for self-organization. Although self-organization contributes 
positively to buffer capacity and learning capacity, it does not directly improve the palm 
oil farmers’ resilience. Although this may seem to contradict literature assigning positive 
implications to self-organization, or to organization in general, this can be explained by 
the fact that farmers under a one-roof management system (not self-organized) have 
more opportunities to diversify their income and find a part-time job outside their plan-
tations. This may help them to recover from shocks that impact the palm oil sector.  
We also found that certification and collaborative relationships with companies (in 
comparison to middlemen) positively correlate with livelihood resilience. Following from 
this, and reflecting on the different institutional settings smallholders may be part of, we 
conclude that the finalized NES system is one of the few that allowed for – and actively 
stimulated – certification and collaboration with companies. If we regard these variables 
as favorable conditions for livelihood resilience, we can view some emerging initiatives in 
the Indonesian palm oil sector in a rather positive light. First, this relates to the standard 
for Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) (Wijaya and Glasbergen 2016; Hospes 2014). 
The ISPO standard is a public sustainability standard initiated by the Indonesian Gov-
ernment through The Ministry of Agriculture, with the aim of regulating the palm oil 
sector to achieve a more sustainable production. This initiative is now mandatory for 
companies, and will become mandatory for smallholders in the future (Suharto 2010). 
We see that the ISPO certification body explicitly considers the favorable conditions for 
livelihood resilience as they certify smallholders and promote collaboration between 
smallholders and companies. Second, this relates to the establishment of so-called FAIR 
company-community partnerships initiated by Oxfam, aiming to improve economic de-
velopment, and reduce adverse impacts of palm oil expansion on local communities 
(Oxfam 2017). Setting up collaborations between smallholders and companies is central 
to their approach, combined with support for smallholders to become certified. In addi-
tion, this model follows a so-called landscape approach, focusing on diversification in-
stead of monoculture, which may provide opportunities for smallholders to improve 
their recovering ability should shocks impact their oil palms.  
Although we could verify most relations between the dimensions of resilience and 
livelihood resilience as suggested by Speranza et al. (2014), and defined two more varia-
bles correlating with livelihood resilience (certification and collaboration), most correla-
tions turned out to be rather weak. This means that there are more variables that play a 
role in explaining livelihood resilience in the palm oil production sector. One of those 
variables may include the geographical location of the farmers’ plantations in relation to 
the exposure to risk, particularly regarding climate change and the resulting confronta-
tion to weather extremes and their effects, such as storms and floods. More frequent 
exposure may imply a shorter time between shocks, and less time to rebuild capital and 
accumulate savings. Following from this we believe that climate change may pose risks 
to livelihood resilience in the near future that cannot be overcome by current forms of 
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certification or collaboration with companies alone. Improving livelihood resilience to 
climate change may therefore be an important topic to consider in further research. 
Follow-up research could also further increase our understanding of the magnitude of 
causal relationships between the dimensions of resilience, certification, collaboration 
and livelihood resilience through a more advanced statistical analysis (e.g. using simulta-
neous equation modelling). 
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Chapter 5 
Sustainable palm oil as a public responsibility? 
On the governance capacity of Indonesian 
standard for sustainable palm oil (ISPO) 
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POSITIONING CHAPTER 5 
Chapter 5 answers the following research questions:  
To what extent may ISPO become a viable alternative to private regulation (i.e. RSPO)?  
1. To what extent will ISPO be able to meet its own objectives? 
2. To what extent will ISPO contribute to solving palm-oil related problems if fully im-
plemented?  
While Chapter 2 to 4 focus on private certification initiatives, Chapter 5 analyses a public 
Indonesian certification initiative, namely Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO).  In 
particular, and through a governance capacity approach, we question the extent to 
which ISPO may be able to meet its own objectives and the extent to which it may con-
tribute to solve palm oil related problems. ISPO faces a very complicated governance 
challenge, given the fact that millions of smallholder farmers need to be directed to-
wards a more sustainable production. The limited authority of the ISPO committee is a 
crucial constraining factor in the process of becoming a viable alternative to private 
certification schemes under current conditions. We conclude that ISPO, although it has 
initiated a process of change, has not yet developed its full potential to meet its own 
targets and solve palm oil related sustainability problems.   
This chapter was written in collaboration with Astrid Offermans and Pieter Glasbergen, 
and has been published in the journal of Agriculture and Human Values.  The full refer-
ence is: 
Hidayat, N. K., A. Offermans, and P. Glasbergen. 2017. Sustainable palm oil as a public 
responsibility? On the governance capacity of Indonesian standard for sustainable palm 
oil (ISPO). Agriculture and Human Values. doi: 10.1007/s10460-017-9816-6 
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5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Governments from some developing countries are currently developing their own, pub-
lic sustainability standards and certifications as a reaction to earlier private standards by 
businesses and NGOs. The Indonesian government, for example, developed its own, 
supposed to be mandatory, sustainability standard and certification scheme for palm oil 
– Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO). Comparable schemes are proceeding for coffee 
and cocoa (Wijaya and Glasbergen 2016). Given Indonesia’s status as largest palm oil 
producer in the world, we focus on Indonesia’s public standard on sustainable palm oil in 
this paper. 
The expansion of oil palm production in developing countries, including Indonesia, is 
widely debated. Although this expansion contributes positively to the Indonesian econ-
omy by generating job opportunities (Sheil et al. 2009), and creating benefits to the 
wellbeing of farmers (Rist et al. 2010), it is also associated with sustainability problems 
such as deforestation (Koh and Wilcove 2009; Sheil et al. 2009), the emission of green-
house gasses (see Fargione et al. 2008; Sheil et al. 2009), biodiversity losses (Fitzherbert 
et al. 2008), and emerging social conflicts (Rist et al. 2010; Rival and Levang 2014).  
Initiatives to overcome the adverse effects of palm oil production have particularly 
been taken by private actors (Glasbergen and Schouten 2015). An example of such an 
initiative is the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). However, this Northern-
based initiative is debated in terms of its effectiveness (Ruysschaert and Salles 2014; von 
Geibler 2013), inclusiveness of stakeholders’ interests (Bitzer and Glasbergen 2015; 
Cheyns and Riisgaard 2014; Silva-Castañeda 2012), and its ability to contribute to sus-
tainability changes (Bitzer and Glasbergen 2015). Many studies have also questioned the 
legitimacy of the RSPO as a multi-stakeholder initiative (see for example Partzsch 2011; 
Schouten and Glasbergen 2011; Schouten and Glasbergen 2012; von Geibler 2013).  
ISPO can be seen as a counter-initiative of the Indonesian government to the RSPO 
(Wijaya and Glasbergen 2016) and was established with the intention to increase the 
competitiveness of Indonesian palm oil, while guaranteeing the sustainability of its pro-
duction, particularly in terms of the prevention of palm oil related problems. ISPO explic-
itly aims to be more economically viable for producers, while remaining independent 
from foreign pressures (Schouten and Bitzer 2015).  
The ISPO standard is currently compulsory for companies, and will become compul-
sory for smallholders in 2022 (InPOP 2015). This implies the certification of millions of 
smallholders, who are geographically spread, culturally and organizational diverse and 
sometimes difficult to reach, which may challenge ISPO in realizing its objectives. More-
over, weak administrative structures may further challenge the implementation and 
enforcement of a public regulation in a development context (Schouten and Bitzer 2015) 
such as ISPO.  
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Based on a recognition of the potential of public regulations to induce a more sus-
tainable palm oil production, this paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of 
the challenges Southern public initiatives are confronted with in their attempt to realize 
a more sustainable agricultural production. Based on the concept of governance capaci-
ty, we developed an evaluation tool, operationalized in a policy-driven and a problem-
driven analysis, to answer the question whether ISPO may become a viable alternative to 
private regulation (e.g., RSPO). As a rather new initiative on sustainability, ISPO, and 
more generally public sustainability initiatives regarding palm oil production in develop-
ing countries, are still under investigated in literature. This research further informs 
about the relationships between private and public certifications regarding palm oil.  
First, we will highlight ISPO’s principles, and the procedures towards certification. 
Next, we will introduce our evaluation tool based on the governance capacity approach, 
followed by a description of the research methods, results and conclusions. 
5.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF ISPO 
ISPO’s objectives are operationalized in 7 principles that need to be fulfilled by certi-
fied companies and -in the future- by certified smallholders (the latter only need to 
comply with the first, second, fourth and seventh principle): 
 
1. Compliance with legal business permits 
2. The implementation of plantation management based on Good Agricultural Practices 
(GAP)  
3. Protecting primary forest and peat land 
4. Conducting and monitoring environmental management (e.g., protecting biodiversi-
ty, waste management, and fire prevention and mitigation) 
5. Showing responsibility towards employees 
6. Contributing to social and economic empowerment of society 
7. Commitment to continuous improvements in sustainable palm oil production  
 
These principles are further elaborated in criteria and more detailed regulations that 
are collected from existing palm oil regulations from five different Ministries; The Minis-
tries of Agriculture, Environment and Forestry, Agrarian and Spatial Planning, Manpower 
and Transmigration, and The Ministry of Health. To become certified, producers have to 
follow a pre-set procedure (see Appendix 7). ISPO’s certification process starts with a 
plantation classification by the local government. In this classification, the local govern-
ment assesses the extent to which plantations comply with the national regulations and 
meet the standard regarding plantation management. Only plantations that score well in 
this assessment (classified as 1st to 3rd class companies) can formally enter the process 
towards ISPO certification; poor performing plantations can adjust their practices and 
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start a new classification procedure afterwards. Well-preforming companies can request 
certification by submitting documents to an independent certification body. The latter 
will then verify the documents, perform field assessments, and report the final evalua-
tion to the ISPO commission
21
 and ISPO’s assessment team
22
. In case of a positive evalu-
ation, the ISPO commission approves the certification body to grant certification to the 
plantation. ISPO’s certificate is valid for 5 years. Certified plantations receive an annual 
surveillance and can extend their certificate one year before it expires. In case of a nega-
tive evaluation, companies will be requested to rectify within 6 months. If they do not 
succeed, a re-audit should be done with the same certification body. According to regu-
lation of the Ministry of Agriculture No. 11/2015, companies who refuse or forget to 
request certification will be downgraded to Grade IV automatically. This implies that 
their license will eventually be revoked (see Appendix 8 for the sanction mechanism and 
Appendix 9 for the time line). 
Several studies compared RSPO and ISPO and concluded that the objectives of the 
standards are rather comparable, which can be explained by the fact that ISPO officials, 
when developing the scheme, were strongly inspired by the RSPO and initially even par-
ticipated in it (Wijaya and Glasbergen 2016). Nonetheless, it is also concluded that the 
RSPO, compared to ISPO, is more voluntary (Schouten and Bitzer 2015), less complicated 
in terms of its certification procedure (Wijaya and Glasbergen 2016), stricter in terms of 
its regulations and criteria, and also more inclusive in terms of regulations and criteria 
(Hospes 2014). Finally, although using similar vocabulary, the interpretation of concepts 
differs between the two standards (for example regarding the concept of ‘high conserva-
tion value’ see Suharto et al. 2015). Here again, RSPO’s interpretation of concepts can be 
considered more strict compared to ISPO’s interpretations of the same concepts 
(Hospes 2014; Yaap and Paoli 2014). 
5.3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This paper aims to analyze the implementation capacity of ISPO given its intentions, and 
its potential contribution to solve palm-oil related problems. We conceptualize the im-
plementation of ISPO as a governance capacity challenge. This concept has been applied 
to a wide variety of topics, including the promotion of social innovation (González and 
Healey 2005), evaluation of policy initiatives regarding forest management (Howlett and 
Rayner 2006), coastal tourism (Caffyn and Jobbins 2003), and public-private initiatives in 
the environmental domain (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002). Governance capacity generally 
                                                                 
21
 The ISPO commission consists of members of the highest level of the central administrative structure 
(ESELON I) from the Ministries of Agriculture, Environment and Forestry, and Agrarian and Spatial Planning. 
22
 The ISPO assessment team consists of government officials, ESELON II, which is lower than ESELON I in the 
organizational structure from the same Ministries as the ISPO commission, an NGO and producer associations. 
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refers to the ability to induce change (Lancaster and Ras 2012) and -in relation to ISPO- 
covers 1) the ability to act on available rules and resources as worked-out in ISPO regula-
tions; 2) the ability to direct the interactions of the involved actors to concerted action 
through authoritative actions; and 3) the ability to navigate within the prevailing market 
context. Fulfilling these conditions subsequently needs to 4) induce change and contrib-
ute to solving palm oil related problems (see also Dang et al. 2015). The first three ele-
ments of governance capacity (rules and resources, authoritative actions, and market 
context) we operationalize in a policy-driven approach, the last element (regarding the 
problem-solving capacity) we operationalize in a problem-driven approach. 
5.3.1. The policy driven approach 
The policy-driven approach can be considered a managerial approach that accepts certi-
fication as a governance instrument and questions how its governance can be improved. 
The policy-driven approach refers to ISPO’s ability to organize a diversity of actors to 
work together towards ISPO’s objectives and rules (concerted action), or - in other 
words - the extent to which the intended implementation of new regulations is, or can 
be, realized in practice. The policy-driven approach, in our case, takes ISPO’s objectives 
and rules as given, and enquires whether these will be materialized and followed by 
actors in the palm oil sector. In the case of ISPO, we consider concerted action challeng-
ing for several reasons, including the foreseen participation of thousands of companies 
and millions of smallholders, the diversity of actors and interests involved, and the chal-
lenge of informing all actors properly. The diversity of actors involved does not only refer 
to actors from different domains (NGOs, producers, governments, research institutes), 
but also the involvement of actors from different governmental layers and sectors. 
5.3.2. The problem-driven approach  
The problem-driven approach is recently suggested by Bitzer and Glasbergen (2015) as 
an additional evaluative approach and analyzes problems within the embedded context 
of the needs, interests and preferences of different actors, while seeking an answer to 
the question of what the new regulation might be able to contribute in this context vis-
à-vis other interventions. More specifically, this approach refers to the extent to which 
ISPO (if implemented successfully) contributes to solving palm oil related problems. In 
this paper we follow two lines: first, the problem definition as provided by ISPO itself 
(particularly low competitiveness of Indonesian palm oil in the international market, 
deforestation and the release of GHGs) and second, a definition resulting from critical 
accounts in the academic literature on palm oil production (verified through multi-
stakeholders interviews), which generally refer to deforestation, the generation of social 
conflicts, biodiversity loss, and the intensified release of GHGs (see Abood et al. 2015; 
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Brandi et al. 2013; Casson 2000; Hanu and Sadjli 2013; Koh and Wilcove 2009; Meijaard 
et al. 2005; Nellemann et al. 2007; Sheil et al. 2009). 
5.4. METHODS 
ISPO’s principles and planning differ for large plantation companies and smallholders. 
For large scale plantations, an ex-post evaluation is relevant because companies have 
been under ISPO certification already. Regarding smallholders, only one group is current-
ly under an ISPO certification pilot project; all other smallholders have not yet been 
certified. Therefore, we use an ex-ante approach to evaluate the extent to which ISPO 
may meet its objectives regarding smallholders.  
Our main research method comprises in-depth interviews for both the policy-driven 
and the problem-driven approach. We interviewed 45 informants from various stake-
holder groups that were purposely selected based on their involvement in palm oil pro-
duction and/or ISPO certification (Table 18). We performed interviews at the place pre-
ferred by the interviewees. We developed a list of open ended questions based on the 
literature (see below). This list was used for all stakeholders, although not all questions 
could be answered by them due to differences in their expertise and knowledge. All 
interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
Table 18. List of informants - 2016  
Categories Number of interviewed respondents 
Large plantation companies 5 
Central government officials 7 
Certification bodies 2 
Development institute (UNDP) 1 
Experts (from university and research institute) 6 
Local government officials (Riau and West Kalimantan) 7 
NGOs 7 
Producer associations 5 
Farmer organizations 5 
Grand Total 45 
In order to construct the list with questions for the respondents on the policy-driven 
approach, we selected variables from literature on concerted action and governance 
capacity. These variables include clarity of ISPO’s legislations, ISPO’s alignment with 
other rules, clarity in the communication of rules (Dang et al. 2015); availability of re-
sources including people, budget, and knowledge (Börzel 1997; Dang et al. 2015), au-
thority to enforce sanctions (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979; Schneider and Ingram 1990) 
and contextual factors such as market acceptance, which may accelerate or hamper the 
implementation of ISPO’s objectives (Dang et al. 2015). Regarding the problem-driven 
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approach we constructed a cause-effect diagram of sustainability problems based on the 
literature, which was used in the interviews (see Appendix 10). Next to the factors in the 
diagram, we paid attention to ISPO’s problem definition that also covers deforestation 
and the release of GHGs, but also the low competitiveness of Indonesian palm oil in the 
international market. The interviews focused on: 1) the extent to which respondents 
recognize the presented problems, 2) the extent to which they recognize the identified 
causes, and 3) how and to what extent they reason that ISPO can contribute to solving 
these problems.  
We employed computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDA) to transcribe and 
analyze all interviews in the policy driven approach and the problem-driven approach. 
Transcriptions regarding the policy-driven approach were labelled based on the element 
of governance capacity the quote refers to (e.g., clarity of rules, availability of resources, 
authority, market acceptance), and whether the quote expresses a positive or negative 
opinion on the governance capacity (see an example of quotation coding in Appendix 
11). In the problem-driven approach, the quotations were labelled and grouped based 
on the problem under discussion and whether the respondent considers ISPO to be 
(conditionally) able to contribute to solving the problem.  
We complemented the interviews with document analysis and participation in 
events. The document analysis included the official minutes of a diplomatic meeting 
about palm oil trade in Europe conducted by the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, InPOP newsletters, The Jakarta Post newspaper, InfoSawit magazine, and 
communications from the IPOCC. The document analysis mainly enriched our under-
standing of palm oil related problems from ISPO’s perspective and the way in which ISPO 
intends to solve these problems. Furthermore, we participated in three events; an ISPO 
evaluation meeting organized by a producer association (Jakarta, February 5th 2016), a 
socialization event of ISPO for farmer groups, organized by an NGO (Pelalawan-Riau, 
February 23rd 2016), and a multi-stakeholder workshop organized by UNDP (Jakarta, 
February 17th 2016). In these meetings we acted as a passive observer and recorded the 
discussion in notes. These observations allowed us to better understand ISPO’s imple-
mentation process and the implementation barriers faced by companies. 
5.5. GOVERNANCE CAPACITY: THE POLICY-DRIVEN APPROACH  
5.5.1. On the clarity of rules  
We observe that the rules of ISPO, as basic requirements to realize concerted action, are 
not problem-free. First, some of ISPO’s action points are still rather vague. An example 
can be found in the rule about biodiversity conservation where ISPO touches upon the 
need for conservation management. However, neither the concept of conservation 
management, nor the corresponding management practices, or the intensity of these 
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activities are explicated. Related to this vagueness is the absence of clear and detailed 
technical instructions, which leads to different interpretations of the PnC by different 
auditors. Issues such as healthy and safe working conditions, can therefore be seen as a 
requirement by one auditor but not by others. Therefore, a company may move its audit 
contract from a strict certification body to a less strict body to get certification in the 
easiest way. An auditor illustrated this: 
 “Yes, some rules may be applied in different ways. For example, Government 
Regulation No. 50/2012 about the Application of a Health and Safety Work Man-
agement System/ Sistem Manajemen Keselamatan, dan Kesehatan Kerja 
(SMK3)
23
. According to this regulation, palm oil millers are required to have certifi-
cation on the SMK3
24
, because they generally have more than 100 employees and 
these employees work with high-risk equipment e.g. a boiler. Therefore, millers 
are categorized as having a high management risk. [Which implies that they 
should have an approved SMK3 in order to receive a certificate]. This is however 
discussed in the appendix of the original rule, and therefore some certification 
bodies believe that the SMK3 certificate is not mandatory for miller companies [in 
the process towards certification]”.  
Second, we observe conflicting rules within ISPO, and between ISPO and other minis-
terial regulations. Oil palm cultivation in peatland, for example, is explicitly permitted 
under ISPO point 2.2.1.4
25
 but not under principle 3
26
 in the protection of primary for-
ests and peatlands, and neither under the regulation of the Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry dealing with peatland clearance
27
. ISPO’s regulation about land use manage-
ment offers another example of conflicting regulations, especially the requirement to 
use all concession areas for oil palm plantations within 6 years. This regulation conflicts 
with a regulation from the Ministry of Agrarian and Spatial Planning, that is, Surat Edaran 
no. 10/SE/VII/2015 regarding High Conservation Value Forest (HCVF). The latter regula-
tion suggests conserving High Conservation Value (HCV) areas
28
 whereas ISPO would 
proceed to classify non-used land as abandoned. Both vagueness of rules and the exist-
ence of conflicting rules between the Ministry of Agriculture and other Ministries, create 
                                                                 
23
 Translated as safety management system and occupational health.  
24
 See Government Regulation No. 50/2012 Appendix 1 about the implementation guidance of SMK3, on page 
6 point C, explaining that to implement a safety management system and occupational health planning a 
company should provide an expert, who has a SMK3 certificate.  
25
 See PnC ISPO, point 2.2.1.4 which is based on PERMENTAN No. 14/2009: “plantation companies who culti-
vate palm oil in peat land should pay attention to the characteristic of the peatland to eliminate the environ-
mental damage”.   
26 
See PnC ISPO, Principle 3 about: “protection to the utilization of primary forest and peat land areas”.  
27
See Surat Edaran Ministry of Environment and Forest about moratorium on peat land clearance, 3 November 
2015 
28 
A location permit is a permission letter that is issued by the local regency government, in order to carry out 
activities involving the acquisition of land. 
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confusion for palm oil companies. Confusion may either result in passiveness or it may 
hamper the concertedness of actions and threaten the (univocal nature of) actions in the 
field. 
5.5.2. Availability and distribution of resources 
In our research we observed problems related to the availability and distribution of re-
sources that can be expected to seriously hamper concerted action. Lack of resources 
occurs on different governmental levels, both in terms of money and manpower. First, 
on the national level, we observe limitations in the availability of certification bodies. 
Nation-wide, ISPO encompasses 11 Certification Bodies with 800 auditors. Most of the 
auditors are overloaded with work, bearing the risk of a lower performance of the certi-
fication bodies. Reviewers working at ISPO’s secretariat are also limited in number (4) 
and have more work than they can handle. In the best case, this issue may delay the 
process of ISPO certification, but in the worst case it may prevent and discourage planta-
tions to become certified. An auditor reported: 
 “We have already handed in the audit report to the ISPO secretariat, but the re-
view in the ISPO commission takes a long time. [..] we submitted a report in Sep-
tember 2014, but we only received back the review by November 2015…” 
and: 
“… after they heard about the experience from other companies, they [companies] 
now take indifferent positions… they [companies] say things such as, ‘my neigh-
bor’s company has been registered for ISPO a long time ago, but ISPO certification 
has not been issued yet. Why should I make more expenses on the account of 
ISPO’? I don’t know if it will ever be issued”.        
At the local governmental level, there are not enough people to conduct the compul-
sory classification. Some trained officers have been reallocated to other divisions, with-
out any appropriate replacements. This means companies cannot even start the process 
towards certification. Next to a lack of personnel budgets are limited as well. To deal 
with these limitations, local government officials now often conduct the assessments 
based on desk studies, without performing field evaluations. This may result in inaccu-
rate classification results, as a company may possibly be classified as an eligible company 
but formally does not comply with all requirements.  
Further, we also see that local governments cannot easily access information about 
participating companies in ISPO in their region. This results in difficulties in monitoring 
these companies and in controlling them. Moreover, our research indicates many cases 
where knowledge about ISPO has not reached the village level or the extension officers 
yet. A local government official said: 
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“…We do not know how many companies are currently in the process of certifica-
tion here. We do not suggest complicated bureaucratic procedures, but in order 
for us to proceed with our task of supervising this process, we need to be informed 
about it. We do not have enough budget to go to the field directly. At least, if we 
would be informed, we would know that Company ‘A’ has reached this process… 
Company ‘B’ is undergoing that process, then, we can follow up on the difficulties 
they are faced with” 
Facing constraints in budget and manpower may slow down and even negatively in-
fluence the initial classification process (i.e. approving companies unjustly). It may also 
threaten concerted action if different regions are confronted with different intensities of 
constraints and/or deal with these constraints differently. Together with a lack of com-
munication, limited resources may also harm ISPO’s objectives in the process towards 
certification, and at the moment companies are certified already. Verification of the 
extent to which companies meet ISPO’s criteria and whether they are, and remain, com-
pliant is currently put under pressure due to a limited availability of resources on the 
national and regional governmental levels.   
5.5.3. Authority and enforcement 
Our research reveals that the authority of ISPO committee is rather limited. However, 
authority can be considered crucial to motivate companies and smallholders to follow 
rules and regulations and to enforce sanctions to assure that actions are in line with 
ISPO’s policy objectives. ISPO’s regulations are an accumulation of (national) rules under 
various ministries and the execution of each rule, including the right to enforce sanc-
tions, lies fully beyond ISPO’s influence, and belongs to the legal domain of the separate 
ministries. This leads to a serious lack of authority on behalf of ISPO. 
 Inadequate coordination between the different Ministries further hampers ISPO’s 
speed of action and potentially leads to a rather passive or expectant attitude of Minis-
tries and companies.  
A spatial planning official on the provincial level illustrates this: 
 “…Well, we take a passive position. As long as they (producers) do not propose 
to issue their HGU (land cultivation right), we will not ask them to do so… now, if it 
becomes an obligation of ISPO, it is not our program… we cannot “pick up the 
ball” unless our Ministry (The Ministry of Agrarian and Spatial Planning) regulates 
it”.  
The Head of the ISPO commission informed:  
 “On one hand, we push oil palm plantation companies to get ISPO certification, 
on the other hand, business actors are still constrained by a lack of coordinated 
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management between the Ministry of Environment and Forest, and the Ministry 
of Agrarian and Spatial Planning. Sometimes companies already have a HGU le-
gally issued by the Ministry of Agrarian and Spatial Planning, but [this legally is-
sued HGU is then] contradicted by the ministry of environment and forest because 
it is claimed to overlap with forest areas. The ISPO commission cannot do any-
thing, as this is the domain of the Ministry of Environment and Forest”.  
Second, and in line with the results above, we observe that the ISPO commission 
lacks authority to enforce sanctions for non-compliance with ISPO standard.  Sanctioning 
(i.e. lowering the Plantation Grade and revocation of the Plantation’s Permit
29
), belongs 
to the responsibility of local governments (Governor or Bupati/Walikota). Following from 
this, we can state that Indonesia’s  decentralization policies (see for example Hadiz 2004, 
Firman 2009) increase ISPO’s inability to enforce sanctions as local governments are 
allowed to make decisions in the domain of agriculture independent from the National 
government. Patron-client relationships (see Kolstad and Søreide 2009, Varkkey 2013) 
and economic considerations may further demotivate local governments to execute 
punishments (Ascher 2000, Tacconi 2007) as this may harm support for their election 
programs or reduce income from taxes. One respondent illustrates this (Anonymous): 
“ … but sometimes, we cannot deny that the Bupati
30 
cannot be ‘hard’ to compa-
nies… If the Bupati is a good friend of certain companies, it is difficult to establish 
instruments for monitoring and controlling. I myself wonder if it is possible to re-
voke the plantation’s permit by the Bupati, because, he is the one that issued the 
permit”.  
A member of the Provincial Investment Coordinating Board/ Badan Penanaman 
Modal Provinsi (BKPM) said:  
 “At the local level, it is not easy to revoke a permit. We have to think about it. 
Because it will create unemployment and increases poverty in our region”  
Another issue that complicates enforcement, particularly regarding newly developed 
plantations in protected areas, is that sanctioning may lead to social conflicts and eco-
nomic hardship for the farmers who invested a lot of money in the plantations. Punish-
ment may include the closure of plantations, which are farmers’ sources of living. Legal-
izing these plantation areas, or adopting a passive attitude, like the government is cur-
                                                                 
29
 According to The Regulation of Ministry of Agriculture No. 98/Permentan/ OT. 140/9/2013, there are 5 
reasons for revocation of a plantation permit: (1) a plantation company having >=250 ha does not establish  a 
plantation for smallholders (2) A miller company who has a partnership with a cooperative, but  does not sell at 
least 5% of the company’s share to the cooperative (3) A company who falsifies information about land holding 
(4) A company who does not report any changes in the ownership and or management (5) A company who 
does not fulfil obligations including zero burning and  implementing environmental monitoring and control 
(AMDAL)    
30
 Bupati/ Regent, is the head of a regency and directly elected.  
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rently doing, however, might create a precedent, which invites other encroachments 
such as opening new illegal plantations. 
In summary, ISPO’s lack of authority combined with a lack of incentives for local gov-
ernments to assure compliance and punish companies or smallholders in the case of 
non-compliance or encroachments can be considered a serious threat for ISPO in meet-
ing its objectives. Without an effective and well-functioning enforcement principle, im-
plementing ISPO according to its aims and objectives may need to be dismissed as a 
myth. 
5.5.4. Market acceptance 
We observe that both the domestic and the global palm oil market do not yet support 
ISPO. First, certification of palm oil is no prerequisite in the domestic market; demand 
for uncertified palm oil is equal to the demand for certified palm oil
31
 . A division manag-
er in a palm oil company stated that:  
“Competitiveness of oil palm products really depends on the market. Let’s have a 
look at the domestic market: let’s say I have a margarine or soap factory in Jakar-
ta. For the sake of our company’s profit, we will buy the cheapest CPO. This may 
imply that we buy the CPO from Lampung instead of North Sumatera because of 
the cheaper transport costs. It doesn’t matter whether the CPO is certified or not”.     
Second, a vivid black market exists in Indonesia (Dixon 2016; InfoSawit 2016) that 
makes it difficult to trace the origin of palm oil. So, even if domestic demand for certified 
palm oil would increase, incentives to produce sustainable palm oil remain low. As long 
as companies can continue selling palm oil products in the traditional market and if they 
feel ISPO does not offer benefits, such as tax reliefs, companies may likely postpone 
their participation in ISPO. Regarding acceptance in the global market, we observe that 
Western markets, including the European Union, United Kingdom (UK), and the United 
States, have not recognized ISPO as a sustainability standard yet. Acceptance of ISPO in 
the global market is crucial for its competitiveness. We particularly observe difficulties to 
convince the global community about the credibility and trustworthiness of ISPO (see 
Jong 2016). Promotional efforts from the ISPO commission and the Ministry of Agricul-
ture in the Netherlands, the European commission, and Germany, in 2012 and 2015 
(Suharto 2015) have not succeeded to convince the European market about the credibil-
ity of ISPO. This is illustrated by a representative of the UK Embassy: 
“There are credibility issues: about the development of the standard, the way in 
which the system runs, and the lack of transparency and independent audits. In 
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 Based on interviews with a government official and the head of a palm oil company  
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fact, there is no credible system. SVLK
32
 shows that Indonesia can do it differently, 
and now, the European Union has recognized it. I would like to see ISPO in the 
same position. As a British government representative, I dare to say, we will rec-
ognize ISPO when the standard is multi-stakeholder based, when the system is 
transparent and able to ensure the inclusion of smallholders. A multi-stakeholder 
approach gives us confidence that the ISPO system works”.  
Different from the earlier mentioned variables, that mainly posed a threat to con-
certed action, a lack of acceptability of ISPO in the global market threatens the extent to 
which ISPO will be accepted and followed by actors in the palm oil value chain.    
5.5.5. Interim conclusions on the policy-driven approach 
Our research based on the policy-driven approach indicates that ISPO lacks the ability to 
organize actors to work together toward concerted action. Most fundamental is the lack 
of authority to implement and enforce ISPO, which becomes visible in coordination 
problems related to different policies of different ministries, and in the division of re-
sponsibilities between the national government and the local governments. The latter 
are essential for the implementation of ISPO and verifying compliance. However, their 
autonomous responsibilities do not necessarily align with the aims and regulations of 
ISPO. Our results also indicate communication problems between the actors involved. 
These partly result from a lack of clear and operational rules, budgets, and man-power. 
Last, there are uncertainties about the acceptance of ISPO in the global palm oil market. 
5.6. GOVERNANCE CAPACITY: THE PROBLEM-DRIVEN APPROACH 
According to ISPO, the sustainability requirements of the RSPO are driven by ‘western 
buyers’ requests, they are very strict and imply higher production costs for Indonesian 
farmers (Suharto 2010). ISPO finds itself torn in two ways: on the one hand, they see 
that higher costs resulting from private certification may pose barriers to competitive-
ness in the global market, on the other hand, they see the risk of losing part of the ex-
port market when withdrawing from private certification. ISPO aims to improve the 
competitiveness of Indonesian palm oil in the global market and solve sustainability 
problems connected to palm oil production, such as deforestation and biodiversity loss, 
the release of greenhouse gasses (GHGs) and social conflicts. Our interviews indicate 
that most respondents agree on the identified sustainability problems and recognize the 
causes presented in Appendix 10. We could however identify differences in the way in 
which respondents conceptualize deforestation as a problem. Some respondents share 
ISPO’s interpretation that deforestation is considered a problem if it occurs in protected 
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forests only. Deforestation of un-protected forests is therefore not regarded problemat-
ic. In their argumentation, these respondents tend to refer to regional spatial planning 
documents (Dokumen Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah), stating that unprotected forests 
are legally categorized as convertible area and therefore allocated to support regional 
development, including income generation, job creation, and the generation of govern-
ment revenues. Legal deforestation may even be necessary to meet the target of the 
Indonesian government to reach 40 million tons of palm oil production annually by 2020. 
Other respondents however, including representatives from NGOs, conceptualize the 
problem of deforestation as a general loss of forest cover, independent from the ques-
tion whether this is protected forest or not. A representative of the Ministry of Environ-
ment and Forestry stated: 
“Thus far, NGOs define deforestation as the loss of forest cover. We however, [al-
so ISPO] believe that deforestation is only applicable to protected forests. Land-
use changes in convertible forests should not be categorized as deforestation. Be-
cause forests [based on the Constitution of Indonesia article 33 (3)] shall be used 
for the greatest benefit of the people, and therefore, forest areas, which are allo-
cated to plantations, are legally [by law] allowed to be converted”.      
5.6.1. Prevention of deforestation  
Notwithstanding the location, palm oil plantations are often highlighted as driving 
forces of deforestation (Abood et al. 2015; Casson 2000; Koh and Wilcove 2009; Sheil et 
al. 2009). Private oil palm plantations were responsible for 88.3% of the deforestation 
linked to palm oil in Sumatera from 2000 to 2010, smallholder’s plantations follow with 
10.7% and government-owned oil palm plantations caused 0.9% of the loss of forest 
cover
33
, both in protected and unprotected forests. However, we observe that the Min-
istry of Forest and ISPO has a limited ability to enforce laws to prevent or regulate defor-
estation caused by companies and smallholders, which may further contribute to defor-
estation in protected forests (Mulyani and Jepson 2013). Moreover, corruption, patron-
client relationships, and rent seeking behavior of government officials are also often 
mentioned in the literature as causes for deforestation (Mulyani and Jepson 2013).  
ISPO, as a compulsory standard, is potentially able to reduce deforestation in pro-
tected forest areas (37% of the total land area) (FAO 2014) if the scheme can be fully 
implemented and enforced. However, we also see that the exclusion of plantations that 
are evaluated as performing poorly in the first classification step of ISPO’s procedure 
(see Appendix 7) does not only imply that they cannot join the process towards certifica-
tion, but also that they remain beyond the control of ISPO. They may still commit forest 
encroachments as long as they can sell their products. Moreover, the absence of a 
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commitment to zero deforestation, and the strong emphasis on prevention in protected 
areas only, may lead to an insignificant contribution of ISPO in reducing overall defor-
estation. 
5.6.2. Improving competitiveness 
ISPO’s aim to increase the competitiveness of Indonesian palm oil in the global market 
seems difficult to realize. First, because ISPO is not recognized by global market players 
as a credible sustainability standard yet (see above). Particularly Northern actors such as 
retailers and consumers still see the RSPO as the only credible standard for sustainable 
palm oil (Schouten and Bitzer 2015). The negative NGO campaigns against Indonesian 
palm oil (IPOCC 2014; Lutfi 2014) may reverberate even when Indonesian palm oil pro-
ducers become ISPO certified.  
Second, ISPO also seems to lose the competition with uncertified palm oil on a pro-
ducer level, as ISPO does not include a premium price or additional fee for certified palm 
oil (as RSPO does). Even though participation in the RSPO implies additional costs for 
smallholders, their profits increase because of the premium prices and premium fees 
(Hidayat et al. 2016). 
5.6.3. Protection of biodiversity 
The conversion of forests to monoculture plantations destroys wildlife habitat, and 
with it species including the Sumatran tiger, orang utan, and elephant (Meijaard et al. 
2005; Sheil et al. 2009). Biodiversity loss in forests can subsequently be aggravated by 
forest fires (Nellemann et al. 2007) that are often purposely caused to clear forests to 
convert them to plantations. Moreover, oil palm plantations are intensively sprayed with 
pesticides and herbicides, which may create toxic run-offs killing animals and plant spe-
cies if the waste is not well managed. Waste from the milling process of palm oil fruits is 
regularly discharged into rivers, being lethal to river biodiversity (Marti 2008). 
Based on our interviews we infer that, under current conditions, ISPO will not be able 
to significantly solve biodiversity problems. First, because ISPO’s regulations do not sup-
port the protection of biodiversity in convertible (i.e., unprotected) land areas (Area 
Penggunaan Lain/APL). Also, ISPO currently requires companies to cultivate their entire 
concession area even if this area contains High Conservation Values (HCVs) (see PnC 2.4. 
based on Decree No. 39/2014)
34
. Failing to cultivate the entire area, results in cancella-
tion of the concession permit. Currently, initiatives are going on to overcome this prob-
lem by formulating new regulations about HCV (Surat Edaran Menteri Agraria dan Tata 
Ruang No. 10/SE/VII/2015) that also recognize HCV in converted areas. However, the 
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new and prospective regulation only has a weak legal status
35
 and can therefore not be 
adopted by ISPO in the PnC. Second, because ISPO’s interpretation of HCV, especially in 
comparison to RSPO’s interpretation of the same concept, can be considered rather free 
of engagement. Where the RSPO obliges companies to protect all areas containing high 
conservation values, ISPO only obliges the protection of biodiversity in protection zones 
(kawasan lindung in Bahasa). As the national government defines these protection 
zones, areas may contain HCVs without being designated as protected zone. 
5.6.4. Reduction of Greenhouse gasses (GHGs) 
Expansion of oil palm plantations contributes to GHG emissions (see Fargione et al. 
2008, Sheil et al. 2009). Unsustainable agricultural production on peat land furthermore 
produces Methane gasses, and  excessive fertilization, the transport of Fresh Fruit Bunch 
and CPO, and the  fermentation of palm oil mill effluent (POME)
36
 (Sheil et al. 2009) also 
contribute to the emission of CO2, CH4, and N2O. Further, palm oil plantations absorb less 
CO2 than tropical forests that are usually destroyed to build the oil palm plantations. We 
observe a lot of confidence among palm oil companies and governmental actors regard-
ing the ability of ISPO to reduce emissions by decreasing the use of chemicals, and 
adopting better waste management. However, we also found potential pitfalls that may 
counteract this reduction of greenhouse gasses, and potentially even lead to an increase 
in emissions.  
First, because it is still possible under ISPO to legally convert areas containing high 
carbon stock
37
 or HCV
38
 into plantations, which releases substantial GHG emissions. 
Second, ISPO’s approval to grow oil palm plantations in peat land areas (see Regulation 
of Ministry of Agriculture No.14/2009), may contribute to further GHG emissions. An 
employee of an environmental NGO said:  
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 Surat Edaran Menteri Agraria dan Tata Ruang No. 10/SE/VII/2015 is a new regulation issued by Ministry of 
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Palm oil mill effluent (POME) is the waste water discharged from the sterilization process, crude oil clarifica-
tion process and cracked mixture separation process. 
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The High Carbon Stock (HCS) approach is a methodology  to identify areas of land suitable for plantation 
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http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/briefings/forests/2014/HCS%20Approach_Brei
fer_March2014.pdf ) 
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“…peat land is very important [..] to be conserved because it has a unique charac-
teristic for preventing fire. Peat land contains water or a kind of lake. The function 
of water is maintaining the humidity level of the land, so that the peat land area is 
not easily fired. To establish oil palm plantations in peat land, the water must be 
drained using canalization. It results into soil subsidence: decreasing soil surfaces 
may increase the risk of flooding… Furthermore, the drainage of water on peat 
land will also increase the risk of fire and alter the decomposition of organic soil 
materials in such a way that it will release GHGs. The drainage process of peat 
lands and the degradation of peat land contributes twice to GHG emissions, which 
is higher than the emissions resulting from deforestation”.           
Third, although the PnC do refer to the aim of emission reduction, they do not speci-
fy this aim into a target. This led to confusion among target groups in defining actions, 
and we seriously question whether actors will take any actions as long as there is no 
clear target for emission reduction. The same holds for methane capture: although it is 
specified as an aim it is not clear how much methane ISPO aims to capture and whose 
responsibility this is. Therefore, medium and small-sized companies will not take actions 
in the direction of methane recovery. The fact that this would also imply additional costs 
further contributes to the passive attitude of small and medium sized companies.  
5.6.5. Prevention of social conflict 
The expansion of oil palm plantations creates social conflicts (Rist et al. 2010, Rival and 
Levang 2014, Casson 2000). One of the causes is the unclear land right/ tenure system 
(Sheil et al. 2009, Obidzinski et al. 2012, Austin et al. 1998, Rist, Feintrenie, and Levang 
2010) and uncertain customary land rights (Gerber 2011). Communities living in, or 
nearby, allocated concession areas are in a poor bargaining position to prevent compa-
nies to take their land. Corruption and clientelistic behavior commonly occur in the 
communication process between companies and the local government to get (illegal) 
concessions (Marti 2008, Wakker 2005). Furthermore, social conflicts between commu-
nities around palm oil plantations occur, mostly between migrants and local communi-
ties. This happens often as companies prefer migrant labor over local communities to 
work on estate plantations (Casson 2000, Marti 2008, Sheil et al. 2009). Our research 
shows that ISPO tries to contribute to solving social conflicts through their obligation for 
palm oil companies to develop smallholder plantations for surrounding communities 
with at least 20% of total concession area and to create productive economic activities 
for surrounding communities. However, a lack of clarity in procedures especially for  
scheme plantations  may not solve conflicts in the future (Gunawan et al. 2015, Hanu 
2015). Also the problem resulting from corruption and patron-client relationships will 
not be tackled through this approach.  
Sustainable palm oil as a public responsibility? On the governance capacity of Indonesian 
standard for sustainable palm oil (ISPO) 
 
117 
 
Further we observe that ISPO does not recognize FPIC (Free Prior Consent) and does 
not facilitate a balanced negotiation between large plantation companies and local 
communities, which often leads to social conflicts. ISPO does not improve the bargaining 
position of local communities in negotiation processes and an NGO working with small-
holders showed examples where it happened that local communities did not actively 
participate in negotiations with companies at all. This implies that  communities  become 
unable  to refuse  new plantation establishments, and may only be able to accept the 
company’s plantations with negotiated compensation (Suharto et al. 2015). We, howev-
er, also observe that this situation does not result from a lack of regulations about nego-
tiation processes, but merely from the way in which companies interpret existing ISPO 
regulations
39
 and a difference in the substance of the regulation between FPIC in RSPO 
and ISPO’s social regulation. For example, companies do say they follow the rules by 
informing local communities, even if they do not give a balanced overview of the situa-
tion (e.g., only referring to potential positive effects of establishing a plantation and 
ignoring potential negative (side-) effects). Moreover, ISPO’s strategy only recognizes 
customary communities if they are supported by the local government may further in-
duce social conflicts. 
5.6.6. Interim conclusions on the problem -driven approach 
In the problem-driven approach we analyzed whether ISPO, if successfully implemented, 
contributes to solving palm oil related problems. On the one hand, this analysis results in 
a rather pessimistic view -that is often shared by the respondents- in which we conclude 
that ISPO will not be able to solve problems regarding the competitiveness of Indonesian 
palm oil in the global market, deforestation of protected and unprotected forest, and 
loss of biodiversity, and will only be partially able to solve problems regarding the re-
lease of GHGs and social conflicts. The pessimistic view may even be enforced by the 
fact that some of the underlying reasons for ISPO not being able to significantly improve 
these problems, lie beyond the direct control of ISPO. Here again, we see that the exist-
ence of patron-client relationships, corruption, decentralized authoritative responsibili-
ties, and ISPO’s inability to influence enforcement mechanisms create conditions in 
which ISPO is not well-equipped to solve palm oil related problems. On the other hand, 
however, we see that ISPO has some leverage points to improve its capacity to solve 
palm oil related problems. This mainly regards setting stricter targets and guidelines for 
GHGs and Methane reductions and negotiation procedures between companies and 
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communities. ISPO could also put more efforts in incentivizing poor performing produc-
ers to catch up and meet minimum standards for sustainability. 
5.7. ISPO’S GOVERNANCE CAPACITY AND SMALLHOLDERS 
Almost half of the oil palm plantation area in Indonesia is managed by smallholders. 
They are generally considered a vulnerable group of producers. Their plantations are 
generally too small (approximately two hectares), and the productivity too low (Brandi et 
al. 2013) to support the smallholder’s standards of living. Smallholders further have 
limited technical knowledge, resulting in the inappropriate use of fertilizers (Brandi et al. 
2013), they are not well-organized (they operate individually), and have limited access to 
the market, credit, and governmental support. Even after becoming RSPO certified, 
Indonesian palm oil smallholders remain vulnerable and their livelihoods do not seem to 
become substantially more sustainable (Hidayat et al. 2015). The question is whether 
ISPO will be able to improve the smallholders’ situation for the better.  
Most of the governance challenges identified above also apply to smallholders. It can 
even be considered a more profound challenge to reach millions of smallholders com-
pared to thousands of companies. Especially if certification bodies lack man-power and 
resources and when a lack of clear and operational rules may open opportunities for a 
passive attitude. Although ISPO limits the number of criteria for smallholders (compared 
to the criteria for companies) it does not diversifies its strategy for smallholders. This 
may neglect context specific problems or difficulties the smallholders are confronted 
with, or existing social relations shaping smallholders’ response toward ISPO, further 
contributing to difficulties in the implementation of ISPO.  
One of these issues regards ISPO’s PnC for independent smallholders (point 2.2.9) 
that rule out middlemen from the palm oil supply chain. The procedure says that small-
holders’ FFB should be sold directly to companies. This goes against traditional, deep 
rooted traditions in which middlemen play an important role in the palm oil value chain; 
not only because of existing social relations, but also because middlemen directly pay 
after transactions and arrange the transport of FFB. Exclusion of middlemen, therefore, 
may lead to resistance to ISPO on behalf of the smallholders, further challenging the 
implementation of ISPO.  
Moreover, we observe another difficulty for smallholders to comply with ISPO, relat-
ed to the various forms of farmer organizations existing in Indonesia (see Ibnu et al. 
2016), including associations, farmer groups (GAPOKTAN) and cooperatives. ISPO re-
quires smallholders to be organized under a cooperative, which implies that farmers 
currently belonging to a farmer group (GAPOKTAN) or association have to expand or 
change their organizational membership. Changing membership from farmer groups and 
associations to cooperatives implies the determination of social relations. This may also 
imply an increase in tax payments and more complicated procedures regarding tax pay-
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ment and FFB selling contracts. Moreover, cooperatives are (currently) not necessarily 
available in each region.  
Further we learnt that the implementation of ISPO may run the risk of increasing the 
gap between rich and poor farmers. This follows from the obligation for oil palm compa-
nies to buy at least 70% of their FFB from ISPO certified plantations in 2020. Although 
this may be positive for the certified farmers, who can relatively easily adopt and afford 
ISPO certification, it may marginalize the non-certified smallholders. The latter may face 
difficulties in selling their FFB leading to more income insecurity and hardship. Meeting 
ISPO’s objectives for smallholders can therefore be considered even more challenging 
than meeting the objectives for companies. 
5.8. CONCLUSIONS 
Indonesia is one of the first Southern countries which developed public standards and 
certification schemes for agricultural commodities in a reaction to private sustainability 
standards and certifications. This paper analyzed the potential of the Indonesian stand-
ard to bring about a sustainable change in palm oil production. Therefore, we developed 
an evaluation tool based on the concept of governance capacity. We both looked at the 
potential of ISPO to realize its own objectives and its potential contribution to solving 
palm oil-related problems. Both parts of our analysis reveal serious doubts. Although we 
observe that ISPO set a process of change in motion, it still faces tremendous govern-
ance challenges given the fact that thousands of companies and (in the near future) 
millions of smallholders need to find their way through ISPO’s certification process. 
Compared to private standards (e.g., RSPO), which are voluntary and have low sanction 
opportunities (e.g., suspension/withdrawal of the RSPO certificate), theoretically ISPO 
introduces a stronger sanction (e.g., revocation palm oil companies’ business permit), 
which may potentially be more effective to end the unsustainable practices. However, 
the ISPO committee, who is in charge of the organization and implementation of the 
ISPO standard, lacks the authority to enforce the standard. ISPO was developed with the 
aim to bring palm oil related regulations from different ministries together in one regula-
tory framework. Although this would potentially create a better functioning regulatory 
framework, we see that the various ministries keep their autonomous responsibilities 
regarding their own regulations. This does not only lead to conflicting regulations, but 
also to an impasse on behalf of ISPO when it comes to sanctioning or enforcing regula-
tions. Next to ISPO’s weak horizontal coordination at the national level, the decentraliza-
tion process provides the committee with a weak vertical coordination capacity, as local 
level governments are rather autonomous in their agricultural policies. Because of dif-
ferent interests this seems to hamper compliance with objectives and rules and a proper 
sanctioning of palm oil producers if necessary. 
Chapter 5 
 
120 
 
Another obstacle is the acceptance of ISPO in the global market in which actors ex-
press doubts regarding the credibility of ISPO. Part of this doubt results from ISPO’s 
reluctance to strictly working out the sustainability ambitions regarding palm oil related 
problems, materialized in the lack of adequate regulations on deforestation and biodi-
versity loss. Here we identify a tension between formulating stricter regulations on the 
environmental impacts of the expansion of palm oil plantations and the Indonesian gov-
ernment’s main target of economic expansion of the sector.  
Indicative of this tension is the Indonesian governments’ response to a recent (Sep-
tember 2014) initiative of palm oil companies who formulated their responsibility re-
garding sustainable development in a stricter way (called Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge; 
IPOP). Their ‘zero deforestation’ pledge (a ban on clearing primary, secondary and peat 
forests) was initially signed by the Indonesian top-four largest palm oil producers (Asia 
Agri, Cargill Indonesia, Golden Agri-Resources and Wilmar International). Later, Musim 
Mas and PT Astra Agro Lestari also joined. However, instead of levering this initiative in 
the process of sustainable change, the government claimed that IPOP infringes on the 
government’s authority to set standards and may constitute a cartel dominated by for-
eign interests. The government also claims that IPOP is not in line with Indonesian laws 
and too restrictive on smallholders who cannot afford to comply with a zero deforesta-
tion commitment (Gokkon 2015). Here again we see that economic considerations ham-
per a commitment to the environmental target (e.g., zero deforestation commitment).  
To become a reliable alternative in the global market, ISPO needs a more convincing 
balance between sustainability objectives and economic interests, combined with a 
more authoritative and better equipped implementation- and enforcement mechanism. 
Thus, in our view ISPO’s certification process needs a redesign, particularly if it really 
aims to include millions of smallholders, who need some recompense to become con-
vinced of the value of the scheme for them.  
Considering our results, we formulate some suggestions for improvement of ISPO’s 
performance. First, harmonization of rules regarding palm oil production and the ar-
rangement of a so-called one map policy could be helpful. A one-map policy refers to an 
overarching meta-governance framework applied by the different ministries. All gov-
ernment agencies should then use this framework when designing sectoral rules and 
formulating policies. However, an alternative might be the establishment of a meta-
governing institution, independent from a specific ministry, and with a direct mandate to 
the president to manage the palm oil sector in Indonesia. Although very different from 
the current situation, such an institution is not entirely new. It has existed in Indonesia 
for corruption eradication (KPK) with the argumentation that eradication of corruption is 
an important issue for the entire Indonesian society. It may be reasonable to provide 
ISPO with a similar status because palm oil can be regarded as an important cross-
sectoral commodity, proven by the involvement of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Minis-
try of Forestry, the Ministry of Spatial Planning, and the Ministry of Home Affairs, as well 
as local governments. Such an independent ISPO commission does not have to be entire-
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ly governmental-driven and may also exist of other actors, such as NGOs, and experts, 
which may increase external legitimacy (see Schouten and Bitzer 2015) and therefore 
improve recognition particularly from Northern consumers.  
Second, we suggest creating learning forums to accommodate different actors’ 
knowledge and experiences with ISPO. A multi-stakeholder forum could be an avenue 
for private actors, NGOs, experts, local governments, ISPO implementers (i.e., certifica-
tion bodies, consultants and training institution) and palm oil related ministries to ex-
press their views as a feedback for the improvement of the ISPO system and regulations. 
The additional benefit of such a forum may be that actors engage themselves in a pro-
cess of social learning, overcome or reduce the lack of shared values and increase con-
certed actions. This forum also facilitates discussion about rules, regulations and their 
implementation in the field to minimize conflicting perceptions between auditors.  
Third, given that different types of smallholders may deal differently with ISPO. Not 
all smallholders may be equally vulnerable with regard to the changes requested by 
ISPO. It may therefore we worthwhile for ISPO to diversify its strategies and implementa-
tion for the different types of smallholders. Those who are most vulnerable, such as 
independent smallholders who own less than 2 ha plantations with unqualified planting 
material and who are located in an area where a cooperative does not exist, may be 
given additional support to prevent marginalization. Strengthening their locally based 
agricultural organization is the most important factor. Provision of planting material, 
credit for replanting, simultaneously with an income diversification program, seem to be 
necessary to bring the most vulnerable group in the ISPO scheme. 
To conclude, this study is an early attempt to inform about the stakeholders’ view on 
the potential of ISPO to contribute to solving sustainability problems. Collecting and 
presenting information on such a sensitive topic is challenging, particularly if stakehold-
ers feel that providing information may adversely impact them, for example, because 
negative campaigns influence the palm oil companies’ image. We are fully aware of this 
and we particularly addressed this issue by performing interviews with, and presenting 
the results from, a balanced representation of actors involved. In general, public initia-
tives for sustainability still use the same channels to induce the sustainable changes as 
private initiatives, therefore we doubt whether they will succeed to bring a quicker sys-
temic change than the private initiatives. 
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6.1. INTRODUCTION  
Through sustainability standards and certification attempts are made to eliminate the 
adverse effects of the expansion of palm oil plantations and the production of palm oil. 
The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) is at the forefront of these attempts and 
can be said to follow a value chain approach, as shown by its underlying assumption that 
sustainability changes can be realized through market mechanisms. Initially, the RSPO 
concentrated its certification on large estate companies. More recently, however, the 
RSPO also attempts to bring in, and certify, smallholders. As outlined in the introductory 
chapter of this dissertation, the effectiveness and legitimacy of private certification, 
including the RSPO, is still debated. In the meantime, Indonesia as the largest palm oil 
producer worldwide, reacted to the private regulation of the RSPO and established its 
own public certification, called Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO). ISPO intends to 
realize a more socially and environmentally friendly palm oil production, which is eco-
nomically viable for producers and improves the competitiveness of Indonesian palm oil 
in the international market, but remains independent from foreign interference. ISPO is 
mandatory for large estate companies and will also be mandatory for smallholders in the 
near future. Both certification schemes assume that participation of smallholders in the 
schemes accelerates a transformation towards a more sustainable palm oil production 
and improves smallholders’ livelihoods.  
As we indicated in Chapter 1, impact studies dealing with sustainability certification, 
particularly related to smallholders, are rather inconclusive and lack consideration of the 
social context in which smallholders operate. Therefore, this dissertation aimed to pro-
vide knowledge on the impacts of sustainability certification on the livelihoods of small-
holders within their social contexts and formulated the research question: In what way 
and to what extent does sustainability certification contribute to a better livelihood of 
Indonesian palm oil smallholders? 
In our research, we put smallholders’ values and interests at the core of our analyses 
and asked them to reveal what participation in sustainability certification implies for 
them, what they value as positive contributions, and what they regard negative effects. 
We also consciously considered the social context of smallholders, including their socio-
economic relationships, cultural beliefs and practices, political realities, and the diverse 
ways in which smallholders may be embedded in institutional structures.  
Central in our study is a sustainable livelihood approach. Following the sustainable 
livelihood concept, we define farmers’ livelihoods as the availability of, and access to, 
assets that smallholders need to make a living. These assets are further operationalized 
in terms of human, social, financial, natural, and physical capital.  They are influenced by 
what is known as the vulnerability context (i.e. exposure to stresses and shocks, trans-
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forming structures and processes (e.g. policies and regulations, and strategies of small-
holders (i.e. activities and choices to improve livelihood outcomes. 
Certification can be considered to contribute to a better livelihood if it allows or sup-
ports smallholders to endurably sustain or enhance the availability of, and access to, 
assets. In this concluding chapter, we summarize the findings of our empirical research 
and reflect on potential pathway toward a sustainable future for Indonesian palm oil 
smallholders. We base this pathway on the insights presented in the empirical chapters 
and the premise that it is desirable to further enable smallholders’ agency and empow-
erment.  
6.2. SMALLHOLDERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON LIVELIHOOD 
Smallholders frame their livelihood as sustainable if they can durably maintain a high and 
stable income, if they can afford good quality health care, and if they can provide educa-
tion to their children. They prioritize economic interests over environmental interests, 
which indicates that environmental sustainability cannot be achieved if smallholders’ 
economic problems have not been solved first, or if it is unclear to the smallholders that 
environmental improvements may develop in parallel to economic improvements.  
Based on our research we can identify some barriers hampering a more sustainable 
livelihood for smallholders. First, smallholders often use low-quality planting materials 
and, second, they often lack up-to-date knowledge on Good Agricultural Practices (GAP). 
These two challenges result in a relatively low productivity and poor quality of FFB. 
Third, we see that smallholders do not have much insight into price-setting mechanisms 
and the fairness of prices they receive for their FFB. Fourth, smallholders often face 
difficulties in buying good quality fertilizers. The price of unsubsidized fertilizers is high-
er, while the subsidized ones are often only available for food crop farmers and not for 
plantation farmers. These challenges generally lead to low FFB prices, and smallholders’ 
income can therefore be considered low. Next, we see that poor road-quality increases 
the smallholders’ costs (i.e. higher fuel consumption and drivers need to be paid per 
hour for their driving services) and the delivery time of FFB from the plantations to the 
miller companies. This implies a high risk of depreciation of the quality of FFB, because 
FFB needs to be delivered to a mill within 24 hours after harvesting to maintain its quali-
ty. Further, many smallholders are often un-organized; they manage their plantation 
individually without joining farmer groups or cooperatives. Lack of participation in such 
organizations constrains access to subsidized fertilizers and solving infrastructural prob-
lems. Moreover, smallholders are often constrained by legality issues as they often do 
not have land ownership certificates (In Bahasa, called Surat Hak Milik/SHMs) or cultiva-
tion registration certificates (In Bahasa called Surat Tanda Daftar Budidaya/STDBs). 
SHMs are prerequisites to receive (investment) loans from banks. 
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Additional, it is also crucial that smallholders are willing to adopt sustainability prac-
tices. Smallholders will be able to do so if they obtain information and knowledge which 
can be applied in their practices and if they also understand how these practices benefit 
them. It is also important that the knowledge transfer is adapted to the local context. 
General knowledge on sustainability is abstract and it needs to be translated into practi-
cal knowledge that is relevant for and applicable to smallholders. On the other hand, 
smallholders also have specific customary knowledge gained through experiences that is 
useful given the context in which they operate. They can use their knowledge effectively 
if they would be able to exert agency.  
6.3. REFLECTION ON THE DIVERSITY OF INDONESIAN PALM OIL 
SMALLHOLDERS 
As described in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4, palm oil smallholders are rather diverse regard-
ing the institutional structures in which they are embedded. More concretely, this diver-
sity results from, and depends on, the actors the smallholders collaborate with (compa-
nies, NGOs or middlemen) and the form of management adopted (self-management 
versus one-roof management). We distinguish five different types of smallholders: (1) 
(semi) Independent smallholders collaborating with a company; (2) (semi) Independent 
smallholders collaborating with an NGO; (3) (fully) Independent smallholders collaborat-
ing (informally) with middlemen; (4) Koperasi Kredit Primer untuk Anggota, or scheme 
smallholders (under one-roof management); and (5) Nucleus Estate Smallholders and 
scheme smallholders (under self-management). We have seen that this diversity is cru-
cial to understand differences in farmers’ livelihoods and the (different) implications of 
certification for these livelihoods. The institutional diversity particularly leads to differ-
ences in the magnitude of, and access to, assets (see Chapter 2 and 4).  
6.4. CONTRIBUTION OF SUSTAINABILITY CERTIFICATIONS TO 
SMALLHOLDERS’ LIVELIHOOD 
Based on Chapter 2 that investigates how RSPO certification impacts the livelihoods of 
Indonesian palm oil smallholders, we conclude that participation in the RSPO positively 
contributes to smallholders’ livelihood. This contribution, however, is indirect and works 
through organizational changes (allowing for monitoring practices and gaining benefits 
from economics of scale) and capacity building through training leading to a higher 
productivity and production quality that may further benefit smallholders financially. In 
Chapter 3 we found that certified smallholders indeed receive higher financial returns 
compared to uncertified smallholders. Participation in private certification also improves 
access to the market, but mainly for independent smallholders and only to a very small 
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extent for scheme smallholders. Moreover, participation of smallholders in the RSPO 
contributes to non-monetary benefits, such as safety, better health and better environ-
mental conditions. Certified smallholders are also more resilient to stresses and shocks 
(see Chapter 4) compared to uncertified smallholders.  
However, private certification still leaves smallholders with uncertainties regarding 
premium fees (i.e. the height of the premium fees to be received, and the way in which 
it will be distributed by the miller company) and the low uptake of certified palm oil in 
the global market (see Chapter 2). Therefore, we conclude that private certification does 
not significantly change the vulnerability of smallholders. Private certification also im-
plies extra costs. Currently these extra costs are borne by the miller companies. If the 
smallholders had to pay these costs themselves and premium fees remain uncertain, 
certification would not improve the smallholders’ financial situation (see Chapter 3).  
The implementation of the public certification scheme of ISPO can, given its objective 
to certify all palm oil companies and millions of diverse and geographically scattered 
smallholders, be considered a tremendous governance challenge. Our research shows 
that most crucial is the lack of authority of the ISPO commission to enforce objectives 
and rules. Economic considerations of the Indonesian government, such as fearing a loss 
of government revenues and job opportunities, may further constrain ISPO to enforce 
sanctions for non-compliance of large plantations. Regarding smallholders, we are even 
more doubtful whether the sanction mechanism (i.e. closing plantations that do not 
comply) will ever work, because the government may be very resistant to separate the 
farmers from their sources of living and risk social conflicts and economic hardship for 
smallholders. Market developments are also not in favor of ISPO yet. The global market 
demand for uncertified oil is still significant and, therefore, it will remain attractive for 
producers to neglect ISPO and continue the production of uncertified palm oil. Further-
more, the exclusion of middlemen in the implementation of ISPO, may lead to resistance 
on behalf of the smallholders, because trade with middlemen is part of their culture, and 
middlemen often provide support to smallholders in the form of cash payments and 
transportation.  
Our research also shows that, even if ISPO would be successfully implemented, it will 
not solve palm oil related problems regarding deforestation of protected and unprotect-
ed forest, biodiversity loss, the release of GHGs and social conflicts. We also have doubts 
about the extent to which ISPO will be able to improve the competitiveness of Indone-
sian palm oil in the global market (see Chapter 5). Current ISPO rules, particularly con-
cerning deforestation and protection of high conservation value areas (HCV) are not 
strict enough to fundamentally lead to changes. ISPO may, for example, contribute to 
preventing deforestation of protected forest, but it will not manage to prevent defor-
estation of unprotected forest and forest with HCV. Other rules leave too much space 
for different interpretations. This regards the rules for negotiation processes between 
companies and communities, including the recognition of customary community rights. 
A lack of clarity regarding these rules may stimulate, rather than prevent, social conflicts.  
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Furthermore, as ISPO solely focusses on eligible companies (i.e. that already fulfill some 
basic requirements as explained in Chapter 5), it excludes poor performing producers, 
who may continue their unsustainable practices beyond ISPO’s horizon. Moreover, bu-
reaucratic challenges including the existence of patron-client relationships, corruption, 
and unclear decentralized authoritative responsibilities, may negatively influence ISPO’s 
problem solving capacity as they lie outside the direct control of ISPO.  
To summarize, we doubt whether public and private sustainability certification, in the 
way in which they are currently shaped, will be able to substantially improve the liveli-
hood of palm oil smallholders and solve sustainability problems resulting from, and in-
herent to, the production of palm oil. Our research reveals drawbacks of both private 
and public certification. For both it remains challenging to find a balance between envi-
ronmental sustainability and economic interests. To some extent RSPO managed to find 
a balance between offering a strict environmental standard and providing economic 
benefits from participation in the scheme, but this goes together with uncertainties, 
specifically regarding the provision of price premiums. ISPO is expected to be relatively 
cheap (e.g. no membership fees) and more easily accessible for smallholders compared 
to private certification. However, the rules are less strict and interspersed with leeway. 
Combined with the lack of authority and coordination problems, this leads to a rather 
weak ability to achieve an environmentally sustainable transformation of the palm oil 
sector.  
6.5. POTENTIAL PATHWAYS FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR 
INDONESIAN PALM OIL SMALLHOLDERS  
Existing discrepancies between the current situation and a sustainable future for Indo-
nesian palm oil smallholders can be bridged in different ways. Here we focus on a few of 
them, including adaptations in the current systems of private and public certification and 
new approaches that recently have been introduced in palm oil production in Indonesia 
(landscape approach, jurisdictional approach and FAIR company-community partner-
ships).  
Adapting private or public certification 
Private certification can potentially contribute to a pathway for a sustainable future for 
smallholders, if the system can be re-arranged in such a way that smallholders can be 
assured of a stable, certain and continuous economic incentive for practicing in a more 
environmentally friendly way. Moreover, as current private certification works in a top-
down manner, it lacks consideration of the local context which becomes problematic 
when the system is implemented on the ground. Alignment of the sustainability stand-
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ards with local knowledge is therefore crucial to make sustainability accepted as the 
norm and to make it applicable to the Indonesian context.  
A way to ensure acceptance of the sustainability norms and applicability to the Indo-
nesian context, is to pursue public certification. However, this strategy will not automati-
cally solve issues on the troublesome acceptance of the public standard by global market 
players, which may further accelerate the smallholders’ difficulties in getting access to 
the market. To assure acceptance in the global market, the public certification’s rules 
need to be more convincing regarding the environmental aspects of sustainability. The 
government also needs to better collaborate with non-governmental actors to increase 
the external legitimacy of the scheme and it needs to solve administrative problems 
among different governmental levels (national, provincial and district) and different 
technical ministries to implement and enforce the standards. 
If private certification seems to be able to assure the environmental sustainability of 
the palm oil production and acceptance of the standard in the market, but remains fac-
ing difficulties in translating standards in a way that is understandable in, and applicable 
to, the Indonesian context, a combination or integration of private and public standards 
may comprise a pathway towards a sustainable future for palm oil smallholders. Howev-
er, we do not foresee that a parallel existence of private and a public certification may 
contribute to a more sustainable future for smallholders. Current differences in private 
and public certification are significant and lead to confusion among stakeholders about 
what sustainable practices really are and what actions need to be taken by whom. Mul-
tiple certifications may also imply higher costs, potentially leading to a further reduction 
in smallholders’ income. Another alternative is the development of a combined, or inte-
grated, certification scheme in which ISPO and RSPO merge into one coherent system. 
Combined certification is a way to realize one integrated certification management sys-
tem and a single combined certification audit. Although further studies regarding the 
feasibility of a combined certification are necessary, we see opportunities in the realm of 
a more sustainable pathway. First, because it may re-create a -more or less- shared set 
of sustainability standards, which are more widely accepted than the current public 
standards and solve the problem of farmer confusion in a situation with parallel certifica-
tion schemes. Second, and through the involvement of private actors, it may improve 
the credibility of the current public standard, by involving governmental and non-
government stakeholders to ensure independent monitoring of the implementation of, 
and compliance to, the standard. Third, and through the involvement of the Indonesian 
government, the applicability of the standards to the local context may be assured as 
well as acceptance of the standards among farmers. We however also foresee some 
challenges towards a sustainable future for palm oil smallholders inherent to the idea of 
a mandatory, combined private-public scheme.  
Although it offers opportunities to reach remote and even poor-performing small-
holders (instead of only flagship producers), the risk is that poor-performing smallhold-
ers simply turn out to be unable to fulfil the required standards. This implies that they 
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will not become certified, but continue running their plantation with unsustainable prac-
tices because they need to make a living. For these smallholders, a sustainable future 
will not be guaranteed in this pathway.   
Reversing certification 
Notwithstanding our doubts about the ability of the current certification schemes to 
contribute to a more sustainable palm oil production and better living conditions for 
smallholders, we consider a reverse of ongoing trends in sustainability certification no 
change for the better. Before the rise of private sustainability schemes, the governance 
of palm oil production, including efforts to improve the sustainability of the production, 
were under the full control of the (Indonesian) government. In this period however, it 
became clear that the national Indonesian government did not have enough capacity to 
realize a transformation towards a more sustainable agricultural production on its own. 
Underlying causes for this lack of capacity have not been solved during the last decades 
and issues regarding the absence of well-functioning coordinating mechanisms, conflict-
ing regulations, inadequate enforcement of national regulations, patron-client relation-
ships, corruption and bribing still prevail. However, we do not want to suggest here that 
government interventions in (sustainable) agriculture are necessarily doomed to fail.  
Government-led initiatives may work well if arranged in a specific way and with the 
involvement of a broad range of stakeholders. In the past, the national government, in 
collaboration with palm oil companies and financial donors, initiated the Nucleus Estate 
Scheme (NES) with the aim to promote smallholder-driven palm oil production. We 
observe that some elements of the NES system may contribute to a sustainable future 
for smallholders. First, the NES system provided resources including money, knowledge 
and human resources (in the form of extension officers) and ensured availability of, and 
access to, inputs for improving the productivity of oil palm plantations. Second, the NES 
system facilitated the organization of farmer groups and cooperatives and linked them 
to companies to ensure the acceptance of FFB in the market. As a result, the NES 
scheme smallholders realized relatively better living conditions than (fully) independent 
smallholders (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). A replication of the NES system, however, 
may not guarantee an environmentally-friendlier way of production and a more equal 
power distribution between nucleus companies and smallholders. Attention to the envi-
ronmental aspects of sustainability (including climate change) can be considered crucial 
to guarantee a sustainable future for palm oil smallholders. Not only as these aspects 
may increasingly function as prerequisites to enter the western market, including the 
European Union, United Kingdom and the United States, but also to enable smallholders 
to adapt or respond, to extreme weather conditions that will be aggravated by climate 
change.   
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The landscape approach 
During our research, new approaches were introduced to tackle problems faced by palm 
oil smallholders and the production of palm oil. The landscape approach is one of these 
approaches and aims to manage geographical regions where agriculture competes with 
other land use types (e.g. forest) to achieve social, economic, and environmental objec-
tives (Ros-Tonen et al. 2015, Sayer et al. 2013). This approach is not entirely new and has 
been given different names since the 1980s, including Agro-landscape ecology, 
Lifescape, and Eco-agriculture (Reed et al. 2015). In Indonesia, the landscape approach 
has been applied by NGOs in collaboration with businesses in three regions (West-
Kalimantan, Riau and Aceh) to manage forest areas in consideration of human needs, 
biodiversity, and carbon management. More recently, we see that palm oil production – 
and particularly the prevention of deforestation for palm oil plantations- starts to play a 
role in the landscape approach in West- Kalimantan and Aceh. Currently, the landscape 
approach makes use of certification. One of the main differences with private and public 
certification, is that conventional certification adopts a single-commodity certification 
system. This means that a particular product (palm oil, coffee, cocoa) may become certi-
fied and that farmers need a separate certificate for every crop they grow. This is not 
only administratively inefficient, but also leads to high costs, as every certification pro-
cess needs to be paid separately. The landscape approach does not certify a single crop, 
but a geographical region (farms, villages, districts). In theory, the government could 
play a role in this approach, but it rarely happens in practice. This may relate to the fact 
that the landscape approach has no jurisdictional selection criteria to select the land-
scape under its management. It may only cover part of a jurisdictional area, or combine 
different jurisdictions. The disadvantage of the absence of the government in the land-
scape approach, is that the initiators of the landscape approach only have limited au-
thority to solve issues related to national and regional laws and regulations.  A way to 
guarantee government involvement in the realm of the landscape approach, is via the 
so-called jurisdictional approach. 
Jurisdictional approach 
The jurisdictional approach is in its approach and aims essentially the same as the land-
scape approach. It also tries to integrate different types of land-use in a region in such a 
way that objectives of different stakeholders can be reached and peacefully co-exist next 
to each other. Certification is also often used as an instrument, but in theory this ap-
proach may also exist without the use of certification
40
. The most important distinguish-
ing feature regards the way in which regions are selected and the way in which the ap-
                                                                 
40
 Currently, the RSPO is experimenting with integrating their private certification scheme into a jurisdictional 
approach. Although the RSPO aims to certify all palm oil in a specific region (e.g.  South Sumatera, and Seruyan 
and Kotawaringin Barat districts in Central Kalimantan), they limit their scope to the certification of palm oil.  
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proach is embedded in the political context. The jurisdictional approach was developed 
based on the idea that government involvement is vital to assure long term and struc-
tural changes in the landscape. The landscape under scrutiny is defined along jurisdic-
tional (i.e. existing political and legal) boundaries which assures commitment from the 
government by creating and formalizing a framework of incentives, policies, laws, and 
practices for a more sustainable land use. This framework, including a description of the 
actors involved, and the way in which these actors work together to achieve the agreed-
upon objectives, needs to be formally institutionalized at different governmental levels. 
The idea is that this institutionalized system helps to assure long-term continuity of the 
jurisdictional framework. The jurisdictional approach is still rather new in Indonesia’s 
palm oil sector. The first example stems from 2011 in East Kalimantan (Berau Forest 
Carbon Program) followed by other programs in other jurisdictional regions e.g. the 
Central Kalimantan Sustainable Palm Oil Production and Protection Program (see Paoli et 
al. 2016 for more detail). With regards to a sustainable future for palm oil smallholders 
in Indonesia, we foresee two challenges inherent to this approach. The first one regards 
the involvement of smallholder farmers from the beginning of these projects and the 
available space for smallholders to choose their own strategies and act upon their agen-
tic power. These issues are currently undervalued in the jurisdictional approach. Further, 
and although the institutionalization of the approach may guarantee longer-term com-
mitment from a diversity of stakeholders, it also leads to less flexibility to adapt to 
changes. Especially if smallholders may only become involved after the program has 
been implemented already, it may be impossible to make changes in the program based 
on smallholders’ input. A way to assure smallholder involvement from the early stages of 
a project, is through the so-called FAIR community-company partnerships. 
FAIR company- community partnerships 
FAIR company-community partnerships approach was initiated by Oxfam in 2016 and 
aims to improve regional economic development and reduce the adverse impacts of 
palm oil production via arranging and institutionalizing collaborative arrangements be-
tween smallholders and companies. This approach is also based on the Landscape ap-
proach but emphasizes that smallholders need to be actively involved from an early 
stage of the partnership program. This involvement is shaped through a participatory 
approach and based on four principles that together form the acronym FAIR; Freedom of 
choice, Accountability, Improvement of benefits, and Respect for rights (Oxfam 2017). 
The FAIR company-community partnership approach is very recently initiated and aims 
to launch pilot projects in Indonesia by 2017. Although we are rather optimistic about 
the landscape – and participatory approaches underlying the FAIR community-company 
partnership constellation, we also feel that a lack of government involvement may cause 
authority challenges and hamper vigor, as explained before.    
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Summarized, we doubt whether certification in its current shape may structurally and 
significantly contribute to a more sustainable future for smallholders. Reversing the 
trend of certification is an undesired option as we cannot expect governments to change 
their agricultural systems into more sustainable systems on their own. We also have to 
realize that certification has resulted in minor, but significant improvements in the liveli-
hoods of certified palm oil smallholders, which should not be neglected. It may therefore 
be possible to adapt existing certification systems, or to integrate public and private 
certification into one coherent scheme. We however feel that this may contribute to, 
but not sufficiently guarantee, a sustainable future for smallholders. Based on our re-
search, we feel that an integration of the jurisdictional approach and the FAIR communi-
ty-company partnership model may enable more significant improvements towards a 
sustainable future for Indonesian palm oil smallholders. It is the unique combination of 
government involvement, participatory approaches that guarantee smallholder involve-
ment and allow smallholders to act upon their agency, and the prioritization of a land-
scape approach over a single-crop approach that make us feel positive about the poten-
tial contribution of such an approach towards a more sustainable future for Indonesian 
palm oil smallholders.  
6.6 OUTLOOK ON FUTURE RESEARCH 
Based on our research, we consider the sustainable livelihood concept useful in analyz-
ing the impacts of sustainability certification on palm oil smallholders’ livelihoods from a 
smallholders’ perspective.  The sustainable livelihood concept takes a holistic view on 
the impacts of certification and the channels through which these impacts may be 
shaped. This allows to explicitly consider smallholders’ social contexts, including their 
socio-economic relationships, cultural beliefs, practices, and political realities in analyz-
ing the impact of certification on their livelihoods.  
Our research shows that the impacts of certification can be considered positive, but 
very small. Certification in its current form will probably not result in systemic sustaina-
bility changes. In this chapter we reflected on several pathways for a more sustainable 
future for Indonesian palm oil smallholders. An integration of the jurisdictional approach 
and the FAIR community-company partnership model may provide opportunities to 
combine smallholder empowerment and participation within a landscape approach, 
while assuring commitment from public and private actors. Notwithstanding these po-
tential strengths, we also foresee some challenges justifying further research on the 
implementation, feasibility and prospective impacts of the so-called combined approach.  
A first challenge regards the way in which nation-wide unification of this approach 
can be guaranteed. Currently, the implementation of jurisdictional approaches is strictly 
delineated by jurisdictional borders (i.e. districts or provinces). Given the decentralized 
political structure of Indonesia, it is very well possible that each jurisdiction employs its 
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own rules and regulations that differ from other, neighboring jurisdictions. On the local 
scale, this is not necessarily a problem given the bottom-up and participatory way in 
which the FAIR community-company approach works. This allows the combined ap-
proach to adapt to rules and regulations in different jurisdictional territories. However, 
this situation may become a problem if the target is to induce nation-wide systemic 
sustainability changes in the agricultural sector. Relevant questions that need to be an-
swered regard the way in which the combined approached can be scaled-up to the na-
tional level, who will take the lead in this, and how communication and coordination 
among different levels of the government and among jurisdictions may be shaped.  
When the approach will be scaled-up to a higher level, the commitment of the local 
government will be crucial to keep the program running and to assure a reliable moni-
toring system.  This raises questions on how to keep the local government committed 
and involved, when part of the responsibility and authority shift to the national level, 
and how to assure alignment of this approach with national programs and regulations.  
The question on who can best take the lead in the process of upscaling is also far from 
evident. It may seem obvious to see this as a task for the national or local government, 
but the involvement of companies and NGOs may also be important to preserve legiti-
macy towards manufactures, retailers and financial donors.  
A second challenge that could be further explored in future studies, regards the role 
of certification in the combined approach. In the current situation we see that actors in 
the jurisdictional approach and in the FAIR company-community partnerships seem to 
be keen on adopting private certification. This is no surprise as the actors behind these 
relatively new initiatives also played a role in the establishment of the RSPO.  The ques-
tion however is, whether certification is necessary in a combined approach to either 
enable or speed up a transformation towards a more sustainable agricultural system. 
Even if it is concluded that certification may be beneficial in the combined approach, one 
may wonder what kind of certification fits best. Our earlier plea to integrate public and 
private certification does not seem to add a lot to the integrated approach, as the inte-
grated approach already inherently encompasses the same benefits as integrating public 
and private certification, assurance of government commitment, and assuring global 
market acceptance through the adoption of stricter environmental principles.  
 A third challenge regards a crucial characteristic of the combined approach: early-
stage multi-stakeholder participation. It is inherently challenging to ensure long-term 
commitment among public and private stakeholders. In our view, it is crucial to reveal 
and explicate a compelling value proposition for all stakeholders to stimulate their will-
ingness to engage in the combined approach and their long-term commitment. This asks 
for building an assessment tool to analyze the perceived and the expected benefits and 
costs of the combined approach for all stakeholders and to think about ways to make 
this knowledge available to, and accessible for them. Further building on this disserta-
tion, the assessment tool should pay attention to the five different types of palm oil 
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smallholders and the different ways and intensities in which they may benefit from the 
combined approach.  
A fourth challenge that strongly relates to the previous one, deals with the relation 
between smallholder inclusiveness and smallholder empowerment in the combined 
approach and beyond. Being part of a process does not automatically imply that your 
opinion is actually heard and taken into account in making decisions. Therefore, we 
consider it relevant, to develop a tool to enhance smallholders’ inclusiveness in negotia-
tion processes. As a first step, such a tool could focus on issues regarding integrated land 
use planning and attempts to minimize unintended effects of palm oil production (e.g. 
social conflict and food insecurity). Given our premise that smallholders’ agency and 
empowerment are crucial for a more sustainable future for smallholders, research on 
how smallholders can be empowered in relation to other actors e.g. miller companies, 
governments and NGOs also remains a must. Moreover, given the fact that smallholders, 
but also the contexts in which they are embedded, are very heterogeneous, their priori-
ties, preferences and strategies for maintaining their livelihoods may also be different. In 
relation to that, initiatives may only be effective in empowering smallholders and im-
proving their livelihoods, if they are aligned with smallholders’ priorities and prefer-
ences. In relation to that, we see that a better understanding of smallholders on a micro 
level, particularly on their preferred strategies, behavior and decision-making processes 
is necessary to better adapt initiatives to smallholders’ livelihoods and the institutional 
and social context in which the smallholders are embedded. We consider this a gap in 
current knowledge that may be filled with future research.
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Appendix 1. Indicators and measurements of 
dimensions of farmer resilience 
Variables Indicators Measurements 
Dimension of buffer capacity 
Human capital (score=4-20) 
Education  year of schooling  
1=didn’t go to school; 2=1-12 year (SD); 3=13-15 
year (SMP); 4=16-18 year (SMA); 5=>18 year 
(University) 
Skill Skills being practiced 
1=don’t have any other skill; 2=only have palm 
oil plantation related skills e.g. harvesting, 
spraying, fertilizer application; 3=have palm oil 
plantation related skills  and any other 
agriculture skills; 4=Have agriculture and Non-
agriculture (informal) related skills (blue-collar 
skill); 5=have entrepreneurial skill or white-collar 
skill 
Health condition 
Ability to use own (family) labor to 
work at plantation 
1=never/unable to use family labor; 2=seldom; 
3=sometime; 4=often ; 5=Almost always 
Knowledge 
Training attended in the last 12 
months 
1=never attend training; 2=seldom (1-4); 
3=sometime(5-8); 4=often (9-12) ; 5=Almost 
always (>12) (the value may change dependent 
on distribution of data in the field) 
Financial capital (score=5-25) 
Income  
Last month income from selling 
Fresh Fruit Bunch (FFB) 
1=very low; 2=Below average; 3=Average; 
4=Above average; 5=very high (dependent on 
distribution of data in the field) 
Yield 
Yield per ha last year or (average 
monthly production per ha*12) 
1=very low; 2=Below average; 3=Average; 
4=Above average; 5=very high (based on 
diagnostic study average yield of smallholder is 
16-18 ton/year/ha, with OER 18-22% 
Saving 
Saving: number of livestock 
1=don’t have saving; 2=Below average; 
3=Average; 4=Above average; 5=very high 
(dependent on distribution of data in the field) 
Non-farm income 
percentage of non-oil palm 
plantation income to household 
income (including remittance) 
1=none ; 2=x=<25%; 3=50>=x>25%; 4=75>=x>50; 
5=100>=x>75 
Dependency ratio 
percentage of household member 
who do not earn income (do not 
work)  
1=100>=x>75; 2=75>=x>50; 3=50>=x>25%; 
4=x=<25%; 5=none  
Social capital: any benefits from participation in a group or organization (score=3-15) 
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Variables Indicators Measurements 
Access to 
tools/equipment 
owned by 
organization 
Availability of tools and access 
1=not available, 2=available but difficult to 
access, 3=available and accessible, but poor 
quality; 4=available, accessible, good quality, but 
limited time to use; 5=available, accessible, good 
quality, and free to use anytime 
Better 
infrastructure 
quality supported 
by organization 
Road built and maintained by group 
1=not available; 2=available but in bad condition; 
3=available in good condition only in the main 
road access; 4=available in good condition until 
plantation road inside group; 5=available in good 
condition until private road plantation 
Labour sharing 
among farmer 
group members 
Labor provision/ sharing in group 
1=not available; 2=available but difficult to 
access; 3=available, accessible, but often 
unsatisfactory work; 4=available, accessible, but 
sometimes unsatisfactory work; 5=available, 
accessible, and always satisfactory work 
Physical capital (score=2-10) 
Availability of 
private 
tools/equipment 
Availability of own spraying tools 
and its safety 
1=not available; 2=available with poor quality 
without safety tools; 3= available with good 
quality but without safety tools; 4=available with 
good quality but not complete safety tools; 
5=available with good quality and complete 
safety tools 
 
Availability of own harvesting tools 
and its safety 
1=not available; 2=available with poor quality 
without safety tools; 3= available with good 
quality but without safety tools; 4=available with 
good quality but not complete safety tools; 
5=available with good quality and complete 
safety tools 
Natural capital (score=1-5) 
Plantation risk Plantation risk to erosion/flood 
1=extremely risky to flood or erosion; 2=very 
risky to flood or erosion; 3=moderately risky to 
flood or erosion; 4=Slightly risky to erosion; 
5=not et al  
Dimension of self-organization (score=6-30) 
Institutions 
Rules, regulation, local norm and 
government policies may restrict 
self-organization of farmers  
1=there are rules definitely not allow us to 
manage plantation on his own; 2=there are rules, 
so probably not able to manage plantation (too 
difficult to follow the rule); 3=there are rules, but 
we still possibly able to manage plantation (but 
with many consequences); 4=there are rules, but 
we probably able to manage plantation (but with 
some consequences); 5=there are rules but we 
definitely able to manage plantation without any 
consequences 
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Variables Indicators Measurements 
Cooperation and 
network membership and participation 
1=No organization; 2=Follow at least one 
organization as passive member (e.g. never 
follow meeting); 3=Follow one organization as 
active member (e.g. follow all organization 
activities); 4=join one organization and active in 
management; 5=join more than one organization 
actively as member and/or management 
 
Trust and reciprocity 
1=Definitely not able to borrow money from (or 
labor exchange with) other farmers (impossible); 
2= probably not able; 3=possibly able a; 
4=probably able; 5=definitely able  
Network 
structure 
Bounding level to actors or 
organizations 
1=one roof management or part of company 
concession ; 2=tight in formal contract/ scheme; 
3=tight informally for input supply  and selling 
FFB ; 4=tight informally to sell FFB ;5=do not 
tight to any organization/agency 
 
The level of centralization of 
plantation management  
1=all plantation management are conducted by 
other actor, farmer could not influence et al; 2= 
all plantation activities are managed  by other 
actor, with farmer groups/cooperative control; 
3=partly plantation activities are managed  by 
other actors under farmer groups/cooperative 
control; 4=partly/all plantation activities  are 
managed by other actors under farmers’ control 
(individually); 5=all plantation activities managed 
by farmers themselves (managed=application 
including, input provision, decision when the 
activities conducted etc) 
Reliance on own 
resources 
Percentage of external input 
reduction because of internal input 
substitution 
1=none ; 2=x=<25%; 3=50>=x>25%; 4=75>=x>50; 
5=100>=x>75 
Dimension of learning capacity (score=6-30) 
Knowledge of 
threats and 
opportunities 
Ability to get information about 
ongoing issues around palm oil  
1=Very poor (never get information); 2=Poor 
(Difficult to get information, most of the time 
no); 3=Fair (sometime get information); 4=Good 
(often get information, most of the time get); 
5=Very good (always) 
Commitment to 
learning 
How many time in a year regular 
meetings in organizations are 
conducted to discuss performance 
in the last season/ last year 
1=None/Never attend such meeting; 2=seldom 
(1-4); 3=sometime(5-8); 4=often (9-12) ; 
5=Almost always (>12) (the value may change 
dependent on distribution of data in the field) 
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Variables Indicators Measurements 
Functioning 
feedback 
mechanism 
Frequency discussion between 
farmers and extension officer (from 
government or company or NGO) in 
the last 12 months  
1=None/ Never join such discussions; 2=seldom 
(1-4); 3=sometime(5-8); 4=often (9-12) ; 
5=Almost always (>12) (the value may change 
dependent on distribution of data in the field) 
Knowledge 
identification 
capability-
monitoring Experimentation 
1=Definitely not able to do experiment (no 
available external support); 2= probably not able 
(can ask external support but they have done it 
before); 3=possibly able, (it is done occasionally 
with external supports); 4=probably able with 
external support, (it is done continually); 
5=definitely able (with own resources and it is 
done continually) 
Knowledge 
sharing and 
transfer capability 
Sharing information and knowledge 
among farmers 
1=None/ Never join such discussions; 2=seldom 
(1-4); 3=sometime(5-8); 4=often (9-12) ; 
5=Almost always (>12) (the value may change 
dependent on distribution of data in the field) 
 
Applicability of new knowledge to 
practice in plantation 
1=Never applicable; 2=seldom applicable; 
3=sometime applicable; 4=often applicable; 
5=Almost always  
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Appendix 2. Correlation between dimensions 
of resilience, its interactions and livelihood 
resilience 
Variables Correlation 
coefficient (r) 
Sig. 2 
tailed 
Buffer capacity  .138* .022 
Self-organization .040 .507 
Learning capacity .166**  .006 
Interaction: buffer capacity and self-organization  .077 .204 
Interaction: buffer capacity and learning capacity .173** .004 
Interaction: self-organization and learning capacity .128* .034 
Interaction: among all dimensions .129* .032 
Certification*) .231**  .000 
Collaboration 1 (middleman as control)*) -.232**   .000 
Collaboration 2 (company as control) *) .102  .091  
Management 1 (independent as control) *) .035  .565  
Management 2 (one-roof as control) *) -.030 .616  
Interaction: certification and buffer capacity .251** .000 
Interaction: certification and self-organization .233** .000 
Interaction: certification and learning capacity .240** .000 
Interaction: management (one-roof as control) and buffer capacity  -.027 .657 
Interaction: management (one-roof as control) and self-organization -.021 .725 
Interaction: management (one-roof as control) and learning capacity -.036 .552 
Interaction: collaboration (middlemen as control) and buffer capacity -.194** .001 
Interaction: collaboration (middlemen as control) and self-organization -.194** .001 
Interaction: collaboration (middlemen as control) and learning capacity -.174** .004 
*. Significant level = .05  
** Significant level = .01 
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Appendix 3. T-test: mean difference 
dimension of farmer resilience based on 
participation in certification scheme 
A. Buffer capacity  
 Certification N Mean Sig-2 tailed Mean difference 
Buffer capacity 
certified 105 41.5810 .000** 7.01625 
uncertified 170 34.5647   
   
B. Self-organization  
 Certification N Mean Sig 2-tailed Mean difference 
Self-organization 
certified 105 17.8857 .172 .49748 
uncertified 170 17.3882   
 
C. Learning capacity  
 Certification N Mean Sig. (2-tailed) Mean difference 
Learning capacity 
certified 105 16.6857 .000** 3.780 
uncertified 170 12.9059   
*. Significant level = .05  
** Significant level = .01 
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Appendix 4. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
test: mean difference of livelihood resilience 
based on plantation management 
Mean difference (H-V) Independent NES/KKPA self-
management 
One roof 
Independent   .0513 (.796) .1133 (.586) 
NES/KKPA self-management   .586 (.859) 
One roof    
F=.608, Sig.=.545 
P-value is in the bracket  
*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level 
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Appendix 5. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
test: mean difference of livelihood resilience 
based on partner that smallholders 
collaborate with 
Mean difference (H-V) Middlemen Company NGO 
Middlemen  -.3015* (.008) -.3995* (.005) 
Company   -.0980 (.587) 
NGO    
F=6.360, Sig. = .002 
P-value is in the bracket  
*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level 
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Appendix 6. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
test: mean difference of dimensions of farmer 
resilience based on collaboration 
A. Buffer capacity  
Mean difference (H-V) Middlemen Company NGO 
Middlemen  -3.042*(.006) -.807 (.795) 
Company   3.849* (.000) 
NGO    
F=10.523, Sig. = .000 
P-value is in the bracket  
*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level 
 
B. Self-organization  
Mean difference (H-V) Middlemen Company NGO 
Middlemen  2.253*
 
(.000) -1.180* (.007) 
Company   -3.433* (.000) 
NGO    
F=24.502, Sig. = .000 
P-value is in the bracket  
*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level 
 
C. Learning capacity  
Mean difference (H-V) Middlemen Company NGO 
Middlemen  -3.443*
 
(.000) -2.765* (.001) 
Company   .677 (.506) 
NGO    
F=15.727, Sig. = .000 
P-value is in the bracket  
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level 
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Appendix 7. Flowchart of ISPO certification 
process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*) Scheme smallholders: Manager of scheme plantation  
Independent smallholders: Cooperative/ farmer groups 
 
Re-classified 
(4) Plantation company*) requests 
for certification to certification 
body and ISPO commission in-
cluding pre-requisite docu-
ments i.e. Plantation class, 
plantation business permit 
(IUP), business utilization rights 
(HGU) and Environmental 
permit (AMDAL) 
(5) Independent certification 
body  
 
(6)  ISPO commis-
sion (secretari-
at) evaluates 
completeness 
documents and 
evaluation re-
port from certi-
fication body 
within 2 
months 
(7) ISPO Commission As-
sessment Team assess 
the same report from 
step 7 for its content, 
within 2 months  
If not eligible: need correc-
tive action within 6 months 
after audits  
(8) Approval 
by ISPO 
Commission 
Secretariat will 
inform the applicant 
to fulfil the require-
ments within 2 
weeks 
Document 
incomplete 
Rejected 
(9) ISPO certificate issued by 
Certification bodies and 
published in ISPO website, 
within 10 days 
(10) Surveillance 
by certification 
body 
(2) Classification by 
Local government 
(factually compul-
sory) 
(3) Company Class I-III 
prepare for ISPO cer-
tification helped by 
consultant or internal 
auditor based com-
pany 
(3) Company Class IV-V do 
corrective action based on 
recommendation from local 
government 
(1) National govern-
ment provides regu-
lation and criteria 
for classification 
a) Assess request and docu-
ments (within 7 days) 
b) Audit I: on site audit (2 days) 
 
c) Audit II: field assessment (3 
days) 
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Appendix 8. Sanction mechanism of ISPO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Companies (Grade I, Grade II and 
Grade III and have no land right 
problems) 
Registered in ISPO Yes 
No 
Companies will be 
downgrade to Grade IV 
(1) Do the companies propose 
for certification?  
(2) Do the companies propose for 
plantation classification?  
Yes, and awarded Grade I -III 
Revocation of the 
plantation companies 
permit/licence 
No, and/or do not propose certification after 12 
months 
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Appendix 11. Example of results of CAQDA 
analysis 
Family 1 Family 2 coding Quotations Example of the quotations in English 
Availability 
of resources 
right actors 
quantity 
enough 
people in 
4 
11 certification bodies are enough already, 
however, if there are more institutions 
proposed to be part of ISPO certification 
body, we (ISPO commission) will accept it as 
long as the institution has been approved by 
ISPO evaluation team.  
Availability 
of resources 
  
not enough 
people in 
20 
….., ISPO has too limited auditors, compared 
to palm oil companies that have to be 
audited More than one mo.th is needed to 
audit one palm oil company. That is the 
reason behind the extended of ISPO’s target 
to certify all Indonesian palm oil 
companies….. 
Availability 
of resources 
Money 
enough 
budget 
4 
…. So, there is no budget problem for ISPO 
…… ISPO secretariat should have maybe IDR 
6-7 billion and up to now government still 
able to provide that. 
Availability 
of resources 
  
not enough 
budget 
15 
We know that the government has a limited 
budget particularly for estate crop related 
programs. Only 10 billion is not enough, we 
need hundreds of billions to implement all 
those things ……… 
market 
context 
Market 
acceptance 
recognized 
in global 
market 
1 
So far, Indonesian palm oil export run well. 
Especially to India. For India, cheap price is 
the most important. Although they also 
aware of sustainability, but price is 
considered a priority.   
market 
context 
  
not 
recognized 
in global 
market 
(yet) 
23 
Up to now, ISPO has not been recognized as 
much as RSPO. I think that it is a challenge for 
ISPO to show its credibility as sustainability 
standard scheme….. 
clarity of 
rules 
Clear rules clear rules 16 
Rule and regulations are clear as it is based 
on national and local rules and regulations 
clarity of 
rules 
  
not clear 
rules 
22 
.. ISPO rule says if oil palm trees have been 
planted more than 4 years along a river, we 
can keep it, later after replanting period, it 
should not be planted and conserved, it says 
in both of Agricultural Ministry Regulation No. 
19/2011 and, the new one, Agricultural 
Ministry Regulation No. 11/2015, so from 
which year is it 4 years, 2011 or 2015.  
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Family 1 Family 2 coding Quotations Example of the quotations in English 
clarity of 
rules 
rules 
congruence  
Conflicted 
rules 
17 
……… and in Criteria 2..4. based on Decree 
No. 39/2014, companies are obliged to 
cultivate all concessions that technically 
feasible to be planted. And HCV is technically 
and economically feasible to be planted. On 
the other hand Ministry of Spatial Planning 
enforced Surat Edaran No. 10/2015  
recognizes HCV and require companies to 
conserve HCV  
clarity of 
rules 
  
Rules are 
congruent  
5 
Yes the rules are inline with other Ministries, 
as ISPO is not only a regulation from the 
Ministry of Agriculture but also a collection of 
regulations from different ministries including 
the Ministry of Forestry and Environment and 
the Ministry of Spatial Planning 
Interaction 
of actor 
involved 
Authority Lack of 
authority 
83 …. Monitoring and supervision is important 
for ISPO implementation… but enforcement 
of sanctions is also important.. ISPO says to 
revoke the license of there is non-
compliance. Which license is that? not ISPO, 
but Regent or Walikota/Bupati who has the 
authority to revoke plantation licenses.  
Interaction 
of actor 
involved 
 Enough 
authority 
3 … well.. With recommendation resulting from 
monitoring and supervision of provincial or 
district estate crop plantation office, it is not 
possible that the sanction can be enforced 
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Summary  
Participation of smallholders in sustainability certifications is expected to accelerate the 
transformation towards a more environmentally sustainable production of palm oil 
while simultaneously improving smallholders’ livelihoods. However, studies on the im-
pact of sustainability certification on smallholders are rather inconclusive and lack con-
sideration of the social context in which smallholders operate. The central aim of this 
dissertation is to investigate the impacts of sustainability certification on the livelihoods 
of Indonesian palm oil smallholders from a smallholders’ perspective. We thereby dif-
ferentiate between five different types of smallholders based on differences in their 
social and institutional context of production. The central research question in this dis-
sertation is:  
 
In what way and to what extent does sustainability certification contribute to a better 
livelihood of Indonesian palm oil smallholders? 
 
This general question is specified in three sub-questions: 1) How does private certifica-
tion relate to the smallholders’ livelihood? 2) To what extent may public certification 
become a viable alternative to private certification? 3) What might be a potential path-
way leaving room for a sustainable livelihood for palm oil smallholders? 
To answer these research questions, we adopt, and later on amend, the Sustainable 
Livelihood concept. This concept comprises the capabilities, assets and activities re-
quired for sustaining or improving a means of living. This dissertation exists of four em-
pirical chapters; the first three empirical chapters focus on private sustainability certifi-
cation: the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), whereas the fourth empirical 
chapter analyses an example of public sustainability certification: Indonesian Sustaina-
ble Palm Oil (ISPO).     
Given uncertainties about the implications of sustainability certification for small-
holders’ livelihood, Chapter 2 explores the potential of sustainability certification to 
improve the livelihood of smallholders. To achieve this objective, we develop an 
amended sustainable livelihood framework that we use to analyze the livelihoods of 
Indonesian smallholders participating in the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). 
Although access to markets and vulnerability are not improved through certification, we 
could find some positive, indirect effects of certification, for example through organiza-
tional changes leading to an increase in the productivity of palm oil plantations. Chapter 
2 also indicates a discrepancy between certifications’ theory of change and the meaning 
provided to certification by farmers. Where the former sees certification as a tool to 
create a more sustainable agriculture, the smallholders interpret it as an economic tool 
in the pursuit of a better livelihood. This implies that non-economic benefits of certifica-
Summary 
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tion (such as social and environmental improvements) are not very highly valued by the 
smallholders, unless they result in economic benefits. Certification schemes are thus 
weakly institutionalized, and farmers will easily shift to a more profitable way of produc-
tion if they get the chance. We therefore conclude that a further analysis of the eco-
nomic profitability of certification for smallholders is needed. 
 Chapter 3 analyses the economic profitability of private palm oil certification for 
smallholders using a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) and the assessment of Net Present 
Values (NPV). Better understanding the investment value of certification adoption may 
be relevant to bring in more smallholders and to make certification more beneficial for 
the generally vulnerable smallholders. Chapter 3 shows that under the actual condition, 
in which the smallholders do not pay for the certification costs, certification is profitable 
for all different types of smallholders (scheme smallholders and independent smallhold-
ers). The extent to which certification can be considered profitable depends on the 
smallholder’s conditions before they adopt certification. In the self-funded scenario, 
wherein smallholders pay all certification costs themselves, certification remains profit-
able for all smallholders except for scheme smallholders who were already better off 
before certification. For independent smallholders, certification in the self-funded sce-
nario will only remain profitable if they receive premium prices; if premium prices would 
be abolished, independent smallholders would need unrealistically high premium fees, 
i.e. double compared to the current premium fees, to make it a profitable route Consid-
ering the current oversupply of sustainable palm oil we consider it unlikely that certifica-
tion remains profitable for scheme smallholders in the self-funded scenario and for 
independent smallholders if they do not receive premium prices anymore.  
Chapter 4 is inspired by previous studies that generally analyze whether certification 
affects smallholders’ vulnerability (i.e. ability to cope with stresses and shocks), while 
they seem to neglect the smallholders’ resilience (i.e. ability to recover from stresses 
and shocks). This chapter contributes to knowledge development in this area by empiri-
cally applying and verifying an assessment framework developed by Speranza, 
Wiesmann, and Rist (2014) and through analyzing the livelihood resilience of five differ-
ent types of palm oil smallholders in Indonesia. Chapter 4 shows that palm oil small-
holders are relatively resilient to price declines, haze resulting from forest fires and El 
Nino. Differences in resilience resulting from the different shocks and between the 
different groups of smallholders are small. Regarding the assessment framework, this 
chapter reveals that correlations between the dimensions of resilience and livelihood 
resilience are rather weak for buffer capacity and learning capacity, and even absent for 
self-organization. Although self-organization contributes positively to buffer capacity 
and learning capacity, it does not directly improve the palm oil farmers’ resilience. 
Farmers under a one-roof management system (not self-organized) have more oppor-
tunities to diversify their income and find a part-time job outside their plantation, which 
may help them to recover from shocks that impact the palm oil sector. Chapter 4 also 
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points out that certification and collaborative relationships with companies (in compari-
son to middlemen) positively correlate with livelihood resilience.  
While Chapter 2, 3 and 4 focused on private certification initiatives, Chapter 5 anal-
yses the potential of a public Indonesian certification scheme (ISPO) to initiate sustaina-
ble change in palm oil production. Through a governance capacity approach, this chap-
ter questions the extent to which ISPO may be able to meet its own objectives and the 
extent to which it may contribute to solve palm oil related problems.  ISPO embraces a 
tremendous governance challenge as thousands of companies and millions of small-
holder farmers are expected to participate. It is concluded that, although ISPO has initi-
ated a process of change, it has not yet developed its full potential. The main reason 
regards ISPO’s rather loose problem definition, weak authority of the implementing 
organization, and the fact that the reliability of ISPO is still too low to convince (parts) of 
the global market. ISPO may therefore face difficulties in meeting its own targets and 
solving palm-oil related problems, such as deforestation, biodiversity loss, greenhouse 
gas emissions, and social conflicts between big plantations and local communities. The 
main governance challenge regards combining a more authoritative implementation 
mechanism with a convincing balance between sustainability objectives and economic 
interests of the sector. Given these challenges we consider it unlikely that ISPO, in the 
short term, will become a viable alternative to private certification.  
Chapter 6 concludes that private certification has a positive, but rather small effect 
on smallholders’ livelihoods. We further doubt if public or private sustainability certifi-
cation, in the way in which they are currently shaped, will ever be able to lead to sys-
temic and significant sustainability changes. For both forms of certification, it remains 
challenging to find a balance between environmental sustainability and economic inter-
ests. To some extent, the RSPO managed to find a balance between offering a strict 
environmental standard and providing economic benefits for participating farmers, but 
these economic benefits are far from being certain in the long term. Private schemes 
may further not be able to improve the livelihoods of the most vulnerable smallholders 
who cannot comply with the standards. Without government involvement, it also re-
mains challenging to unify the standards to the local context, existing regulations and 
enforcement mechanisms. ISPO is expected to be relatively cheap (e.g. no membership 
fees) and more easily accessible for smallholders compared to private certification. 
However, the rules are less strict and interspersed with leeway. Combined with the lack 
of authority, coordination problems, and problems regarding acceptance of the stand-
ard in the global market, it leads to a rather weak ability to achieve an environmentally 
sustainable transformation of the palm oil sector.  
Chapter 6 ends with an exploration of potential pathways toward a more sustainable 
future for Indonesian palm oil smallholders. We explore different pathways and discuss 
challenges and weaknesses that go along with them, including a reversal of the trend of 
certification, parallel existence of public and private certification, the landscape ap-
proach, the jurisdictional approach and the FAIR community-company partnership ap-
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proach. After balancing the pros and cons of each pathway we suggest to further ex-
plore the possibilities of integrating the FAIR company-community partnership ap-
proach with the jurisdictional approach as a way forward towards a more sustainable 
future for Indonesian palm oil smallholders. 
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Ringkasan 
Partisipasi petani dalam sertifikasi keberlanjutan diharapkan dapat mempercepat trans-
formasi menuju produksi minyak kelapa sawit yang ramah lingkungan dan sekaligus 
meningkatkan penghidupan petani. Namun, studi tentang dampak sertifikasi keber-
lanjutan terhadap petani masih terbatas dan tidak mempertimbangkan konteks sosial di 
mana petani kecil beroperasi. Tujuan utama dari disertasi ini adalah untuk menyelidiki 
dampak dari sertifikasi keberlanjutan terhadap livelihood petani kelapa sawit Indonesia 
dari perspektif petani. Dengan demikian, kita membedakan antara lima jenis petani kecil 
berdasarkan perbedaan dalam konteks produksi sosial dan kelembagaan mereka. Per-
tanyaan penelitian utama dalam disertasi ini adalah: 
 
Dengan cara apa dan sampai sejauh mana sertifikasi keberlanjutan berkontribusi pada 
livelihood yang lebih baik dari petani kelapa sawit Indonesia? 
 
Pertanyaan umum ini dispesifikasikan dalam tiga sub-pertanyaan: 1) Bagaimana sertifi-
kasi swasta terkait dengan livelihood petani? 2) Sejauh mana sertifikasi publik menjadi 
alternatif untuk sertifikasi swasta? 3) Alternatif pathway seperti apa yang mungkin 
dapat mendukung livelihood yang berkelanjutan bagi pertain kelapa sawit? 
Untuk menjawab pertanyaan penelitian ini, kita mengadopsi, dan kemudian di ubah, 
konsep Sustainable Livelihood. Konsep ini terdiri dari kemampuan, aset dan aktivitas 
yang diperlukan untuk mempertahankan atau memperbaiki sarana hidup. Disertasi ini 
terdiri dari empat bab empiris; tiga Bab empiris petama focus terhadap sertifikasi berke-
lanjutan swasta: Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), sedangkan bab empiris ke 
empat menganalisis contoh sertfikasi public: Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO).      
Dengan ketidakpastian mengenai implikasi sertifikasi keberlanjutan bagi livelihood 
petani, Bab 2 mengeksplorasi potensi sertifikasi keberlanjutan untuk memperbaiki taraf 
hidup petani. Untuk mencapai tujuan ini, kami mengembangkan kerangka kerja sustain-
able livelihood yang telah kami gunakan untuk menganalisis livelihood petani kecil Indo-
nesia yang berpartisipasi dalam Roundtable of Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). Meskipun 
akses terhadap pasar dan vulnerabilitas tidak meningkat melalui sertifikasi, kita dapat 
melihat kontribusi positif dan dampak negative sertifikasi, contohnya melalui perubahan 
organisasi yang mengarahkan pada peningkatan produktivitas perkebunan kelapa sawit.  
Bab 2 juga menunjukkan adanya ketidaksesuaian antara teori perubahan sertifikasi 
dan makna yang diberikan kepada sertifikasi oleh petani. Yang pertama melihat sertifi-
kasi sebagai alat untuk menciptakan pertanian yang lebih berkelanjutan, petani 
menafsirkannya sebagai alat ekonomi untuk mencari livelihood yang lebih baik. Ini me-
nyiratkan bahwa manfaat sertifikasi non-ekonomi (seperti perbaikan sosial dan ling-
kungan) tidak begitu dihargai oleh petani kecil, kecuali jika hal itu mengarah pada 
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manfaat ekonomi. Oleh karena itu, skema sertifikasi kurang terinstitutionalisasi, dan 
petani akan mudah beralih ke cara produksi yang lebih menguntungkan jika mereka 
mendapat kesempatan. Oleh karena itu, kami menyimpulkan bahwa analisis lebih lanjut 
mengenai profitabilitas ekonomi dari sertifikasi untuk petani kecil sangat dibutuhkan. 
Bab 3 menganalisis profitabilitas ekonomi dari sertifikasi minyak sawit swasta untuk 
petani melalui penggunaan Analisis Manfaat Biaya (Cost-Benefit Analysis / CBA) dan 
penilaian Net Present Value (NPV). Pemahaman yang lebih baik mengenai nilai investasi 
dari adopsi sertifikasi mungkin relevan dilakukan untuk mensertifikasi lebih banyak 
petani dan untuk membuat sertifikasi lebih bermanfaat bagi petani yang secara umum 
vulnerable. Bab 3 menunjukkan bahwa dalam kondisi aktual, di mana petani tidak 
membayar biaya sertifikasi, adopsi sertifikasi menguntungkan untuk semua jenis petani 
(petani kemitraan dan pekebun mandiri). Sejauh mana sertifikasi dapat dianggap 
menguntungkan tergantung pada kondisi petani kecil sebelum mereka mengadopsi 
sertifikasi. Dalam skenario yang didanai sendiri dimana petani kecil membayar semua 
biaya sertifikasi sendiri, sertifikasi tetap menguntungkan bagi semua petani kecil kecuali 
petani skema kecil yang sudah lebih baik sebelum sertifikasi. Bagi petani mandiri, sertifi-
kasi dalam skenario self-funded hanya akan menguntungkan jika mereka tetap meneri-
ma harga premium; Jika harga premium akan dihapuskan, pekebun mandiri akan me-
merlukan premium fee yang tidak realistis, yaitu dua kali lipat dibandingkan dengan 
premium fee saat ini untuk sertifikasi agar tetap menguntungkan dalam skenario yang 
didanai sendiri. Mengingat kelebihan pasokan minyak sawit lestari saat ini, kami 
menganggap tidak memungkinkan bahwa sertifikasi tetap menguntungkan bagi petani 
kecil skema dalam skenario yang didanai sendiri dan bagi petani mandiri jika mereka 
tidak menerima harga premium lagi. 
Bab 4 terinspirasi oleh penelitian sebelumnya yang umumnya menganalisis apakah 
sertifikasi mempengaruhi vulnerabilitas petani (yaitu kemampuan untuk mengatasi 
tekanan dan guncangan), sementara hal tersebut tampaknya mengabaikan resiliensi 
petani (yaitu kemampuan untuk pulih dari tekanan dan guncangan). Bab ini berkontri-
busi terhadap pengembangan pengetahuan di bidang ini dengan menerapkan dan 
memverifikasi secara empiris kerangka penilaian yang dikembangkan oleh Speranza et 
al. (2014) dan melalui analisis livelihood resilience dari lima jenis petani kelapa sawit di 
Indonesia. Bab 4 menunjukkan bahwa petani kelapa sawit relatif tahan terhadap 
penurunan harga, kabut akibat kebakaran hutan dan El Nino. Perbedaan resiliensi anta-
ra guncangan dan antara kelompok petani tidak berbeda secara nyata. Terkait dengan 
kerangka penilaian Speranza et al (2014), bab ini mengungkapkan bahwa dimensi resili-
ensi berkorelasi lemah dengan livelihood resilience agak lemah untuk terutama dimensi 
buffer capacity dan learning capacity, dan bahkan tidak ditemukan korelasi antara liveli-
hood resilience dengan self-organization. Meskipun dimensi self-organization berkontri-
busi secara positif terhadap dimensi buffer capacity dan learning capacity, namun hal 
itu tidak secara langsung memperbaiki ketahanan petani kelapa sawit. Petani yang be-
rada di bawah sistem pengelolaan satu atap memiliki lebih banyak kesempatan untuk 
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melakukan diversifikasi pendapatan mereka dan mencari pekerjaan paruh waktu di luar 
perkebunan mereka, yang dapat membantu mereka pulih dari guncangan yang 
berdampak pada sektor kelapa sawit. Bab 4 juga menunjukkan bahwa hubungan sertifi-
kasi dan kolaborasi dengan perusahaan (dibandingkan dengan tengkulak) berkorelasi 
positif dengan livelihood resilience.  
Sementara Bab 2, 3 dan 4 berfokus pada inisiatif sertifikasi swasta, Bab 5 
menganalisis potensi skema sertifikasi publik Indonesia (ISPO) untuk menginisiasi peru-
bahan produksi kelapa sawit yang berkelanjutan. Melalui pendekatan kapasitas tata 
kelola, bab ini mempertanyakan sejauh mana ISPO dapat memenuhi tujuannya sendiri 
dan sejauh mana hal tersebut dapat berkontribusi untuk mengatasi masalah terkait 
minyak kelapa sawit. ISPO menghadapi tantangan yang sangat besar, mengingat ribuan 
perusahaan dan jutaan petani kecil diharapkan untuk berpartisipasi dalam skema terse-
but. Disimpulkan bahwa, walaupun ISPO telah memulai proses perubahan, namun be-
lum mengembangkan potensi penuhnya. Alasan utama menyangkut definisi masalah 
ISPO yang agak longgar, lemahnya kewenangan organisasi pelaksana, dan fakta bahwa 
keandalan ISPO masih terlalu rendah untuk meyakinkan (sebagian) pasar global. ISPO 
dapat menghadapi kesulitan dalam memenuhi targetnya sendiri dan memecahkan ma-
salah terkait minyak kelapa sawit, seperti penggundulan hutan, kehilangan keane-
karagaman hayati, emisi gas rumah kaca, dan konflik sosial antara perkebunan besar 
dan masyarakat lokal. Tantangan tata kelola utama berkaitan dengan menggabungkan 
mekanisme pelaksanaan yang lebih otoritatif dengan keseimbangan yang meyakinkan 
antara tujuan keberlanjutan dan kepentingan ekonomi sektor ini. Dengan tantangan ini, 
kami mempertimbangkan kemungkinan ISPO, dalam jangka pendek, akan menjadi al-
ternatif yang layak untuk sertifikasi swasta.  
Bab 6 menyimpulkan bahwa sertifikasi swasta memiliki pengaruh positif, namun rel-
ative kecil terhadap livelihood petani. Kami meragukan bahwa sertifikasi keberlanjutan 
publik atau swasta, pada saat ini, akan menyebabkan perubahan menuju sustainability 
secara sistemik dan signifikan. Untuk kedua bentuk sertifikasi tersebut yang menjadi 
tantangan adalah untuk menemukan keseimbangan antara keberlanjutan lingkungan 
dan kepentingan ekonomi. Sampai batas tertentu, RSPO berhasil menemukan keseim-
bangan antara menawarkan standar lingkungan yang ketat dan memberikan keun-
tungan ekonomi bagi para petani yang berpartisipasi, namun manfaat ekonomi ini tidak 
dipastikan dalam jangka panjang. Skema swasta mungkin tidak dapat memperbaiki 
livelihood petani yang paling vulnerable dan tidak dapat mematuhi standar tersebut. 
Tanpa keterlibatan pemerintah, cukup sulit untuk menyelaraskan standar dengan 
konteks lokal, peraturan dan mekanisme penegakan yang ada. ISPO diharapkan relatif 
murah (misalnya tidak ada iuran keanggotaan) dan lebih mudah diakses untuk petani 
dibandingkan dengan sertifikasi swasta. Namun, peraturannya kurang ketat. Dikom-
binasikan dengan kurangnya kewenangan, masalah koordinasi, dan masalah mengenai 
penerimaan standar di pasar global, hal ini mengarah pada lemahnya kemampuan ISPO 
untuk membawa perubahan menuju sektor kelapa sawit yang ramah lingkungan.  
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Bab 6 diakhiri dengan eksplorasi potensial pathway untuk menuju masa depan yang 
lebih berkelanjutan bagi petani kelapa sawit Indonesia. Kami mengeksplorasi beberapa 
pathway yang berbeda dan mendiskusikan tantangan dan kelemahan yang menyer-
tainya, termasuk trend terbalik pada sertifikasi, eksistensi sertifikasi publik dan swasta 
secara paralel, pendekatan lansekap, pendekatan yurisdiksi dan pendekatan FAIR Com-
pany-Community partnership. Setelah mempertimbangkan pro dan kontra dari masing-
masing pathway, kami menyarankan untuk lebih jauh mengeksplorasi kemungkinan 
untuk mengintegrasikan pendekatan FAIR Company-Community partnership dengan 
pendekatan yurisdiksi sebagai jalan menuju masa depan yang lebih berkelanjutan bagi 
petani kelapa sawit Indonesia.
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Valorization 
Valorization is a process of creating value from knowledge, by making knowledge suita-
ble and available for social and economic use and by making knowledge suitable for 
translation into competitive products, services, processes and new commercial activities 
(Promotiereglement 2013). In the Indonesian context, valorization is comparable to one 
of the Three obligatory Principles of Higher Education known as Tri Dharma Perguruan 
Tinggi, comprising education and teaching, research, and community services. Valoriza-
tion has strong linkages with the principle of performing community services, referring 
to activities by academics in which they use scientific insights and technology to pro-
mote the welfare of people. In this part, we elaborate on the way in which our disserta-
tion research can be used in practice and for actors outside academia.  
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELEVANCE 
This dissertation offers an analysis of the impacts of sustainability certification on the 
livelihoods of palm oil smallholders in Indonesia from a smallholders’ perspective. The 
research underlying this dissertation was motivated by the existence of uncertainty on 
the impact of sustainability certification on smallholders’ livelihoods. We took the 
smallholders’ point of view as a central focus point in analyzing the impact of certifica-
tion and developing an amended sustainable livelihood framework applied to Indone-
sian palm oil smallholders. We argue that this research is not only a contribution to 
academic insights and literature, but also contributes to a better understanding of the 
livelihoods of Indonesian smallholders and the challenges they face in their daily prac-
tices. With this information, public and private policies and regulations can be better 
targeted to fit into the realities of the smallholders themselves. Our study also helps to 
raise awareness on the diversity that exists among Indonesian palm oil smallholders. 
Given their different characteristics and the different institutional contexts in which 
they operate, it is unlikely that a “one-size-fits-all” solution to improve farmers’ liveli-
hoods will work effectively.  
The first empirical study (Chapter 2) focuses on smallholders’ perspectives on their 
participation in certification, what they value and what they regard as long-term effects. 
In the second empirical study (Chapter 3), we analyze the profitability of certification for 
various types of smallholders. We used a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) and calculated Net 
Present Values (NPV) for all types of smallholders. The next empirical study, Chapter 4, 
focuses on different responses from different types of smallholders to stresses and 
shocks, and analyses how participation in certification correlates with smallholders’ 
livelihood resilience. In, Chapter 5, we analyze the governance capacity of a public certi-
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fication standard in Indonesia (ISPO). In this part we focus on challenges and opportuni-
ties in the implementation of ISPO. This research provides insights on the ability of ISPO 
to realize its objectives.  
This dissertation, therefore, provides information and leverage points to decision 
makers in the public (government, ISPO committee) and private domain (RSPO), which 
is relevant to improve standards and certification systems in such a way that they con-
tribute better to sustainable livelihoods. It also offers insights for organizations including 
governmental agencies, NGOs and smallholder unions concerned with rural develop-
ment, smallholder welfare, and poverty alleviation on factors that potentially influence 
smallholders’ livelihoods.      
TARGET GROUP 
Awareness on sustainability has become prominent in all sectors, including agriculture. 
Many efforts have been initiated to induce changes toward a more sustainable produc-
tion. Sustainability certification is one of the governance instruments intended to lead 
to a more sustainable agricultural production. The palm oil sector in Indonesia is heavily 
criticized for not being sustainable. Therefore, it is in the benefit of all stakeholders 
(Indonesian, Western, producers, retailers, millers, exporters and governmental offi-
cials) to continue the production of Indonesian palm oil in a more sustainable way. 
Recently we even seen large Indonesian companies committing themselves to a zero-
deforestation target and only buying palm oil planted in legal and non-forest areas. 
Increasingly it has been realized that to achieve a sustainable palm oil production the 
involvement of all stakeholders, including smallholders who own almost half of palm oil 
plantation land area in Indonesia, is necessary. This dissertation provides insights into 
smallholders’ priorities, interests and realities regarding palm oil. Making these realities 
explicit, as we did in this dissertation, is a first step in identifying common interests 
among stakeholders and defining a collaborative goal that may be supported by stake-
holders involved. Involvement of smallholders in governance processes is important to 
accelerate the transformation toward a more sustainable palm oil production in parallel 
with improving the ability of smallholders to deal with livelihood problems. Some at-
tempts have been taken to bring in smallholders in certification schemes through vari-
ous support programs conducted by large companies, NGOs, development organization 
(e.g. UNDP) and the Indonesian government. Smallholders were however not part of 
the negotiation processes from the start, and their interests, priorities and concerns are 
- at best - taken in consideration after the boundaries of the certification schemes were 
already set and defined.  Therefore, we may even start to doubt whether the current 
system of (unit) certification is a good pathway to achieve a sustainable future for palm 
oil smallholders.  
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Better understanding the relationship between certification and smallholders ’liveli-
hood (Chapter 2) may further assist government officials to formulate more effective 
regulations in their government-led certification system (i.e. ISPO). We also identify 
barriers hampering ISPO’s governance capacity, and provide suggestions on how to 
overcome these barriers.   Information in this thesis also supports decision making on 
the kind of support that contributes to improvements in farmers’ profit  
Knowledge regarding  smallholders’ motivation to participate, and remain involved,  
in certification (Chapter 2)  may subsequently be interesting for large scale palm oil 
companies to understand how to build partnerships with smallholders and how to cre-
ate mutual benefits. Related to that, information regarding profitability of certification 
(Chapter 3) may be useful for companies to attract smallholders to join certification. 
Information on smallholders’ perceptions is relevant as the national government re-
quires palm oil miller companies to support surrounding smallholders (see Agricultural 
Ministry Regulation No. 98/2013). Next, these companies need continuous supply of 
FFB, which makes it relevant for them to build relations with smallholders. Finally, sup-
porting smallholders to become certified is one possible strategy for companies to en-
sure quality control and better access to the market.  
This research also connects to development work done by NGOs and development 
organizations aiming to support farmers through various channels, such as capacity 
building. The insights in Chapter 2 can be used by these actors to define their approach 
and way of facilitation to smallholders  
Next, as this dissertation concentrates on smallholders, it would be inappropriate if 
the results would not be useful or salient to them. This thesis allows to share infor-
mation and experiences from smallholders with smallholders. This information covers 
experiences from certified smallholders, including their interpretations of the direct and 
indirect benefits, in the short term and long term (Chapter 2) and their experiences with 
the profitability of certification (Chapter 3) 
This study is also relevant for the scientific research community as the amended 
livelihood framework can be used for other sustainability certification schemes, for 
other commodities, and in other countries.  
The results are also interesting for consumers who are willing to contribute to sus-
tainability through buying certified products. Knowledge on how sustainability certifica-
tion contributes to better living conditions for smallholders while reducing negative 
environmental effects from palm oil production may inspire consumers’ decisions to 
buy certified oil and its derivative products.   
Last, the scientific knowledge produced in this dissertation needs to be translated 
and made accessible to actors outside the scientific community.  We consider the role 
of the Indonesian academic community crucial. Through Tri Dharma perguruan tinggi 
(i.e. the community services program), the academic community can arrange activities 
to discuss this information with farmers, farmer organizations, palm oil companies, 
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NGOs and development organizations and government officials. More information 
about these activities can be found below.  
ACTIVITIES AND PRODUCTS 
In their obligatory community service programs, Indonesian scientists are rather free in 
choosing a channel and instrument to convey information to societal actors. Consider-
ing the Indonesian culture and habits in information provision, we suggest the following 
activities: First, the organization of an interactive seminar or workshop to disseminate 
the results of this dissertation. To increase the impact of this workshop or seminar we 
suggest to invite  a broad variety of stakeholders involved in certification and palm oil 
production, such as local NGOs( e.g. Setara Jambi, Yayasan Elang, Serikat Petani Kelapa 
Sawit (SPKS)), international based NGOs (e.g. WWF), Development organizations (e.g. 
UNDP and SNV), National and Local Government- representatives, certification provid-
ers (e.g. RSPO and ISPO commission), auditor institutions (e.g. Sucofindo and Mutu 
Agung), producer associations (e.g. GAPKI and APKASINDO), representatives of palm oil 
companies (e.g. PT Hindoli, PT Indo Sawit Subur), and representatives from farmer or-
ganizations (e.g. Asosiasi Swadaya Amanah and KUD Karya Bakti). In this workshop, 
scientists may present the results regarding the impact of certification on smallholders’ 
livelihoods. Feedback from the audience should be stimulated and used to discuss and 
formulate further action plans to better achieve sustainability targets and improve 
smallholders’ livelihoods.  
Second, a separate, interactive discussion can be conducted close to the farmers 
e.g. in buildings for farmer associations. Besides farmers, it is advisable to also invite 
farmer representatives, extension officers, employees from the local government and 
local NGOs and local miller companies to disseminate research results to farmers. The 
results from the discussion can be used as a starting point for smallholder empower-
ment through certification or without certification.  
Third, the results of this dissertation, specifically Chapter 2 have already been used 
by an internationally-based NGO and have been translated to a discussion on responsi-
ble sourcing for smallholders in Jambi and South Sumatera. We suggest more NGOs to 
follow this example.  
Fourth, and to widen the scope of the valorization of this research, we suggest  re-
producing information of this dissertation in newsletters, policy briefs and an article in 
popular palm oil magazines in Indonesia e.g. InfoSAWIT, SAWIT Indonesia, and Media 
Perkebunan.  
Fifth, the results can also be disseminated by posters that can be showcased in palm 
oil related conferences. A poster based on Chapter 5 has been presented at the Fifth 
International Conference on Palm Oil and Environment (ICOPE 2016) in Bali Indonesia, 
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attended by 400 leading international environmental scientists, senior government 
officials, actors from civil society, and industry representatives.  
INNOVATION 
Although this dissertation won’t lead to technical innovations, it can be considered 
innovative in its theoretical and empirical elements. 
Theoretical 
• Development of a conceptual framework on the relationship between sustain-
ability certification and smallholders’ livelihood 
• The development and application of an evaluation tools based on the concept 
of governance capacity and decomposed into a policy driven approach and 
problem driven approach 
• Contribution to the theoretical development of the resilient livelihood concept  
• Comprehensive analysis on the profitability of certification comparing certified 
and conventional smallholders, which provided a more realistic range of costs 
and benefits for the entire lifespan of a palm oil plantation under current con-
ditions and under a self-funded scenario 
Empirical  
• Explorative study to the first certified scheme and independent smallholders in 
Indonesia  
• We investigated differences in livelihood resilience among five different types 
of palm oil smallholders in Indonesia. The distinction between five types (in-
stead of only two) is rather innovative.  
IMPLEMENTATION (SCHEDULE) 
Some dissemination activities already took place. Reproducing the research results in 
newsletters, policy briefs, and articles in palm oil magazines for the general public can 
be done in the short term. While dissemination through interactive multi-stakeholder 
workshops can be done as part of the community services program in Bogor Agricultur-
al University, the place where the author currently works. For that, an annual grant 
from the Indonesian Ministry of Research and Technology is available solving issues of 
available funds directly. 
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the transformation towards a more environmentally sustainable production of palm 
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